Does justice require the world’s rich populations to transfer significant economic resources to the global poor? Draw critically upon a theory (or theories) of distributive justice to explain and give reasons for your answer.
As a society, our response to global poverty is one of greatest moral challenges that we face. According to the United Nations, around one third of the annual production of food for human consumption in rich nations is wasted and this waste is equivalent to the entire amount of food produced in Sub-Saharan Africa[1]. Despite these facts, poverty continues to claim the lives of 28,000 children every day. They die from hunger and other preventable causes, yet they largely go unknown[2]. In responding to the normative ethical demands of global poverty the first topic that will be considered is whether the transfer of economic resources is beneficial for the recipient society. Second, the causal role of institutions in global poverty will be examined. Finally, methods of distribution of economic resources and the demands they place on the donor will be considered. It will be assumed in this essay that the eradication of poverty is intrinsically valuable to concepts of justice.
If foreign aid has a negative impact or a neutral impact on the receiving society while having a negative or neutral impact on the donor society, giving in such a way could hardly be considered to be a moral duty. In normative ethical theory it can be fairly stated that there is no requirement for the rich to give to the poor if there is no utility gained by the poor or if harm is inflicted[3]. Criticisms of foreign aid include that it has led to, or will lead to, overpopulation and ‘overgrazing’, poor economic growth in poorer nations, and economic imperialism. However these criticisms fail to (1) reduce the importance of the moral imperative of action on global poverty, (2) engage with well designed development efforts, and (3) realise the causal role that rich countries and individuals play in creating, perpetuating, and then ignoring global poverty.
One influential piece in regards to overpopulation is ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’. Hardin states that ‘a finite world can support only a finite population’[4]. He uses the analogous ‘lifeboat ethics’ which further explores his view of how a ‘finite world’ should be managed. An example of ‘lifeboat ethics’ begins as follows: 100 people are paddling in the ocean, trying to save their own lives, 30 of whom have managed to make it onto an emergency lifeboat. The lifeboat can safely carry 30 people, and could carry 40 people, although in such a case it would be more prone to issues. If everyone attempts to get on the lifeboat, everyone will drown. Hardin’s first concern is that the lifeboat example is analogous to the relationship between the world’s rich and the world’s poor as it depicts how finite resources can only stretch so far[5]. Furthermore Hardin believes that world food banks and other charity measures perpetuate and magnify future food emergencies by not allowing a reduction in population, coining this concept the ‘ratchet effect’[6]. Accepting that we live in a world which has the capability to produce a finite quantity and quality of resources, what Hardin fails to realise is that these ‘lifeboats’ that we, the rich, live on do not just hold ourselves but they are also bearing the heavy weight of consumerism, excessive food waste, and other desires that hold minimal moral value in comparison to the 25,000 children who die every day from poverty-related causes[7]. A counter-argument to Hardin’s ‘lifeboat ethics’ is Singer’s drowning child example. Imagine you are walking to work and you notice a drowning child. If you are to save the child you will be the recipient of the following costs: you will dirty your new clean jeans and you will be five minutes late to work. In such a circumstance Singer argues that it would be morally wrong to not save the child[8]. In the same way, it is morally wrong for people from rich nations to value consumerism and excessive food wastage (which takes up a great amount of space on the lifeboat) over the lives of many poor people.
Hardin’s next concern with regard to overpopulation is the rate of reproduction and the ‘ratchet effect’ as outlined above. Hardin writes: ‘the people inside the lifeboats of the wealthy nations are doubling in number every 87 years; those outside are doubling every 35 years, on average’[9]. The ‘ratchet effect’ then explores these facts further, arguing that famine relief is what is fuelling unsustainable levels of population growth within poor nations. Hardin goes so far to argue that poverty is a problem ‘created by poor countries’ and that food programs act as the ‘pawl of a ratchet’ preventing populations from decreasing. According to Hardin, this in turn increases the magnitude of ‘accidents’ and ‘emergencies’[10]. However, Hardin’s argument is only valid under certain conditions: where money is thrown at the problem and no attention is paid to development, and also when global economic institutions which favour the rich are forced upon the world’s poor to their detriment. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development aid is resources that are ‘administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective’, it must also be used with concession and not used for a range of other purposes such as military interventions[11]. Foreign aid, from a holistic perspective should not be primarily targeted at feeding people after a global food crisis, rather, aid should primarily be targeted at developing the economies and agricultural practices of poor countries so that they can better cope with these disasters in the first instance. While the focus must be on development, some emergency relief aid may be given to help a nation get back onto its feet after a large-scale disaster.
It still appears plausible that aid is going into a pool of poor people whose population is increasing at an unsustainable rate. Hardin believes that nature provides ‘two great tools’ for population control which are ‘starvation and disease’. However, research is showing that ‘birth-rates tend to fall dramatically wherever poverty is alleviated and women gain better economic opportunities, more control within their households, and better access to reproductive information and technologies’[12]. To curb population growth with ‘starvation and disease’ rather than development seems morally ludicrous. Hardin does not take this into account when presenting his ‘lifeboat ethics’ case. According to Pogge, Hardin’s analysis of overpopulation and its correlation with moral duties and the poor is inadequate as it does not consider the results of well designed development efforts and the decrease in population growth that is incurred when people, particularly women, are released from poverty.
From the analysis provided above we have good reason to believe that the transfer of economic resources, when primarily focused on development initiatives, will not perpetuate poverty but decrease it. In consideration of this, economic aid as a means of ending poverty can hardly be considered ‘futile’, but something closer to a polar opposite of the term. Now that we have an acceptable means of ending poverty we can proceed to examine some different theories of our moral obligations to the world’s poor. Although some acts of foreign aid or charity may be ‘helpful’, this has not yet mandated a response such as the one characterised in the question, that of a transfer of significant economic resources.
I will now consider the most basic moral duties that we owe to one another and what they mean in regards to practical action. The most basic, fundamental, and obligatory moral duties that we owe to each other are negative duties. Negative duties are duties that involve the duty-bearer simply refraining from a particular course of action, in turn creating negative rights[13]. Somewhat uncontroversial examples of these rights could be any of the following: the right not to be tortured, the right not to be murdered, or the right not to be unjustly discriminated against. In other words, we all have a negative duty not to torture, not to murder, and not to unjustly discriminate. Negative rights, in a strict sense, should not imply a correlative duty of economic assistance; this is typically the role of positive rights. But if we further consider the implications of negative rights, for example the right to not be tortured, and the duty to refrain from torturing, we do see that there are some costs involved. To have the right not to be tortured realised there may need to be a system of courts, laws, and prisons in case one’s right not to be tortured is violated. The right not to be tortured still remains a negative right in light of these facts and duties. It can be concluded that torture is a negative right and that there are costs involved in realising this right. Participating, collaborating, or even voting in such a way that supports the imposition of institutions or rules which are hurtful to the world’s poor is a breach of one’s negative duties towards the poor in the same way that one should refrain from torturing another person. Pogge sums up this relationship stating that ‘those who collaborate in the imposition of an institutional order under which foreseeably and avoidably, many cannot meet their basic needs are violating negative duties of the institutional kind’[14]. Pogge canvases a key concept of his argument here: if you uphold a person or institution who represents you and they are submitting to a global economic order which entrenches systematic poverty, then you have violated the negative right of not imposing life-threatening conditions on another individual or community.
The link between the global economic order, its imposition of poorer countries, and how it adversely affects poorer countries may not yet seem obvious. Generally, we view interaction between countries (for example trade) as something that the two parties would only partake in if they were both likely to gain mutual benefit. Pogge outlines two key concepts of the global economic order which entrench systematic poverty, these are the international borrowing privilege and the international resource privilege. These concepts articulate how there are circumstances where countries interact with one another that do not create mutually beneficial outcomes. In Nigeria, for example, oil exports account for approximately one quarter of the country’s revenue. If a tyrannical dictator is able to seize power they are then able to use the international resource privilege to be able to sell off the country’s assets to fuel their dictatorship. This is precisely what has happened to the Nigerian people because of the global economic order which allows for such travesties. The international borrowing privilege also allows the power-holder of a country to borrow money recklessly, giving their successors, and nation, a mountain of debt which may endure over generations. If the government of the day refuses to honour the debts of a corrupt government before them, they will be refused any monetary loans in the future. This faulty global economic order imposed on the poor has not just hurt Nigeria, but also the Congo, Kenya, Angola, Mozambique, Brazil, Venezuela, the Philippines, Burma/Myanmar, as well as other poor countries[15]. In addition to institutional reforms, development assistance is also owed to the global poor due to the historical injustice of unfavourable global economic conditions that have been imposed on them. The beneficiaries of this global economic order happen to be rich countries, and the individuals they represent. Therefore it is fair to state that rich nation-states and individuals owe a duty of supporting institutional reform and the redistribution of at least a small amount of surplus resources (above those of one’s day to day survival needs) as a minimum moral duty to counteract to harm they (or those representing them) have foreseeably and repeatedly inflicted on poorer nations.
In some situations however, justice may require more than the minimally good ‘do no harm’ approach that was elaborated upon above. Drawing back on Singer’s example of the drowning child, let me ask again, is it permissible to simply walk past a child who is drowning in a pond when the costs involved in saving the child are minimal? What if, like with poverty, there are many other people who may be equally or better placed to help, yet choose not to; should you still save the drowning child? In both circumstances, it seems clear in my mind that you should save the drowning child, even though you are not at fault for the child’s predicament. Singer expands on this principle, stating that ‘if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it’[16]. Singer uses this principle to justify saving the drowning child, even considering the costs that will be involved, as they are minimal in comparison to the ‘moral gain’. For Singer, there is little or no moral difference between watching a child drown while able to help (an act of omission), and actually drowning a child (act of commission) as they both result in the same utility loss[17]. Since proximity should not amount to a significant moral difference, Singer suggests that those who can act on the issue of global poverty without sacrificing something of comparable moral importance, ought to do it.
Singer’s moral framework is far removed from that of Pogge’s, yet still carries a strong moral imperative. Although Singer’s theory is demanding, and in reality one’s duty will continue to increase as others fail to comply, this does not render it wrong[18]. However Arneson does note that setting the moral bar too high, where every last dollar goes to buying oral rehydration salts, will lead to less compliance. In this sense, from a utilitarian perspective it may lead to less preferences being satisfied. Both Singer and Pogge do share one common value: apathy in the face of global poverty is morally impermissible. The transfer of economic resources to the resource deprived is not merely an act of niceness, but an obligation. The purpose of this essay is not to pinpoint precise institutional reforms or an exact monetary figure that is owed to the poor (although Singer does attempt this) but to conclude whether economic assistance and institutional reforms are owed to the poor and why. Due to the causal role that rich nations play in perpetuating poverty as well as the capacity of many states and individuals to help to global poor, economic assistance should be part of a wider duty owed to the poor in helping release over one billion people from severe poverty[19].
Bibliography
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (2009). "1.02 billion people hungry." Retrieved May 7, 2011, from http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/20568/icode/.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (2011). "Cutting food waste to feed the world." Retrieved May 11, 2011, from http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/74192/icode/.
Hardin, G. (1968). "The Tragedy of the Commons." Science 162(3859): 1243-1248. 3859, 162. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1724745.
Hardin, G. (1974). "Commentary: Living on a Lifeboat." BioScience 24(10): 561-568. 10, 24. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1296629.
Kuper, A. (2002). "More Than Charity: Cosmopolitan Alternatives to the “Singer Solution”." Ethics & International Affairs 16(1): 107-128. 1, 16. Retrieved http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2002.tb00378.x.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2008). "Is it ODA?" Retrieved May 10, 2011, from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/21/34086975.pdf.
Singer, P. (1972). "Famine, Affluence, and Morality." Philosophy & Public Affairs 1(3): 229-243. 3, 1. Retrieved May 6, 2011 from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265052.
United Nations Development Group (2008) "Thematic Paper on MDG 4, 5 and 6." Retrieved May 8, 2011 from http://www.undg.org/docs/11421/MDG4-6_1954-UNDG-MDG456-LR.pdf.
[1] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Cutting food waste to feed the world, Rome, 2011
[2] United Nations Development Group, Thematic Paper on MDG 4, 5 and 6, 2008, p. 12.
[3] Wenz, Political philosophies in moral conflict, Boston, 2007 p. 349.
[4] Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 1968, p. 1243.
[5] Hardin, Commentary: Living on a Lifeboat, 1974, pp. 561-563.
[6] Ibid. pp. 563-564.
[7] Pogge, Politics as usual : what lies behind the pro-poor rhetoric, Cambridge, 2010, p. 5.
[8]Adapted from Arneson, The ethics of assistance : morality and the distant needy, Cambridge, 2004, pp. 33-34 & Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1972, p. 231.
[9] Hardin, Commentary: Living on a Lifeboat, 1974, pp. 562-565.
[10] Ibid., pp. 562-565.
[11] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Is it ODA?, Paris, 2008.
[12] Pogge, World poverty and human rights : cosmopolitan responsibilities and reforms, Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA, 2002, p. 7.
[13] Donnelly, Universal human rights in theory and practice, Ithaca, 2003, pp. 30-31.
[14] Pogge, Politics as usual : what lies behind the pro-poor rhetoric, 2010, pp. 28-29.
[15] Pogge, World poverty and human rights : cosmopolitan responsibilities and reforms, 2002, pp. 112-117.
[16] Brooks, The global justice reader, Malden, MA, 2008, p. 388.
[17] Denton, Casimir and Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Enough rope with Andrew Denton 2, Sydney, 2004, p. 158.
[18] Arneson, The ethics of assistance : morality and the distant needy, 2004, pp. 33-57.
[19] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1.02 billion people hungry, Rome, 2009
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