Is Kant right to suppose that morality is a system of categorical imperatives?
In Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant develops his view on morality, basing it on a system of categorical imperatives. Kant proposes a system where some maxims can be universal and without condition[1]. According to Kant, a system of morality that is based on empiricism is tainted as it does not recognise the unconditionality of the moral law[2]. Integrity is at the core of Kant’s categorical imperative, separating it from other systems of morality like utilitarianism. Utilitarianism suggests that one should do whatever is necessary to achieve maximum happiness, even if this will result in using someone as a mere means[3]. However, in Groundwork, Kant clearly asserts that rational agents should never be used as a mere means rather they should always treated as an end[4]. Kant’s categorical imperative does not provide a solid epistemological framework for morality as one would expect from moral systems. However, an ontological interpretation of Kant’s Groundwork allows for an appreciation of the value of the text and what it can offer moral discourse.
The categorical imperative is based on three formulas. The first is a concept of universalisability. Kant’s first formulation suggests that for a maxim to become categorical (unconditional) rather than hypothetical (conditional) a rational agent must ‘act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law’[5]. The concept of universalisability is crucial to Kant’s writing, forming the strict criteria for his moral theory. For conduct to be morally ‘right’, it would have to be the ‘right’ conduct for any other person to perform if they are in similar circumstances. In the second formulation, Kant states ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’[6]. The third formulation provides the maxim of ‘an absolutely good will’, that is to ‘act in accordance with maxims that can at the same time have as their object themselves as universal laws of nature’[7].
Kant places himself in risky territory by unveiling a normative application of the categorical imperative. One of Kant’s greatest mistakes in regard to the categorical imperative is how his normative approach preferences rules over principles. Rules are typically derived from principles so it would be appropriate that when they are in conflict with one another, the principle should trump the rule[8]. For example, Kant asserts that making false promises is using another person ‘merely as a means’, therefore making false promises is unconditionally impermissible and can be included as part of the categorical imperative[9]. Imagine there is a murderer at your door, and you are hiding a person the murderer wants to kill. Then, if the murderer asks: ‘are you hiding anybody in your house?’, you would be morally obliged to tell the murderer the truth. Intuitively this feels abhorrent as Kant prioritises the rule of not making false promises above principles of justice or loyalty. In another example of the categorical imperative in practice, Kant asserts that one must always seek to develop their own predisposed talents, arguing that not doing so would be neglecting the ‘furtherance’ of humanity[10]. He argues that these capacities must be developed as they serve the rational being and are ‘given to him for all sorts of possible purposes’[11]. However, the maxim of universalisability neither rules out neglecting one’s talents or pursuing them. In this case, it seems that Kant is taking a rule that should be a hypothetical imperative and attempting to convert it into a categorical imperative[12]. Although the rule of furthering one’s predisposed talents is inconsistent with the categorical imperative, it may be interpreted as a means to further the ends of other rational agents. In a third example, Kant argues that caring for one another is a universal law and therefore is a categorical imperative[13]. Although Kant’s rationale for this categorical imperative seems flimsy, if one were to accept it to be the case, it would then be possible to argue that one cannot truly care for another unless they have developed their own natural talents. Or rather, one will at least be able to provide better care for another person in their time of need if they have developed their natural talents in the first instance. If the categorical imperatives rest on nothing else, they can at least be supported by one another.
In the previous example it has been shown how Kant’s substantive examples of the categorical imperative fail to conform with the maxims that he claims to base them upon. It has also been shown how Kant values these rules highly, even above the principles that they are derived from. However, there is still value to his deontological approach to morality. An ontological perspective, that is a question of being, is able to give Kant’s categorical imperative greater meaning[14]. Satkunanandan suggests that the only way one can overcome ‘moral impurity’ is for one to ground oneself in the style of discipline that Kant suggests[15]. Kant’s concern is that something as important as morality cannot be derived from ‘something so varied and variable as human sentiments’[16]. This claim is waged against alternative moral theories such as utilitarianism which are based on empiricism. For example, in utilitarianism something must be maximised. According to proponent of utilitarianism, Mill, It is unclear as to why happiness should be maximised apart from the presumption that each person desires their own happiness[17]. Kant argues that this is a weak basis for the formulation of the moral law. In consideration of these criticisms, deontology has something to offer as a moral framework.
The natural dialectical is one of the most intriguing aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy. Kant describes the natural dialectical as the ‘propensity to rationalise against those strict laws of duty and to cast doubt upon their validity … that is, corrupt them at their basis and to destroy all their dignity’[18]. An illustration of this concept can be found in the film The Emperor’s New Groove. In one scene from the film, Kronk faces the dilemma of whether or not he should save his enemy’s life. Kronk’s shoulder angel appears asking: ‘you’re not just going to let him die, are you?’. Kronk’s shoulder devil suddenly appears and replies ‘don’t listen to that guy: he’s trying to lead you down the path of righteousness, I’m going to lead you down the path that rocks!’[19]. In the previous example, the shoulder devil mirrors the nature of Kant’s natural dialectical by persuading the rational being away from strict adherence to the rules by an appeal to the consequences. If Kronk allows his enemy to die, it would appeal to Kronk’s own self interest. However, Kronk still feels compelled, as if he has a duty to refrain from killing his enemy. Kant suggests that a sense of ‘becoming human’ and freedom occurs when one’s morality is in accord with the law. Likewise, if one flees from their duty ‘under the sway of the natural dialectic’, they also flee from their freedom[20]. The ontological perspective of Kant’s categorical imperative suggests that this is where the beauty in his formulation lies.
The nature of freedom and how it can be found through obligations surrounding duty synthesises with Kant’s concept of strict adherence to ‘the rules’ as well as rejecting the natural dialectical. Our freedom can be found through moving from the ‘sensible world’ to the ‘intelligible world’[21]. In the sensible world our actions are in some ways groundless, that is, they are based merely on our desires and inclinations. In the intelligible world, however, laws are not empirical, rather, they are grounded on reason[22]. Kant believes this progression into the intelligible world is desirable as it allows one to be free from impulses of sensibility and these impulses now need not affect one’s actions. For Kant, this is similar to removing the ‘shoulder devil’ in the Kronk example above. Following the ‘path of righteousness’ frees one from being able to rationalise oneself out of performing the correct action.
A deontological system of morality has benefits over other systems of morality. It is very difficult to work out exactly what should be maximised in utilitarianism. Once this is established, issues still remain as anything can be justified to achieve the ends. Kant’s deontological approach, however, purports an alternate view where the value of an action is found not in its consequences, but rather, can be found through strict adherence to a system of rules. However, Kant’s categorical imperative is fundamentally flawed and self-contradictory in its logical performance. It also must be noted that the deontological nature of the categorical imperative may lead to worse consequences than utilitarianism or other systems. Due to its problematic nature, systems of morality should not be blindly based on Kant’s categorical imperative. Although Kant’s logic is flawed, there is strong value in his concept of freedom through duty. The ontological idea that one can resist the natural dialectical in order to strive for moral purity is a valuable asset to Kant’s system of morality, rendering it worthy of further investigation. There can be a great wealth of understanding gained from Kant’s concepts of freedom through duty which are crucial elements of his categorical imperative.
Bibliography
Craig, E. (1991). "Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy." Retrieved May 17, 2011, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/N039.
Disney, W. (2000). "Emperor's New Groove scene: Kronk's dilemma." Retrieved May 5, 2011, from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VnMGCUH-lLY.
Satkunanandan, S. (2011). "The Extraordinary Categorical Imperative." Political Theory 39(2): 234-260. 2, 39. Retrieved April 19, 2011 from http://ptx.sagepub.com/content/39/2/234.abstract.
[1] Kant and Gregor, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, Cambridge, 1998, p. 31.
[2] Satkunanandan, The Extraordinary Categorical Imperative, 2011, p. 245.
[3] Kant and Gregor, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, 1998, p. 38.
[4] Ibid., p. 45.
[5] Ibid., p. 31.
[6] Ibid., p. 38.
[7] Ibid., p. 44.
[8] Seung, Kant : a guide for the perplexed, London; New York, 2007, p. 102.
[9] Kant and Gregor, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, 1998, p. 38.
[10] Ibid., pp. 38-39.
[11] Ibid., p. 33.
[12] Seung, Kant : a guide for the perplexed, 2007, p. 103.
[13] Kant and Gregor, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, 1998, p. 39.
[14] Craig, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London, 1991.
[15] Satkunanandan, The Extraordinary Categorical Imperative, 2011, p. 239.
[16] Dudley and Engelhard, Immanuel Kant : key concepts, Durham, 2011, p. 105.
[17] Mill and Gorovitz, Utilitarianism, Indianapolis, 1971, p. 37.
[18] Kant and Gregor, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, 1998, pp. 17-18.
[19] Disney, Emperor's New Groove scene: Kronk's dilemma, 2000.
[20] Satkunanandan, The Extraordinary Categorical Imperative, 2011, p. 245.
[21] Ibid., pp. 245-246.
[22] Kant and Gregor, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, 1998, p. 57.
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