Many theorists of democracy think that there is an
important connection between some ideal of equality and the desirability of
democracy. Explain and discuss this connection. Do you think it is sufficient
to justify democratic institutions?
This paper shows why both democracy and
equality are desirable, and why democracy, in its true sense, is an important
step to achieve greater equality. There are many reasons why political
philosophers need to look beyond the ‘one person, one vote’ conception of
democracy to understand why such theories have allowed social and economic
inequality to prevail. While many democracies do not live up to our
expectations in regards to providing equality, there are explanations for this
and methods of overcoming such problems.
Is equality desirable?
The first thing to consider is whether
equality is desirable, and if so, what kinds of equality are desirable. For
example, should young children have equal voting rights with adult persons? The
consensus around this issue in most democracies is that there is an age where
children should not be able to vote (even if there is disagreement on exactly
what the age should be). However, it does not follow that it is permissible for
children to be discriminated against by the law because they are unable to
vote. For example, if an election is held when Bob is 17 and 11 months, and
James has just turned 18, James is by no means worth more than Bob. James may
in fact know a lot less about politics than Bob. An individual can be excluded
from the demos yet still have equal value as a person. Therefore, the crucial
issue is that there is that in similar circumstances, different people are
treated equally. To determine whether equality is, in the first instance,
desirable we must consider what is meant by the term ‘equality.’
Equality is often considered to be
important exclusively within a designated demos. This is important because it
facilitates an ongoing conversation and reflection on individual preferences.
The laws created by the demos are seen as binding upon them. This is partially
where our obligation to follow the laws of the government arises – because we
voted them in and are bound by the social contract. Of course, there will
always be questions of legitimacy and what obliges the disenfranchised minority
to follow the laws of the majority. However, when there has been some effective
compromise and deliberation which has influenced the outcome, there seems to be
a morally binding obligation to follow the law.[1]
Consider the case of the recently
proposed Malaysia solution. The proposed deal between Malaysia and Australia
would have meant that 800 asylum seekers who travel to Australia by boat would
be sent to Malaysia in order to deter others, while Australia, in exchange
would take 4000 refugees from one of Malaysia’s refugee camps. The intended
effect was to ‘stop the boats’ and save the Australian government from
political turmoil. The people who this legislation has the greatest effect on
are the asylum seekers who plan to travel to Australia by boat, and the asylum
seekers who are waiting in refugee camps in Malaysia. However, because these
groups of people are not part of the demos creating the law, and have no
influence on the legislation, are they obliged to follow it? While the
interests of those seeking asylum in Australia should be considered by the
demos in a democracy, this does not give anyone who interacts with the state
the automatic right to the ballot and citizenship. In summary, there is a type
of equality which each person has, but it does not always follow that every
person in the world is entitled to have citizenship of a nation-state in order
for the state to acknowledge the equality of persons. It may seem arbitrary to argue
that a demos is constituted by a particular geographical location, but this is
not the case. It is in fact quite pragmatic, as the geographical relationship
between each member of a nation-state helps form the nation’s life.
Myers points out that there are
‘virtually limitless ways in which human beings might be equal or unequal.’[2] From
birth, individuals develop and pursue different talents and strengths, yet their
individual uniqueness does not render them unequal. Some individual
differences, like illness or disability will, however, mean that the
individuals concerned are on unequal footing to pursue their respective
interests. If one was to divide the medication belonging to a sick person into
portions so that the healthy person receives some of the medication too, they
would not be pursuing equality. Ensuring that both the sick and healthy do not
have access to medical supplies is to not act equally. Equality demands
different responses to unequal situations.
The principle of equal consideration
The principle of equal consideration is
sometimes thought to be compatible with democracy. This principle, attributed
to Jeremy Bentham, suggests that ‘everyone must count for one and no more than
one.’[3] In a
procedural sense, this is true of most liberal democracies. Everyone has equal
rights to vote, free speech, freedom of assembly, and so on. While procedural
equality grants each person rights to be able to express their political views
in various manners, these rights are not obligations. Therefore, government
responsiveness to each citizen will not be equal, as some citizens participate
more than others. Is this an issue for democracy? It is arguable that this is
not an issue because each person still has equality of opportunity; it seems
that they can each participate if they choose to. However, there are other
factors in play. As Green notes, there is a class of people who write to their
representatives and receive an impersonal response. Their opinions have been
‘hopelessly devalued’. On the other hand, there is another class of people who
will be consulted without request.[4] This
seems to be straying away from Bentham’s suggestion that each person only count
for one, and for no more than one.
Although there is a sense of procedural
equality in many liberal democracies, correlative substantive equality among
individual citizens does not always follow. There is nothing intrinsically
wrong with citizens participating different amounts, this is surely inevitable
in any conceivable construction of society.
The point of concern is why participation levels differ. Verba and Nie
suggest that participation levels differ because ‘motivation, skills, [and]
resources are not equally distributed.’ According to their empirical study, the
authors found that upper-status citizens are six times more likely to be in the
category of ‘highest participant’ than citizens from low socioeconomic
backgrounds. The study concludes that
this leads to an ‘unequal distribution of participation.’[5]
Brighouse asks the reader: ‘Why should
it matter if Julian, who has boundless enthusiasm for participation in public
life , wields more influence than Sandy, who prefers to hone his psychic
talents?’[6] The
author suggests that this is perfectly compatible with what he coins the ‘equal
availability of political influence’. While it is tempting to agree with Brighouse
from the outset, there are reasons as to why we should be cautious. Every
inequality of political influence is not reconcilable, and every element of
substantive equality is not achievable from political equality (nor is it
necessarily desirable). However, there is a strong case to reduce political
inequalities and substantive inequalities in order to attain a society where
one really does count for one. Therefore, if Sandy chooses not to participate
in the political process our concern is not with forcing him to increase his
participation so that he may realise equality, but rather, our concern regards
to whether there are other external factors that have caused him to be less
involved and caused Julian to have a greater involvement. For example, if Sandy
had never learnt in school that he was able to run for political office, this
would concern the advocate of equality. If he had ingrained into him from a
young age, the belief that people of his race, class, area, or intelligence
were unable to cause any significant change through political institutions,
this would concern the proponent of equality. Therefore, while Sandy and Julian
both have equal opportunity to participate in the procedural system, the
political philosopher must look beyond this assertion to ask why various groups
are less inclined to practice their democratic rights.
Qualitative and normative equality
Christiano proposes a solution to the
problem of the procedural equality paradox by valuing qualitative equality over
normative equality. Qualitative equality has a greater focus on supply, while
normative equality has a greater focus on demand. If we are to only focus on
demand, then the views of the minority will be given less consideration. The
principle of equal consideration suggests that each person, Mary, John, and
Jane, should have an equal say. However, the concept of substantive equality
proposes that if Mary and John both support idea A, while Jane supports idea B,
there should not necessarily be twice as many resources put into idea A. If
Mary has put forward her view, John does not need to put forward the same
argument again, whereas, it is important that Jane puts forth her view. Christiano suggests that in discourse
we can learn a lot from hearing the views of others, and therefore, we should
focus on the fact that there is supply of both idea A and B, and not on the
fact that there is greater demand for idea A.[7] Focussing
on qualitative equality in discourse is one step to addressing the inequalities
created by the varying participation levels of groups with diverse ideas.
However, it prescribes nothing on how one ought to decide.
Philosophical problems with the current
situation
The following section will focus on how
procedural equality is adversely hampered by substantive inequality. The first
issue to be tackled is the problem of political elites. Green notes that those
making decisions for the vast majority of society don’t actually represent
their constituents. He writes that ‘transportation policies are made by people
who fly in (subsidised) private planes, are driven by chauffeurs, and generally
travel first class in every way possible.’[8] In
addition to this, it is visible in Australia that those making laws on refugee
policies have never been refugees, those making decisions on climate change are
not the poor who are most reliant on the land, and those who decide how much
money goes to public housing have never been homeless. Political elites are ‘of
a different effective social class from the bulk of their constituents.’[9]
Is this a bad thing for democracy and
equality? Surely there is some expectation that those who are elected to the
highest offices have expert skills, enabling them to make considered decisions?
It is possible to have equality without democracy, and perhaps complete
equality is more compatible with benevolent dictatorship. However, as was
pointed out previously in this paper, the people have less of an obligation to
follow laws that they did not help make. Often, dictatorships are not
benevolent, or only benevolent to few, so it appears to be rather utopian to
suggest that a functioning liberal democracy will not be the best form of
government to implement equality. Therefore, proper representation through
electing leaders who do not just represent the peoples’ views but also
represent the peoples’ material status is important. To grasp a solution to
this problem, the political philosopher must ask why the public elect people
who are of a different social class to their constituents.
As noted earlier by Verba and Nie,
there is not an equal distribution of participation among voters, and this can
be broken up into social class. The rich are typically able to exercise greater
influence over politics and how society is constructed as compared to the poor.
Brighouse gives some clear reasons for why this is the case: ‘they (the rich)
usually have more access to mass media, a more suitable educational background
and more leisure time to develop considered views about political issues.’[10]
Therefore, the rich typically have a greater ability to persuade others to
their views. Christiano suggests that deliberation among equals is one of the
most effective ways to gain democratic equality.[11]
However, with the rich having better access to education, media, and other
resources, it does not seem that deliberation among equals is currently occurring.
Examples of procedural and substantive
issues
Over the past few months the world has
seen unusually large numbers of people rising up, arguing that there is too
much socioeconomic inequality, and furthermore, that money is infiltrating
democracy leaving the big decisions in the hands of wealthy corporations. There
is not merely a problem in theory with wealth and democracy, but as we shall
see, it is a very serious problem in practice for democratic nation-states, now
more than ever. The proposed mining super-profits tax is an example of where an
advertising campaign by wealthy corporations was able to sway public opinion,
arguably in a manner which was unhealthy for democracy.[12] In
regard to the tax, The Australian provocatively asked the reader ‘How
much does it cost to bring down a prime minister? The answer a tad over $22
million.’[13]
It seems that the effect of the advertising was what Brighouse described as
‘subliminal manipulation that bypassed the rational capacities of the voter.’[14] He
distinguishes this from coming to a decision ‘through a process of
ratiocination in conditions of free and equal debate.’[15] While
there were multiple factors at play in the ousting of Rudd and the dilution of
the super-profits tax, it seems that in this instance, as predicted, the rich
won.
Currently, the issue of how to best to
tackle problem gambling is receiving attention in the Australian media after Independent
Member Andrew Wilkie and Independent Senator Nick Xenophon proposed tougher
regulation and limits on how much people can bet. Tim Costello, chairman of the
Australian Churches Gambling Taskforce, argues that the $11.8 billion industry
is in dire need of reform.[16] With
four in every ten dollars coming from problem gamblers, it is understandable as
to why change is unattractive to the industry. And while the industry have
every right, as equals, to voice their concern, their voice should not be a
roar which masks the possibility for progress. Unfortunately, this has been the
case. Costello writes that Clubs NSW used ‘political donations to buy
government access’ and that Clubs Australia has ‘mounted a sustained campaign
of personal attacks’ against the politicians who suggested reform to current
pokies legislation.[17] Similar
to the campaign by the mining industry against Rudd’s proposed super-profits
tax, Clubs Australia will do what they need to do to ensure that their
shareholders are satisfied. As often happens when money enters into politics,
this leads to an ‘ends justify the means’ scenario. Few of the most virtuous
men or women can survive sustained, belligerent, personal attacks of an
expensive marketing campaign. This is particularly harmful to democracy.
In summary, democracy is a good way of
ensuring a basic standard of equality. However, as shown throughout this paper,
there are different levels of democracy. The case studies above have shown that
for true democracy to exist, and for correlative equality to come about, the
government must ensure that the rich are not drowning out the poor and the
working-class. An effective way of bringing this about is by ensuring that
equality is a major focus of democratic institutions. This essay supports
Myer’s proposition, that ‘government intervention in the economic realm is
necessary for the promotion of equal freedom.’[18] True
procedural equality cannot be achieved until the substantive problems adversely
affecting it are fixed. Once these problems are fixed through better regulation
and a higher priority on the supply of ideas rather than just demand, only then
will we see the flow on effects from procedural equality.
Bibliography
Brighouse, H. (1996).
"Egalitarianism and Equal Availability of Political Influence." Journal of Political Philosophy 4(2): 118-141. 2, 4. Retrieved http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.1996.tb00045.x.
Costello, T. (2011).
"Clubs use tricky numbers to outfox pokies reform." Retrieved November 3, 2011, from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/clubs-use-tricky-numbers-to-outfox-pokies-reform/story-e6frgd0x-1226183977007.
Davis, M. (2011).
"A snip at $22m to get rid of PM."
Retrieved November 3, 2011, from http://www.smh.com.au/business/a-snip-at-22m-to-get-rid-of-pm-20110201-1acgj.html.
Internet Encyclopedia
of Philosophy. (2011). "Jeremy Bentham." Retrieved November 3, 2011, from http://www.iep.utm.edu/bentham/.
Megalogenis, G.
(2010). "Trivial Pursuit: Leadership and the End of the Reform Era." Quarterly Essay(40): 1-83. 40. Retrieved
November 1, 2011 from http://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=586827778419771;res=IELHSS.
[5] Verba
and Nie, Participation in America:
political democracy and social equality, New York, 1972, pp. 336-337.
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