Are there intrinsic values in nature? If so,
what are they?
Nature must be treated as
though it has intrinsic value even if this metaphysical property cannot be
proven to exist. This essay shows that while objective intrinsic value is
likely to exist, it is important that nature is treated as though it has
intrinsic value. Deep Ecology is a key concern of this essay. Deep Ecology
suggests that there is intrinsic value in all of nature and that there are
strong ontological reasons for accepting this. Three philosophical problems
with the concept of intrinsic value will considered in this essay: origins,
limits, and priorities. This paper shows how many of the reasons why intrinsic
value is not accepted are either misguided or are inapplicable to Deep Ecology.
There are several different
ways that one can value nature. Nature can, and often is, valued for the
economic gain it brings about. It can also be valued purely as a resource for
human or animal existence. One of the problems with valuing nature in this way
is that it is difficult to stipulate why economic gain or resource value should
be viewed as a greater end than nature in itself. While human existence may
be seen as a greater end, one should not automatically assume that it is then
the only end worth pursuing.
Objective metaphysical
properties are also problematic in philosophy. However, the dilemma of being unable
to prove intrinsic value does not instantly mean that intrinsic value does not
exist. It is clear that if nature is treated purely as a means and never as an
end, it will be subject to a lesser degree of concern. Environmental thinkers
such as Arne Naess have explored this idea which will need to be considered if
we are to reflect critically on how we view the environment.
Empirical studies have
shown that many people value nature intrinsically, however, it is often hard to
explain why this is the case. This means that nature is valuable regardless of
its ‘usefulness’ (Butler and Acott 2007, p. 166). Translating this empirical ‘feeling’ into philosophical reasoning is
very difficult, as proving objective metaphysical properties is problematic in
philosophy. Who has authority to proclaim that property A is an objective value
if another person disagrees? This thinking can lead to the idea that there are
no objective metaphysical properties – but this is a mistaken observation. If a
property cannot be determined then it does not follow that the property in
question does not exist.
If humans can treat nature as though it has intrinsic value then it is worth assessing whether nature actually possesses this property. In addition to this it is clear that if nature is treated purely as a means and never as an end (valued intrinsically), it will be subject to a lesser degree of concern. Therefore, it is important to assess whether nature has intrinsic value. Three problems associated with valuing nature intrinsically will be the primary concern of this paper: origins, limits, and priorities.
- Origins
Objective metaphysical
properties, just like a deity, cannot be proven in a syllogistic manner. One
may simply assume that because these properties cannot have a proven existence
it then follows that they do not exist. However, both non-existence and
existence are problematic. In the same way, objective intrinsic and
non-intrinsic value cannot be proven syllogistically. However, it is possible
to show through concepts such as Naess’ ‘Deep Ecology’, that intrinsic value provides
a more coherent perception of the world.
The problem of origin is
visible in both objective and subjective metaphysics. The former is arguably more
important and problematic while the latter is less important and less
problematic. Subjective intrinsic value is philosophically sound but less
valuable. If I believe that I have a
million dollars in my bank account, yet I actually do not have this money, it
will not matter whether I actually have the money (providing that I never go to
use it). Whether I have the money or whether I don’t have the money, this does
not matter. If I believe I have the money and act as if I have the money, until
I discover that I in fact do not have the money, it would not matter.
In the same way, if I am to
believe that the environment has intrinsic value when in hypothetically it does
not, it would not matter so much that I was acting on false beliefs. I would go
about treating the environment as though it has intrinsic value, and therefore
I would probably treat it with higher regard. However, objectivity is important
if others around me do not ascribe intrinsic value to the environment. While I
may believe that I have one hundred dollars in my pocket, my neighbor may have
no good reason to believe this to be the case until he sees the money. How will
I convince him that the money exists? Reasons such as ‘because I believe it has
intrinsic value’ is a subjective one, and my neighbor has no reason to adhere
to it. Alternatively one could argue that the environment will be treated
better if we ascribe intrinsic value to it. While this is probably true, this
does not prove the existence of the objective intrinsic value of nature.
According to this argument, it is something that we would merely want to be
true because of its good consequences.
Naess does not attempt to
prove ‘Deep Ecology’ but instead he reveals a different system of thought. His
thoughts on the intrinsic value of nature give an alternative passage of
thinking which avoids the brick wall of the burden of proof. In particular, his
concept of Self-realisation and the transformation from the self to the Self (capital ‘S’) is of
utmost importance. Naess suggests that self-interest undermines our ontological
value. He believes that we find true value not in the self (individuality), but
in the Self (universality) (Næss and
Rothenberg 1989, pp. 84-86).
Core to self-realisation
for Naess and other Deep Ecologists is the concept that all life is
fundamentally one. This is in concordance with Naess’ influences of Gandhian
and Buddhist philosophies. Martin Luther King Jr. also took a similar view of
the Self (arguably more anthropocentric, but still heavily influenced by the
philosophy of Gandhi) stating that ‘injustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere’ (McGraw 2003,
p. 113). King
believes that an injustice that is happening to someone other than myself will
actually harm me as well. In the same way, Naess believes that we a part of a
larger Self where all injustices against nature strip humans of meaning as
well. Self-realisation is an ontological and ecological philosophy that Naess
would describe as an ‘ecosophy’. The concept of an ecosophy is unlike other
philosophical ideas in that it is neither strict nor vague. It is not strict in
the sense that it will vary from person to person, according to their place in
the world, and it is not vague in the sense that it is precise for each
individual. An ecosophy should be seen as a wider collection of ideas and
thinking rather than a narrow concept. This ontological argument provides strong
evidence as to how the question of the origin of intrinsic values in nature can
be answered by Deep Ecology.
- Limits
If intrinsic value is to be
placed in all of nature, as Naess suggests, there must be some degree of
limitation. Jonge, in his writings on Spinoza
and Deep Ecology, questions how we must treat a mosquito that is carrying
malaria if we are to remain consistent with Deep Ecology thinking. The
anopheles genus is responsible for the deaths of 1.4 to 2.6 million African
children. If we are to value all of nature as holding equal intrinsic value
then it would not be ethical to perform experiments on the mosquito (De Jonge 2004, p. 20.). This poses a significant problem for environmental ethicists who claim
that all life forms have intrinsic value. One solution to this is to ascribe
different levels of intrinsic value according to particular characteristics of groups
of life forms. This provokes two further problems: the problem of the
justification of collective characteristics trumping individual
characteristics, and the inevitable problem of anthropocentricism. The former
will be addressed now, and the latter will be addressed in the next section.
It is illogical to state
that each individual member of a species has a different level of intrinsic
value. This is not possible because it goes against the very meaning of
intrinsic value. For example, imagine two humans. The first is fit and healthy,
and she has a very high productive capacity. The second suffers from a chronic
illness and has a lower productive capacity. To assess these two people
instrumentally it would be clear that the first person has higher value. The
same cannot be said to be true in regard to intrinsic value. The intrinsic
value of both people remain the same regardless of their instrumental worth.
This is why it is logical to apply intrinsic value to collectives rather than
individuals, otherwise intrinsic value will become synonymous with instrumental
value and the distinctions will be worthless. As Jong (2004, p. 20.) suggests, ‘it is possible that all beings have intrinsic value, viz., a
life of their own, and still regard human beings as more valuable and therefore
superior to the non-human world.’
- Priorities
If there is to be some kind
of hierarchical application of intrinsic value as suggested by the discussion
on the limits of intrinsic value above, then there must be justified
prioritization of value between species. Ascribing less intrinsic value to the
anopheles genus and more intrinsic value to higher non-human animals and human
beings can be reconciled with Deep Ecology. Such prioritization of value will
inevitably cause some degree of anthropocentricism. Anthropocentricism is often
perceived to be a dirty word in environmental and animal rights discourse. However,
this should not be the case for when it is applied to Deep Ecology theories. An
anthropocentric hierarchical approach to environmental ethics, where all
species have varying degrees of intrinsic value, is the most effective and rational
way to protect both the human and non-human beings. This will be referred to as
the species based approach.
A common objection to the
species based approach is that moral obligations could be fulfilled by ensuring
that a diverse range of species are raised in zoos (Pojman and Pojman 2011, p. 191.). Russow uses this example to show that ascribing intrinsic value to
species leads to intuitively bad outcomes. However, this is cannot apply to Deep
Ecology understandings of value. A Deep Ecologist does not value a synthetic
nature. A constructed landscape can never have the same worth as a natural
landscape to the Deep Ecologist. Zoos are not natural and do not preserve the
integrity and flourishing on the species in question.
A further four of Russow’s
case studies suggest that if one were to accept a species based account, it
would then follow that there are moral obligations to preserve species whom are
dying out, evolving, and those who have been domesticated (Pojman and Pojman 2011, p. 192.). It seems that an acceptable solution to Russow’s concern, at least to
those species who are dying out or evolving, would be to weigh up human
interference with the specie in question against a natural equilibrium. In
practice, this would involve assessing the extent of interference the specie
has been victim to by humans or other species introduced by humans to the
specie’s natural habitat. If interference has taken place then it follows that
there is a restorative duty. However, if interference has not taken place, and
it appears that nature is simply ‘taking its course’, then it follows that no
moral obligations are due. There is and ought be moral obligations derived from
valuing nature intrinsically, however, Russow is mistaken in her criticism of
the excessive burden and unintuitive obligations that she believes must follow
on from valuing nature intrinsically.
A hierarchy of intrinsic
value will inevitably be anthropocentric. As mentioned above, one should not
make the assumption that because humans have higher intrinsic value than the
anopheles genus this means the non-human world can continue to be exploited.
For Deep Ecology, this is far from true. Understanding and responding to the
intrinsic value of nature leads to the best treatment of not only humans, not
only animals, but the entirety of nature.
Consider the contrast
between valuing nature intrinsically and instrumentally. If one is to value
nature instrumentally as opposed to intrinsically it follows that it is morally
acceptable to use nature as a mere means rather than as an end in and of
itself. Naess (1989, p. 11.) draws an analogy between how we ought to treat our friends and how we
ought to treat nature. He suggests that ‘like friends – we should never use
them only as a means to something else. To do so is superficial, seeing only
surface interactions.’ He suggests that ‘we tend to lose friends’ if we treat
them only as means and never as ends. Naess (1989, pp.
11-12.) concludes that ‘the same could happen with nature’.
It is clear that the best
way to treat nature, both for the sake of nature and for our own sakes, is to
treat it as though it has intrinsic worth. This essay has shown that there is a
stalemate between whether it is possible for intrinsic value to be subjective
or objective. However, it has also shown that what is crucial is not whether I
am applying intrinsic value to nature subjectively or whether this objective
metaphysical property exists, but rather that nature must be treated as though
it has intrinsic value. Applying intrinsic value to nature allows us to explore
the meaning of our own lives in the context of a wider Self.
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