Democracy & Equality

Many theorists of democracy think that there is an important connection between some ideal of equality and the desirability of democracy. Explain and discuss this connection. Do you think it is sufficient to justify democratic institutions?

This paper shows why both democracy and equality are desirable, and why democracy, in its true sense, is an important step to achieve greater equality. There are many reasons why political philosophers need to look beyond the ‘one person, one vote’ conception of democracy to understand why such theories have allowed social and economic inequality to prevail. While many democracies do not live up to our expectations in regards to providing equality, there are explanations for this and methods of overcoming such problems.

Is equality desirable?

The first thing to consider is whether equality is desirable, and if so, what kinds of equality are desirable. For example, should young children have equal voting rights with adult persons? The consensus around this issue in most democracies is that there is an age where children should not be able to vote (even if there is disagreement on exactly what the age should be). However, it does not follow that it is permissible for children to be discriminated against by the law because they are unable to vote. For example, if an election is held when Bob is 17 and 11 months, and James has just turned 18, James is by no means worth more than Bob. James may in fact know a lot less about politics than Bob. An individual can be excluded from the demos yet still have equal value as a person. Therefore, the crucial issue is that there is that in similar circumstances, different people are treated equally. To determine whether equality is, in the first instance, desirable we must consider what is meant by the term ‘equality.’

Equality is often considered to be important exclusively within a designated demos. This is important because it facilitates an ongoing conversation and reflection on individual preferences. The laws created by the demos are seen as binding upon them. This is partially where our obligation to follow the laws of the government arises – because we voted them in and are bound by the social contract. Of course, there will always be questions of legitimacy and what obliges the disenfranchised minority to follow the laws of the majority. However, when there has been some effective compromise and deliberation which has influenced the outcome, there seems to be a morally binding obligation to follow the law.[1]

Consider the case of the recently proposed Malaysia solution. The proposed deal between Malaysia and Australia would have meant that 800 asylum seekers who travel to Australia by boat would be sent to Malaysia in order to deter others, while Australia, in exchange would take 4000 refugees from one of Malaysia’s refugee camps. The intended effect was to ‘stop the boats’ and save the Australian government from political turmoil. The people who this legislation has the greatest effect on are the asylum seekers who plan to travel to Australia by boat, and the asylum seekers who are waiting in refugee camps in Malaysia. However, because these groups of people are not part of the demos creating the law, and have no influence on the legislation, are they obliged to follow it? While the interests of those seeking asylum in Australia should be considered by the demos in a democracy, this does not give anyone who interacts with the state the automatic right to the ballot and citizenship. In summary, there is a type of equality which each person has, but it does not always follow that every person in the world is entitled to have citizenship of a nation-state in order for the state to acknowledge the equality of persons. It may seem arbitrary to argue that a demos is constituted by a particular geographical location, but this is not the case. It is in fact quite pragmatic, as the geographical relationship between each member of a nation-state helps form the nation’s life.

Myers points out that there are ‘virtually limitless ways in which human beings might be equal or unequal.’[2] From birth, individuals develop and pursue different talents and strengths, yet their individual uniqueness does not render them unequal. Some individual differences, like illness or disability will, however, mean that the individuals concerned are on unequal footing to pursue their respective interests. If one was to divide the medication belonging to a sick person into portions so that the healthy person receives some of the medication too, they would not be pursuing equality. Ensuring that both the sick and healthy do not have access to medical supplies is to not act equally. Equality demands different responses to unequal situations.

The principle of equal consideration

The principle of equal consideration is sometimes thought to be compatible with democracy. This principle, attributed to Jeremy Bentham, suggests that ‘everyone must count for one and no more than one.’[3] In a procedural sense, this is true of most liberal democracies. Everyone has equal rights to vote, free speech, freedom of assembly, and so on. While procedural equality grants each person rights to be able to express their political views in various manners, these rights are not obligations. Therefore, government responsiveness to each citizen will not be equal, as some citizens participate more than others. Is this an issue for democracy? It is arguable that this is not an issue because each person still has equality of opportunity; it seems that they can each participate if they choose to. However, there are other factors in play. As Green notes, there is a class of people who write to their representatives and receive an impersonal response. Their opinions have been ‘hopelessly devalued’. On the other hand, there is another class of people who will be consulted without request.[4] This seems to be straying away from Bentham’s suggestion that each person only count for one, and for no more than one.

Although there is a sense of procedural equality in many liberal democracies, correlative substantive equality among individual citizens does not always follow. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with citizens participating different amounts, this is surely inevitable in any conceivable construction of society.  The point of concern is why participation levels differ. Verba and Nie suggest that participation levels differ because ‘motivation, skills, [and] resources are not equally distributed.’ According to their empirical study, the authors found that upper-status citizens are six times more likely to be in the category of ‘highest participant’ than citizens from low socioeconomic backgrounds.  The study concludes that this leads to an ‘unequal distribution of participation.’[5]

Brighouse asks the reader: ‘Why should it matter if Julian, who has boundless enthusiasm for participation in public life , wields more influence than Sandy, who prefers to hone his psychic talents?’[6] The author suggests that this is perfectly compatible with what he coins the ‘equal availability of political influence’. While it is tempting to agree with Brighouse from the outset, there are reasons as to why we should be cautious. Every inequality of political influence is not reconcilable, and every element of substantive equality is not achievable from political equality (nor is it necessarily desirable). However, there is a strong case to reduce political inequalities and substantive inequalities in order to attain a society where one really does count for one. Therefore, if Sandy chooses not to participate in the political process our concern is not with forcing him to increase his participation so that he may realise equality, but rather, our concern regards to whether there are other external factors that have caused him to be less involved and caused Julian to have a greater involvement. For example, if Sandy had never learnt in school that he was able to run for political office, this would concern the advocate of equality. If he had ingrained into him from a young age, the belief that people of his race, class, area, or intelligence were unable to cause any significant change through political institutions, this would concern the proponent of equality. Therefore, while Sandy and Julian both have equal opportunity to participate in the procedural system, the political philosopher must look beyond this assertion to ask why various groups are less inclined to practice their democratic rights.

Qualitative and normative equality

Christiano proposes a solution to the problem of the procedural equality paradox by valuing qualitative equality over normative equality. Qualitative equality has a greater focus on supply, while normative equality has a greater focus on demand. If we are to only focus on demand, then the views of the minority will be given less consideration. The principle of equal consideration suggests that each person, Mary, John, and Jane, should have an equal say. However, the concept of substantive equality proposes that if Mary and John both support idea A, while Jane supports idea B, there should not necessarily be twice as many resources put into idea A. If Mary has put forward her view, John does not need to put forward the same argument again, whereas, it is important that Jane puts forth her  view. Christiano suggests that in discourse we can learn a lot from hearing the views of others, and therefore, we should focus on the fact that there is supply of both idea A and B, and not on the fact that there is greater demand for idea A.[7] Focussing on qualitative equality in discourse is one step to addressing the inequalities created by the varying participation levels of groups with diverse ideas. However, it prescribes nothing on how one ought to decide.

Philosophical problems with the current situation

The following section will focus on how procedural equality is adversely hampered by substantive inequality. The first issue to be tackled is the problem of political elites. Green notes that those making decisions for the vast majority of society don’t actually represent their constituents. He writes that ‘transportation policies are made by people who fly in (subsidised) private planes, are driven by chauffeurs, and generally travel first class in every way possible.’[8] In addition to this, it is visible in Australia that those making laws on refugee policies have never been refugees, those making decisions on climate change are not the poor who are most reliant on the land, and those who decide how much money goes to public housing have never been homeless. Political elites are ‘of a different effective social class from the bulk of their constituents.’[9]

Is this a bad thing for democracy and equality? Surely there is some expectation that those who are elected to the highest offices have expert skills, enabling them to make considered decisions? It is possible to have equality without democracy, and perhaps complete equality is more compatible with benevolent dictatorship. However, as was pointed out previously in this paper, the people have less of an obligation to follow laws that they did not help make. Often, dictatorships are not benevolent, or only benevolent to few, so it appears to be rather utopian to suggest that a functioning liberal democracy will not be the best form of government to implement equality. Therefore, proper representation through electing leaders who do not just represent the peoples’ views but also represent the peoples’ material status is important. To grasp a solution to this problem, the political philosopher must ask why the public elect people who are of a different social class to their constituents.

As noted earlier by Verba and Nie, there is not an equal distribution of participation among voters, and this can be broken up into social class. The rich are typically able to exercise greater influence over politics and how society is constructed as compared to the poor. Brighouse gives some clear reasons for why this is the case: ‘they (the rich) usually have more access to mass media, a more suitable educational background and more leisure time to develop considered views about political issues.’[10] Therefore, the rich typically have a greater ability to persuade others to their views. Christiano suggests that deliberation among equals is one of the most effective ways to gain democratic equality.[11] However, with the rich having better access to education, media, and other resources, it does not seem that deliberation among equals is currently occurring.

Examples of procedural and substantive issues

Over the past few months the world has seen unusually large numbers of people rising up, arguing that there is too much socioeconomic inequality, and furthermore, that money is infiltrating democracy leaving the big decisions in the hands of wealthy corporations. There is not merely a problem in theory with wealth and democracy, but as we shall see, it is a very serious problem in practice for democratic nation-states, now more than ever. The proposed mining super-profits tax is an example of where an advertising campaign by wealthy corporations was able to sway public opinion, arguably in a manner which was unhealthy for democracy.[12] In regard to the tax, The Australian provocatively asked the reader ‘How much does it cost to bring down a prime minister? The answer a tad over $22 million.’[13] It seems that the effect of the advertising was what Brighouse described as ‘subliminal manipulation that bypassed the rational capacities of the voter.’[14] He distinguishes this from coming to a decision ‘through a process of ratiocination in conditions of free and equal debate.’[15] While there were multiple factors at play in the ousting of Rudd and the dilution of the super-profits tax, it seems that in this instance, as predicted, the rich won.

Currently, the issue of how to best to tackle problem gambling is receiving attention in the Australian media after Independent Member Andrew Wilkie and Independent Senator Nick Xenophon proposed tougher regulation and limits on how much people can bet. Tim Costello, chairman of the Australian Churches Gambling Taskforce, argues that the $11.8 billion industry is in dire need of reform.[16] With four in every ten dollars coming from problem gamblers, it is understandable as to why change is unattractive to the industry. And while the industry have every right, as equals, to voice their concern, their voice should not be a roar which masks the possibility for progress. Unfortunately, this has been the case. Costello writes that Clubs NSW used ‘political donations to buy government access’ and that Clubs Australia has ‘mounted a sustained campaign of personal attacks’ against the politicians who suggested reform to current pokies legislation.[17] Similar to the campaign by the mining industry against Rudd’s proposed super-profits tax, Clubs Australia will do what they need to do to ensure that their shareholders are satisfied. As often happens when money enters into politics, this leads to an ‘ends justify the means’ scenario. Few of the most virtuous men or women can survive sustained, belligerent, personal attacks of an expensive marketing campaign. This is particularly harmful to democracy.

In summary, democracy is a good way of ensuring a basic standard of equality. However, as shown throughout this paper, there are different levels of democracy. The case studies above have shown that for true democracy to exist, and for correlative equality to come about, the government must ensure that the rich are not drowning out the poor and the working-class. An effective way of bringing this about is by ensuring that equality is a major focus of democratic institutions. This essay supports Myer’s proposition, that ‘government intervention in the economic realm is necessary for the promotion of equal freedom.’[18] True procedural equality cannot be achieved until the substantive problems adversely affecting it are fixed. Once these problems are fixed through better regulation and a higher priority on the supply of ideas rather than just demand, only then will we see the flow on effects from procedural equality.

Bibliography

Brighouse, H. (1996). "Egalitarianism and Equal Availability of Political Influence." Journal of Political Philosophy 4(2): 118-141. 2, 4. Retrieved http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.1996.tb00045.x.

Christiano, T. (1996). Deliberative Equality and Democratic Order. Political order. I. Shapiro and R. Hardin. New York, New York University Press: 251-287.

Costello, T. (2011). "Clubs use tricky numbers to outfox pokies reform."   Retrieved November 3, 2011, from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/clubs-use-tricky-numbers-to-outfox-pokies-reform/story-e6frgd0x-1226183977007.

Davis, M. (2011). "A snip at $22m to get rid of PM."   Retrieved November 3, 2011, from http://www.smh.com.au/business/a-snip-at-22m-to-get-rid-of-pm-20110201-1acgj.html.

Green, P. (1985). Retrieving democracy : in search of civic equality. Totowa, N.J., Rowman & Allanheld.

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (2011). "Jeremy Bentham."   Retrieved November 3, 2011, from http://www.iep.utm.edu/bentham/.

Megalogenis, G. (2010). "Trivial Pursuit: Leadership and the End of the Reform Era." Quarterly Essay(40): 1-83. 40. Retrieved November 1, 2011 from http://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=586827778419771;res=IELHSS.

Myers, J. C. (2010). The politics of equality : an introduction. London; New York; New York, Zed Books ; Distributed in the USA exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan.

Singer, P. (1973). Democracy and disobedience. Oxford, Clarendon Press.

Verba, S. and N. H. Nie (1972). Participation in America: political democracy and social equality. New York, Harper & Row.

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[1] Singer, Democracy and disobedience, Oxford, 1973, p. 43.

[2] Myers, The politics of equality : an introduction, London; New York; New York, 2010, p. 34.

[3] Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Jeremy Bentham, 2011.

[4] Green, Retrieving democracy : in search of civic equality, Totowa, N.J., 1985, p. 172.

[5] Verba and Nie, Participation in America: political democracy and social equality, New York, 1972, pp. 336-337.

[6] Brighouse, Egalitarianism and Equal Availability of Political Influence, 1996, p. 126.

[7] Christiano, Deliberative Equality and Democratic Order, New York, 1996, pp. 258-259.

[8] Green, Retrieving democracy : in search of civic equality, 1985, p. 177.

[9] Ibid., p. 178.

[10] Brighouse, Egalitarianism and Equal Availability of Political Influence, 1996, p. 120.

[11] Christiano, Deliberative Equality and Democratic Order, 1996, p. 252.

[12] Megalogenis, Trivial Pursuit: Leadership and the End of the Reform Era, 2010, p. 4.

[13] Davis, A snip at $22m to get rid of PM, 2011.

[14] Brighouse, Egalitarianism and Equal Availability of Political Influence, 1996, p. 126.

[15] Ibid., p. 126.

[16] Costello, Clubs use tricky numbers to outfox pokies reform, Sydney, 2011.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Myers, The politics of equality : an introduction, 2010, p. 83.

Metaphysics: The Case For Intrinsic Value

Are there intrinsic values in nature? If so, what are they?

Nature must be treated as though it has intrinsic value even if this metaphysical property cannot be proven to exist. This essay shows that while objective intrinsic value is likely to exist, it is important that nature is treated as though it has intrinsic value. Deep Ecology is a key concern of this essay. Deep Ecology suggests that there is intrinsic value in all of nature and that there are strong ontological reasons for accepting this. Three philosophical problems with the concept of intrinsic value will considered in this essay: origins, limits, and priorities. This paper shows how many of the reasons why intrinsic value is not accepted are either misguided or are inapplicable to Deep Ecology.

There are several different ways that one can value nature. Nature can, and often is, valued for the economic gain it brings about. It can also be valued purely as a resource for human or animal existence. One of the problems with valuing nature in this way is that it is difficult to stipulate why economic gain or resource value should be viewed as a greater end than nature in itself. While human existence may be seen as a greater end, one should not automatically assume that it is then the only end worth pursuing.

Objective metaphysical properties are also problematic in philosophy. However, the dilemma of being unable to prove intrinsic value does not instantly mean that intrinsic value does not exist. It is clear that if nature is treated purely as a means and never as an end, it will be subject to a lesser degree of concern. Environmental thinkers such as Arne Naess have explored this idea which will need to be considered if we are to reflect critically on how we view the environment.

Empirical studies have shown that many people value nature intrinsically, however, it is often hard to explain why this is the case. This means that nature is valuable regardless of its ‘usefulness’ (Butler and Acott 2007, p. 166). Translating this empirical ‘feeling’ into philosophical reasoning is very difficult, as proving objective metaphysical properties is problematic in philosophy. Who has authority to proclaim that property A is an objective value if another person disagrees? This thinking can lead to the idea that there are no objective metaphysical properties – but this is a mistaken observation. If a property cannot be determined then it does not follow that the property in question does not exist.

If humans can treat nature as though it has intrinsic value then it is worth assessing whether nature actually possesses this property. In addition to this it is clear that if nature is treated purely as a means and never as an end (valued intrinsically), it will be subject to a lesser degree of concern. Therefore, it is important to assess whether nature has intrinsic value. Three problems associated with valuing nature intrinsically will be the primary concern of this paper: origins, limits, and priorities.

1. Origins

Objective metaphysical properties, just like a deity, cannot be proven in a syllogistic manner. One may simply assume that because these properties cannot have a proven existence it then follows that they do not exist. However, both non-existence and existence are problematic. In the same way, objective intrinsic and non-intrinsic value cannot be proven syllogistically. However, it is possible to show through concepts such as Naess’ ‘Deep Ecology’, that intrinsic value provides a more coherent perception of the world.

The problem of origin is visible in both objective and subjective metaphysics. The former is arguably more important and problematic while the latter is less important and less problematic. Subjective intrinsic value is philosophically sound but less valuable. If I believe that I have a million dollars in my bank account, yet I actually do not have this money, it will not matter whether I actually have the money (providing that I never go to use it). Whether I have the money or whether I don’t have the money, this does not matter. If I believe I have the money and act as if I have the money, until I discover that I in fact do not have the money, it would not matter.

In the same way, if I am to believe that the environment has intrinsic value when in hypothetically it does not, it would not matter so much that I was acting on false beliefs. I would go about treating the environment as though it has intrinsic value, and therefore I would probably treat it with higher regard. However, objectivity is important if others around me do not ascribe intrinsic value to the environment. While I may believe that I have one hundred dollars in my pocket, my neighbor may have no good reason to believe this to be the case until he sees the money. How will I convince him that the money exists? Reasons such as ‘because I believe it has intrinsic value’ is a subjective one, and my neighbor has no reason to adhere to it. Alternatively one could argue that the environment will be treated better if we ascribe intrinsic value to it. While this is probably true, this does not prove the existence of the objective intrinsic value of nature. According to this argument, it is something that we would merely want to be true because of its good consequences.

Naess does not attempt to prove ‘Deep Ecology’ but instead he reveals a different system of thought. His thoughts on the intrinsic value of nature give an alternative passage of thinking which avoids the brick wall of the burden of proof. In particular, his concept of Self-realisation and the transformation from the self to the Self (capital ‘S’) is of utmost importance. Naess suggests that self-interest undermines our ontological value. He believes that we find true value not in the self (individuality), but in the Self (universality) (Næss and Rothenberg 1989, pp. 84-86).

Core to self-realisation for Naess and other Deep Ecologists is the concept that all life is fundamentally one. This is in concordance with Naess’ influences of Gandhian and Buddhist philosophies. Martin Luther King Jr. also took a similar view of the Self (arguably more anthropocentric, but still heavily influenced by the philosophy of Gandhi) stating that ‘injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere’ (McGraw 2003, p. 113). King believes that an injustice that is happening to someone other than myself will actually harm me as well. In the same way, Naess believes that we a part of a larger Self where all injustices against nature strip humans of meaning as well. Self-realisation is an ontological and ecological philosophy that Naess would describe as an ‘ecosophy’. The concept of an ecosophy is unlike other philosophical ideas in that it is neither strict nor vague. It is not strict in the sense that it will vary from person to person, according to their place in the world, and it is not vague in the sense that it is precise for each individual. An ecosophy should be seen as a wider collection of ideas and thinking rather than a narrow concept. This ontological argument provides strong evidence as to how the question of the origin of intrinsic values in nature can be answered by Deep Ecology.

2. Limits

If intrinsic value is to be placed in all of nature, as Naess suggests, there must be some degree of limitation. Jonge, in his writings on Spinoza and Deep Ecology, questions how we must treat a mosquito that is carrying malaria if we are to remain consistent with Deep Ecology thinking. The anopheles genus is responsible for the deaths of 1.4 to 2.6 million African children. If we are to value all of nature as holding equal intrinsic value then it would not be ethical to perform experiments on the mosquito (De Jonge 2004, p. 20.). This poses a significant problem for environmental ethicists who claim that all life forms have intrinsic value. One solution to this is to ascribe different levels of intrinsic value according to particular characteristics of groups of life forms. This provokes two further problems: the problem of the justification of collective characteristics trumping individual characteristics, and the inevitable problem of anthropocentricism. The former will be addressed now, and the latter will be addressed in the next section.

It is illogical to state that each individual member of a species has a different level of intrinsic value. This is not possible because it goes against the very meaning of intrinsic value. For example, imagine two humans. The first is fit and healthy, and she has a very high productive capacity. The second suffers from a chronic illness and has a lower productive capacity. To assess these two people instrumentally it would be clear that the first person has higher value. The same cannot be said to be true in regard to intrinsic value. The intrinsic value of both people remain the same regardless of their instrumental worth. This is why it is logical to apply intrinsic value to collectives rather than individuals, otherwise intrinsic value will become synonymous with instrumental value and the distinctions will be worthless. As Jong (2004, p. 20.) suggests, ‘it is possible that all beings have intrinsic value, viz., a life of their own, and still regard human beings as more valuable and therefore superior to the non-human world.’

3. Priorities

If there is to be some kind of hierarchical application of intrinsic value as suggested by the discussion on the limits of intrinsic value above, then there must be justified prioritization of value between species. Ascribing less intrinsic value to the anopheles genus and more intrinsic value to higher non-human animals and human beings can be reconciled with Deep Ecology. Such prioritization of value will inevitably cause some degree of anthropocentricism. Anthropocentricism is often perceived to be a dirty word in environmental and animal rights discourse. However, this should not be the case for when it is applied to Deep Ecology theories. An anthropocentric hierarchical approach to environmental ethics, where all species have varying degrees of intrinsic value, is the most effective and rational way to protect both the human and non-human beings. This will be referred to as the species based approach.

A common objection to the species based approach is that moral obligations could be fulfilled by ensuring that a diverse range of species are raised in zoos (Pojman and Pojman 2011, p. 191.). Russow uses this example to show that ascribing intrinsic value to species leads to intuitively bad outcomes. However, this is cannot apply to Deep Ecology understandings of value. A Deep Ecologist does not value a synthetic nature. A constructed landscape can never have the same worth as a natural landscape to the Deep Ecologist. Zoos are not natural and do not preserve the integrity and flourishing on the species in question.

A further four of Russow’s case studies suggest that if one were to accept a species based account, it would then follow that there are moral obligations to preserve species whom are dying out, evolving, and those who have been domesticated (Pojman and Pojman 2011, p. 192.). It seems that an acceptable solution to Russow’s concern, at least to those species who are dying out or evolving, would be to weigh up human interference with the specie in question against a natural equilibrium. In practice, this would involve assessing the extent of interference the specie has been victim to by humans or other species introduced by humans to the specie’s natural habitat. If interference has taken place then it follows that there is a restorative duty. However, if interference has not taken place, and it appears that nature is simply ‘taking its course’, then it follows that no moral obligations are due. There is and ought be moral obligations derived from valuing nature intrinsically, however, Russow is mistaken in her criticism of the excessive burden and unintuitive obligations that she believes must follow on from valuing nature intrinsically.

A hierarchy of intrinsic value will inevitably be anthropocentric. As mentioned above, one should not make the assumption that because humans have higher intrinsic value than the anopheles genus this means the non-human world can continue to be exploited. For Deep Ecology, this is far from true. Understanding and responding to the intrinsic value of nature leads to the best treatment of not only humans, not only animals, but the entirety of nature.  

Consider the contrast between valuing nature intrinsically and instrumentally. If one is to value nature instrumentally as opposed to intrinsically it follows that it is morally acceptable to use nature as a mere means rather than as an end in and of itself. Naess (1989, p. 11.) draws an analogy between how we ought to treat our friends and how we ought to treat nature. He suggests that ‘like friends – we should never use them only as a means to something else. To do so is superficial, seeing only surface interactions.’ He suggests that ‘we tend to lose friends’ if we treat them only as means and never as ends. Naess (1989, pp. 11-12.) concludes that ‘the same could happen with nature’.

It is clear that the best way to treat nature, both for the sake of nature and for our own sakes, is to treat it as though it has intrinsic worth. This essay has shown that there is a stalemate between whether it is possible for intrinsic value to be subjective or objective. However, it has also shown that what is crucial is not whether I am applying intrinsic value to nature subjectively or whether this objective metaphysical property exists, but rather that nature must be treated as though it has intrinsic value. Applying intrinsic value to nature allows us to explore the meaning of our own lives in the context of a wider Self.

Bibliography

Butler, W. F. and T. G. Acott (2007). "An Inquiry Concerning the Acceptance of Intrinsic Value Theories of Nature." Environmental Values 16(2): 149-168.

Callicott, J. B. (2002). "The Pragmatic Power and Promise of Theoretical Environmental Ethics: Forging a New Discourse." Environmental Values 11(1): 3-25.

De Jonge, E. (2004). Spinoza and deep ecology : challenging traditional approaches to environmentalism. Aldershot, Ashgate.

McGraw, M. (2003). Justify the means. Lincoln, Neb., IUniverse, Inc.

Næss, A. and D. Rothenberg (1989). Ecology, community, and lifestyle : outline of an ecosophy. Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press.

Pojman, L. P. and P. Pojman (2011). Environmental ethics : readings in theory and application. Belmont, Calif., Wadsworth Cengage Learning.

Sterba, J. P. (2009). Ethics : the big questions. Chichester, U.K.; Malden, MA, Wiley-Blackwell.