Metaphysics: The Case For Intrinsic Value

Are there intrinsic values in nature? If so, what are they?

Nature must be treated as though it has intrinsic value even if this metaphysical property cannot be proven to exist. This essay shows that while objective intrinsic value is likely to exist, it is important that nature is treated as though it has intrinsic value. Deep Ecology is a key concern of this essay. Deep Ecology suggests that there is intrinsic value in all of nature and that there are strong ontological reasons for accepting this. Three philosophical problems with the concept of intrinsic value will considered in this essay: origins, limits, and priorities. This paper shows how many of the reasons why intrinsic value is not accepted are either misguided or are inapplicable to Deep Ecology.

There are several different ways that one can value nature. Nature can, and often is, valued for the economic gain it brings about. It can also be valued purely as a resource for human or animal existence. One of the problems with valuing nature in this way is that it is difficult to stipulate why economic gain or resource value should be viewed as a greater end than nature in itself. While human existence may be seen as a greater end, one should not automatically assume that it is then the only end worth pursuing.

Objective metaphysical properties are also problematic in philosophy. However, the dilemma of being unable to prove intrinsic value does not instantly mean that intrinsic value does not exist. It is clear that if nature is treated purely as a means and never as an end, it will be subject to a lesser degree of concern. Environmental thinkers such as Arne Naess have explored this idea which will need to be considered if we are to reflect critically on how we view the environment.

Empirical studies have shown that many people value nature intrinsically, however, it is often hard to explain why this is the case. This means that nature is valuable regardless of its ‘usefulness’ (Butler and Acott 2007, p. 166). Translating this empirical ‘feeling’ into philosophical reasoning is very difficult, as proving objective metaphysical properties is problematic in philosophy. Who has authority to proclaim that property A is an objective value if another person disagrees? This thinking can lead to the idea that there are no objective metaphysical properties – but this is a mistaken observation. If a property cannot be determined then it does not follow that the property in question does not exist.

If humans can treat nature as though it has intrinsic value then it is worth assessing whether nature actually possesses this property. In addition to this it is clear that if nature is treated purely as a means and never as an end (valued intrinsically), it will be subject to a lesser degree of concern. Therefore, it is important to assess whether nature has intrinsic value. Three problems associated with valuing nature intrinsically will be the primary concern of this paper: origins, limits, and priorities.

1. Origins

Objective metaphysical properties, just like a deity, cannot be proven in a syllogistic manner. One may simply assume that because these properties cannot have a proven existence it then follows that they do not exist. However, both non-existence and existence are problematic. In the same way, objective intrinsic and non-intrinsic value cannot be proven syllogistically. However, it is possible to show through concepts such as Naess’ ‘Deep Ecology’, that intrinsic value provides a more coherent perception of the world.

The problem of origin is visible in both objective and subjective metaphysics. The former is arguably more important and problematic while the latter is less important and less problematic. Subjective intrinsic value is philosophically sound but less valuable. If I believe that I have a million dollars in my bank account, yet I actually do not have this money, it will not matter whether I actually have the money (providing that I never go to use it). Whether I have the money or whether I don’t have the money, this does not matter. If I believe I have the money and act as if I have the money, until I discover that I in fact do not have the money, it would not matter.

In the same way, if I am to believe that the environment has intrinsic value when in hypothetically it does not, it would not matter so much that I was acting on false beliefs. I would go about treating the environment as though it has intrinsic value, and therefore I would probably treat it with higher regard. However, objectivity is important if others around me do not ascribe intrinsic value to the environment. While I may believe that I have one hundred dollars in my pocket, my neighbor may have no good reason to believe this to be the case until he sees the money. How will I convince him that the money exists? Reasons such as ‘because I believe it has intrinsic value’ is a subjective one, and my neighbor has no reason to adhere to it. Alternatively one could argue that the environment will be treated better if we ascribe intrinsic value to it. While this is probably true, this does not prove the existence of the objective intrinsic value of nature. According to this argument, it is something that we would merely want to be true because of its good consequences.

Naess does not attempt to prove ‘Deep Ecology’ but instead he reveals a different system of thought. His thoughts on the intrinsic value of nature give an alternative passage of thinking which avoids the brick wall of the burden of proof. In particular, his concept of Self-realisation and the transformation from the self to the Self (capital ‘S’) is of utmost importance. Naess suggests that self-interest undermines our ontological value. He believes that we find true value not in the self (individuality), but in the Self (universality) (Næss and Rothenberg 1989, pp. 84-86).

Core to self-realisation for Naess and other Deep Ecologists is the concept that all life is fundamentally one. This is in concordance with Naess’ influences of Gandhian and Buddhist philosophies. Martin Luther King Jr. also took a similar view of the Self (arguably more anthropocentric, but still heavily influenced by the philosophy of Gandhi) stating that ‘injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere’ (McGraw 2003, p. 113). King believes that an injustice that is happening to someone other than myself will actually harm me as well. In the same way, Naess believes that we a part of a larger Self where all injustices against nature strip humans of meaning as well. Self-realisation is an ontological and ecological philosophy that Naess would describe as an ‘ecosophy’. The concept of an ecosophy is unlike other philosophical ideas in that it is neither strict nor vague. It is not strict in the sense that it will vary from person to person, according to their place in the world, and it is not vague in the sense that it is precise for each individual. An ecosophy should be seen as a wider collection of ideas and thinking rather than a narrow concept. This ontological argument provides strong evidence as to how the question of the origin of intrinsic values in nature can be answered by Deep Ecology.

2. Limits

If intrinsic value is to be placed in all of nature, as Naess suggests, there must be some degree of limitation. Jonge, in his writings on Spinoza and Deep Ecology, questions how we must treat a mosquito that is carrying malaria if we are to remain consistent with Deep Ecology thinking. The anopheles genus is responsible for the deaths of 1.4 to 2.6 million African children. If we are to value all of nature as holding equal intrinsic value then it would not be ethical to perform experiments on the mosquito (De Jonge 2004, p. 20.). This poses a significant problem for environmental ethicists who claim that all life forms have intrinsic value. One solution to this is to ascribe different levels of intrinsic value according to particular characteristics of groups of life forms. This provokes two further problems: the problem of the justification of collective characteristics trumping individual characteristics, and the inevitable problem of anthropocentricism. The former will be addressed now, and the latter will be addressed in the next section.

It is illogical to state that each individual member of a species has a different level of intrinsic value. This is not possible because it goes against the very meaning of intrinsic value. For example, imagine two humans. The first is fit and healthy, and she has a very high productive capacity. The second suffers from a chronic illness and has a lower productive capacity. To assess these two people instrumentally it would be clear that the first person has higher value. The same cannot be said to be true in regard to intrinsic value. The intrinsic value of both people remain the same regardless of their instrumental worth. This is why it is logical to apply intrinsic value to collectives rather than individuals, otherwise intrinsic value will become synonymous with instrumental value and the distinctions will be worthless. As Jong (2004, p. 20.) suggests, ‘it is possible that all beings have intrinsic value, viz., a life of their own, and still regard human beings as more valuable and therefore superior to the non-human world.’

3. Priorities

If there is to be some kind of hierarchical application of intrinsic value as suggested by the discussion on the limits of intrinsic value above, then there must be justified prioritization of value between species. Ascribing less intrinsic value to the anopheles genus and more intrinsic value to higher non-human animals and human beings can be reconciled with Deep Ecology. Such prioritization of value will inevitably cause some degree of anthropocentricism. Anthropocentricism is often perceived to be a dirty word in environmental and animal rights discourse. However, this should not be the case for when it is applied to Deep Ecology theories. An anthropocentric hierarchical approach to environmental ethics, where all species have varying degrees of intrinsic value, is the most effective and rational way to protect both the human and non-human beings. This will be referred to as the species based approach.

A common objection to the species based approach is that moral obligations could be fulfilled by ensuring that a diverse range of species are raised in zoos (Pojman and Pojman 2011, p. 191.). Russow uses this example to show that ascribing intrinsic value to species leads to intuitively bad outcomes. However, this is cannot apply to Deep Ecology understandings of value. A Deep Ecologist does not value a synthetic nature. A constructed landscape can never have the same worth as a natural landscape to the Deep Ecologist. Zoos are not natural and do not preserve the integrity and flourishing on the species in question.

A further four of Russow’s case studies suggest that if one were to accept a species based account, it would then follow that there are moral obligations to preserve species whom are dying out, evolving, and those who have been domesticated (Pojman and Pojman 2011, p. 192.). It seems that an acceptable solution to Russow’s concern, at least to those species who are dying out or evolving, would be to weigh up human interference with the specie in question against a natural equilibrium. In practice, this would involve assessing the extent of interference the specie has been victim to by humans or other species introduced by humans to the specie’s natural habitat. If interference has taken place then it follows that there is a restorative duty. However, if interference has not taken place, and it appears that nature is simply ‘taking its course’, then it follows that no moral obligations are due. There is and ought be moral obligations derived from valuing nature intrinsically, however, Russow is mistaken in her criticism of the excessive burden and unintuitive obligations that she believes must follow on from valuing nature intrinsically.

A hierarchy of intrinsic value will inevitably be anthropocentric. As mentioned above, one should not make the assumption that because humans have higher intrinsic value than the anopheles genus this means the non-human world can continue to be exploited. For Deep Ecology, this is far from true. Understanding and responding to the intrinsic value of nature leads to the best treatment of not only humans, not only animals, but the entirety of nature.  

Consider the contrast between valuing nature intrinsically and instrumentally. If one is to value nature instrumentally as opposed to intrinsically it follows that it is morally acceptable to use nature as a mere means rather than as an end in and of itself. Naess (1989, p. 11.) draws an analogy between how we ought to treat our friends and how we ought to treat nature. He suggests that ‘like friends – we should never use them only as a means to something else. To do so is superficial, seeing only surface interactions.’ He suggests that ‘we tend to lose friends’ if we treat them only as means and never as ends. Naess (1989, pp. 11-12.) concludes that ‘the same could happen with nature’.

It is clear that the best way to treat nature, both for the sake of nature and for our own sakes, is to treat it as though it has intrinsic worth. This essay has shown that there is a stalemate between whether it is possible for intrinsic value to be subjective or objective. However, it has also shown that what is crucial is not whether I am applying intrinsic value to nature subjectively or whether this objective metaphysical property exists, but rather that nature must be treated as though it has intrinsic value. Applying intrinsic value to nature allows us to explore the meaning of our own lives in the context of a wider Self.

Bibliography

Butler, W. F. and T. G. Acott (2007). "An Inquiry Concerning the Acceptance of Intrinsic Value Theories of Nature." Environmental Values 16(2): 149-168.

Callicott, J. B. (2002). "The Pragmatic Power and Promise of Theoretical Environmental Ethics: Forging a New Discourse." Environmental Values 11(1): 3-25.

De Jonge, E. (2004). Spinoza and deep ecology : challenging traditional approaches to environmentalism. Aldershot, Ashgate.

McGraw, M. (2003). Justify the means. Lincoln, Neb., IUniverse, Inc.

Næss, A. and D. Rothenberg (1989). Ecology, community, and lifestyle : outline of an ecosophy. Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press.

Pojman, L. P. and P. Pojman (2011). Environmental ethics : readings in theory and application. Belmont, Calif., Wadsworth Cengage Learning.

Sterba, J. P. (2009). Ethics : the big questions. Chichester, U.K.; Malden, MA, Wiley-Blackwell.

Rule based morality

Is Kant right to suppose that morality is a system of categorical imperatives?

In Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant develops his view on morality, basing it on a system of categorical imperatives. Kant proposes a system where some maxims can be universal and without condition[1]. According to Kant, a system of morality that is based on empiricism is tainted as it does not recognise the unconditionality of the moral law[2]. Integrity is at the core of Kant’s categorical imperative, separating it from other systems of morality like utilitarianism. Utilitarianism suggests that one should do whatever is necessary to achieve maximum happiness, even if this will result in using someone as a mere means[3]. However, in Groundwork, Kant clearly asserts that rational agents should never be used as a mere means rather they should always treated as an end[4]. Kant’s categorical imperative does not provide a solid epistemological framework for morality as one would expect from moral systems. However, an ontological interpretation of Kant’s Groundwork allows for an appreciation of the value of the text and what it can offer moral discourse.

The categorical imperative is based on three formulas. The first is a concept of universalisability. Kant’s first formulation suggests that for a maxim to become categorical (unconditional) rather than hypothetical (conditional) a rational agent must ‘act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law’[5]. The concept of universalisability is crucial to Kant’s writing, forming the strict criteria for his moral theory. For conduct to be morally ‘right’, it would have to be the ‘right’ conduct for any other person to perform if they are in similar circumstances. In the second formulation, Kant states ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’[6]. The third formulation provides the maxim of ‘an absolutely good will’, that is to ‘act in accordance with maxims that can at the same time have as their object themselves as universal laws of nature’[7].

Kant places himself in risky territory by unveiling a normative application of the categorical imperative. One of Kant’s greatest mistakes in regard to the categorical imperative is how his normative approach preferences rules over principles. Rules are typically derived from principles so it would be appropriate that when they are in conflict with one another, the principle should trump the rule[8]. For example, Kant asserts that making false promises is using another person ‘merely as a means’, therefore making false promises is unconditionally impermissible and can be included as part of the categorical imperative[9]. Imagine there is a murderer at your door, and you are hiding a person the murderer wants to kill. Then, if the murderer asks: ‘are you hiding anybody in your house?’, you would be morally obliged to tell the murderer the truth. Intuitively this feels abhorrent as Kant prioritises the rule of not making false promises above principles of justice or loyalty. In another example of the categorical imperative in practice, Kant asserts that one must always seek to develop their own predisposed talents, arguing that not doing so would be neglecting the ‘furtherance’ of humanity[10]. He argues that  these capacities must be developed as they serve the rational being and are ‘given to him for all sorts of possible purposes’[11]. However, the maxim of universalisability neither rules out neglecting one’s talents or pursuing them. In this case, it seems that Kant is taking a rule that should be a hypothetical imperative and attempting to convert it into a categorical imperative[12]. Although the rule of furthering one’s predisposed talents is inconsistent with the categorical imperative, it may be interpreted as a means to further the ends of other rational agents. In a third example, Kant argues that caring for one another is a universal law and therefore is a categorical imperative[13]. Although Kant’s rationale for this categorical imperative seems flimsy, if one were to accept it to be the case, it would then be possible to argue that one cannot truly care for another unless they have developed their own natural talents. Or rather, one will at least be able to provide better care for another person in their time of need if they have developed their natural talents in the first instance. If the categorical imperatives rest on nothing else, they can at least be supported by one another.

In the previous example it has been shown how Kant’s substantive examples of the categorical imperative fail to conform with the maxims that he claims to base them upon. It has also been shown how Kant values these rules highly, even above the principles that they are derived from. However, there is still value to his deontological approach to morality. An ontological perspective, that is a question of being, is able to give Kant’s categorical imperative greater meaning[14]. Satkunanandan suggests that the only way one can overcome ‘moral impurity’ is for one to ground oneself in the style of discipline that Kant suggests[15]. Kant’s concern is that something as important as morality cannot be derived from ‘something so varied and variable as human sentiments’[16].  This claim is waged against alternative moral theories such as utilitarianism which are based on empiricism. For example, in utilitarianism something must be maximised. According to proponent of utilitarianism, Mill, It is unclear as to why happiness should be maximised apart from the presumption that each person desires their own happiness[17]. Kant argues that this is a weak basis for the formulation of the moral law. In consideration of these criticisms, deontology has something to offer as a moral framework.

The natural dialectical is one of the most intriguing aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy. Kant describes the natural dialectical as the ‘propensity to rationalise against those strict laws of duty and to cast doubt upon their validity … that is, corrupt them at their basis and to destroy all their dignity’[18]. An illustration of this concept can be found in the film The Emperor’s New Groove. In one scene from the film, Kronk faces the dilemma of whether or not he should save his enemy’s life. Kronk’s shoulder angel appears asking: ‘you’re not just going to let him die, are you?’. Kronk’s shoulder devil suddenly appears and replies ‘don’t listen to that guy: he’s trying to lead you down the path of righteousness, I’m going to lead you down the path that rocks!’[19]. In the previous example, the shoulder devil mirrors the nature of Kant’s natural dialectical by persuading the rational being away from strict adherence to the rules by an appeal to the consequences. If Kronk allows his enemy to die, it would appeal to Kronk’s own self interest. However, Kronk still feels compelled, as if he has a duty to refrain from killing his enemy. Kant suggests that a sense of ‘becoming human’ and freedom occurs when one’s morality is in accord with the law. Likewise, if one flees from their duty ‘under the sway of the natural dialectic’, they also flee from their freedom[20]. The ontological perspective of Kant’s categorical imperative suggests that this is where the beauty in his formulation lies.

The nature of freedom and how it can be found through obligations surrounding duty synthesises with Kant’s concept of strict adherence to ‘the rules’ as well as rejecting the natural dialectical. Our freedom can be found through moving from the ‘sensible world’ to the ‘intelligible world’[21]. In the sensible world our actions are in some ways groundless, that is, they are based merely on our desires and inclinations. In the intelligible world, however, laws are not empirical, rather, they are grounded on reason[22]. Kant believes this progression into the intelligible world is desirable as it allows one to be free from impulses of sensibility and these impulses now need not affect one’s actions. For Kant, this is similar to removing the ‘shoulder devil’ in the Kronk example above. Following the ‘path of righteousness’ frees one from being able to rationalise oneself out of performing the correct action.

A deontological system of morality has benefits over other systems of morality. It is very difficult to work out exactly what should be maximised in utilitarianism. Once this is established, issues still remain as anything can be justified to achieve the ends. Kant’s deontological approach, however, purports an alternate view where the value of an action is found not in its consequences, but rather, can be found through strict adherence to a system of rules. However, Kant’s categorical imperative is fundamentally flawed and self-contradictory in its logical performance. It also must be noted that the deontological nature of the categorical imperative may lead to worse consequences than utilitarianism or other systems. Due to its problematic nature, systems of morality should not be blindly based on Kant’s categorical imperative. Although Kant’s logic is flawed, there is strong value in his concept of freedom through duty. The ontological idea that one can resist the natural dialectical in order to strive for moral purity is a valuable asset to Kant’s system of morality, rendering it worthy of further investigation. There can be a great wealth of understanding gained from Kant’s concepts of freedom through duty which are crucial elements of his categorical imperative.

Bibliography

Craig, E. (1991). "Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy."   Retrieved May 17, 2011, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/N039.

Disney, W. (2000). "Emperor's New Groove scene: Kronk's dilemma."   Retrieved May 5, 2011, from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VnMGCUH-lLY.

Dudley, W. and K. Engelhard (2011). Immanuel Kant : key concepts. Durham, Acumen.

Kant, I. and M. J. Gregor (1998). Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.

Mill, J. S. and S. Gorovitz (1971). Utilitarianism. Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill.

Satkunanandan, S. (2011). "The Extraordinary Categorical Imperative." Political Theory 39(2): 234-260. 2, 39. Retrieved April 19, 2011 from http://ptx.sagepub.com/content/39/2/234.abstract.

Seung, T. K. (2007). Kant : a guide for the perplexed. London; New York, Continuum.

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[1] Kant and Gregor, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, Cambridge, 1998, p. 31.

[2] Satkunanandan, The Extraordinary Categorical Imperative, 2011, p. 245.

[3] Kant and Gregor, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, 1998, p. 38.

[4] Ibid., p. 45.

[5] Ibid., p. 31.

[6] Ibid., p. 38.

[7] Ibid., p. 44.

[8] Seung, Kant : a guide for the perplexed, London; New York, 2007, p. 102.

[9] Kant and Gregor, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, 1998, p. 38.

[10] Ibid., pp. 38-39.

[11] Ibid., p. 33.

[12] Seung, Kant : a guide for the perplexed, 2007, p. 103.

[13] Kant and Gregor, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, 1998, p. 39.

[14] Craig, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London, 1991.

[15] Satkunanandan, The Extraordinary Categorical Imperative, 2011, p. 239.

[16] Dudley and Engelhard, Immanuel Kant : key concepts, Durham, 2011, p. 105.

[17] Mill and Gorovitz, Utilitarianism, Indianapolis, 1971, p. 37.

[18] Kant and Gregor, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, 1998, pp. 17-18.

[19] Disney, Emperor's New Groove scene: Kronk's dilemma, 2000.

[20] Satkunanandan, The Extraordinary Categorical Imperative, 2011, p. 245.

[21] Ibid., pp. 245-246.

[22] Kant and Gregor, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, 1998, p. 57.