Peter Singer on Q&A tonight

Tonight's Q&A Panellists

Thought I would blog a quick post mentioning that Peter Singer will be on ABC's Q&A tonight. If you live in Australia, you will be able to catch up on ABC iView if you miss it.

As you are probably aware, I have written a few too many essays about Peter Singer's views on various ethical issues. These essays have included my comparison of Singer and Rawls on International Justice. In this essay I was cautiously supportive of Singer's views on most international relations issues like increased foreign aid. However, I was sceptical about his ideas on refugee issues - and I'm hoping this will be talked about tonight.

I have other concerns with his work. Singer's views on equality have some serious problems. As Singer is a committed preference utilitarian, he places the fulfilment of one's preferences over and above any idea of rights-based moralities. Sometimes these two ideas overlap, but in other scenarios they clash. You can read more about it in my essay Singer and the Principle of Equality.

This isn't even his controversial stuff though. You'll find that in his papers on abortion, infanticide, and bestiality. While I tend to disagree with his writings surrounding bioethics, I can't help but admit that many of his views represent the natural outcome of morality without God.

While I disagree with Singer in many areas, I find his work in books such as The Life You Can Save to be inspiring, challenging, and incredibly important. You can find my essay entitled The Case For Foreign Aid.

Please post all your comments about tonight's show below. I'm sure topics such as asylum (which I wrote about here) and religion will be covered. Do you agree with the panellists? Do you agree with my essays on these issues?

And while you're here, why not plus-one or like a post, or follow my blog :)

*UPDATE* 14/8/12 4:21PM

As expected, when pressed about his thoughts on 'boat people' by Tony Jones, Singer conceded that off-shore processing of refugees is the best way to address this 'issue' according to his moral framework. Kudos for consistency.

Perhaps this is the natural outcome of utilitarianism - a theory that allows an individual to be treated as a means to an end if a greater good can be maximised. I incredibly disappointed that Phillip Blonde didn't call Peter Singer up on this.

Singer and Rawls on International Justice

Compare the conception of international justice held by Peter Singer and John Rawls. Indicate which thinker’s conception is superior and why.

John Rawls and Peter Singer both hold to the view that society should be constructed in an egalitarian manner. In this essay I will explore the differing methodologies which Rawls and Singer use to develop their respective theories of international justice. I will argue that Rawl’s approach has stronger potential if the ‘difference principle’ were to be applied to the international justice sphere. I will also explore Singer’s theory and suggest that as they both stand, Singer provides a more responsible and egalitarian conception of international justice. Throughout this essay, I will work from the assumption that a philosophically consistent, egalitarian and responsible theory is superior to the alternative options.

First, I will briefly describe the core components of Justice as Fairness which is Rawls’ domestic conception of justice. A basic understanding of Rawls’ domestic conception of justice will help us better understand the potential of a Rawls-based conception of international justice. Rawls’ domestic understanding of justice applies primarily to how the ‘basic structure’ of society should be set out and regulated. The term constructivism can be appropriately applied to his theory as he considers justice ‘only as a virtue of social institutions.’[1] The two primary principles that Rawls seeks to fulfill are as follows: (i) an ‘equal right to extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all’, and (ii) that ‘inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone’s advantage, and provided the positions and offices to which they attach, or from which they may be gained, are open to all.’[2] It is important to note that the second principle is not utilitarian (average or total) in the sense that disadvantaging the least well-off can be counterbalanced by advantaging the most well-off equal amounts. According to Rawls, if there is an inequality it must benefit all people including the least well-off. This will be referred to as the difference principle.

These principles are what Rawls believes a rational, risk-averse, and self-interested person would choose in the original position. According to Rawls, in the original position ‘no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.’[3] He goes on to state that ‘the principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.’ Behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ people are unknowing of particular factors which should when applied nullify ‘the accidents of natural endowment and the contingencies of social circumstance as counters in quest for political and economic advantage.’[4]

The aforementioned elements of Rawls’ thinking are to be applied in full to the domestic realm, yet, they are only granted limited applicability by Rawls in the international realm. The difference principle is especially relevant to my later discussion of the potential of a Rawlsian understanding of international justice. Law of Peoples is Rawls’ attempt to extend Justice as Fairness to the international sphere. He endeavors to develop a framework of international justice which is ecumenical, and one which is not partisan to ‘societies whose political institutions and culture are liberal.’ Rawls states that a ‘liberal society must respect other societies organized by comprehensive doctrines, provided that their political and social institutions meet certain conditions that lead the society to adhere to a reasonable law of peoples.’[5] He provides seven principles in regards to international relations which include respect for freedom and independence, equality among persons, rights to self-defense (but not aggression), duty of nonintervention, duty to observe treaties and undertakings, restrictions within war, and a duty to honor human rights.[6] While Rawls does suggest that there ‘should be certain provisions for mutual assistance between peoples in times of famine and drought’, his theory of international justice emphasizes restrictions rather than prescriptions; negative duties of justice rather than positive duties of distributive justice, like his domestic theory.[7]

Peter Singer, unlike Rawls, uses a moralist approach to support his arguments surrounding international justice. These arguments are not tied in with a social contract.[8] His views are broadly utilitarian, although, one could easily accept the argument he gives in Famine, Affluence, and Morality without having a commitment to utilitarianism. Singer begins with the assumption that ‘suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care’ are bad things. His argument then follows that ‘if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.’ [9] The qualifier he uses in the strong version of the principle, ‘without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance’ (my emphasis) is particularly important. [10] Singer is essentially suggesting that we must give foreign aid to the point of marginal utility whereby to give any more resources would sacrifice something which of equal moral worth, either for us or our dependents. Following this principle to its logical conclusions would have radical implications for how many people, especially those of us who reside in richer nations, would have to live in order to be moral.

The principle is most simply articulated by the drowning child example which Singer provides in Famine, Affluence, and Morality. He puts forward the deceptively uncontroversial assertion that ‘if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out.’ Singer goes on to suggest that the distance between me and the child ‘makes no moral difference.’ Since Singer, like most practical philosophers, subscribes to principles of ‘impartiality, universalisability,’ and ‘equality,’ it seems reasonable to state that distance either makes very little difference or no difference at all in situations where people who have access to vast resources can easily support famine relief in places like Bangladesh. [11] He also refutes the argument that says ‘there are other people either equally or better placed to give money and this therefore exempts me from owing anything to the worlds’ poor.’ While it may be the case that there are people better placed than I to help, it is clear that many of those people have chosen not to address the problem and therefore the conclusion is based upon a hypothetical premise which presumes that the very rich will do all that they can to address poverty. As Singer points out, such an argument is ‘an ideal excuse for inactivity’ which does nothing to address the situation which we currently find ourselves in.[12]

The question regarding which author provides a better framework for dealing with poverty is a difficult one. I will argue that as their respective theories stand, Peter Singer provides a better theory in regards to international justice. However, if John Rawls took his theory of domestic justice as it is outlined in A Theory Of Justice and applied it consistently to the realm of international justice, his theory would be able to address poverty equally, if not better than Singer’s theory. There are two main reasons why Rawls’ theory of international justice is incomplete: (i) he attempts to synthesize liberal tolerance with prescriptive egalitarianism, and (ii) he effectively creates a morality based upon the social contract.

In order to gain ecumenical support, Rawls compromises and waters down many of the logical conclusions that one would reach if they were to apply the ‘veil of ignorance’ hypothetical scenario to shape international governance.  Rawls attempts to be tolerant with societies whose members may have different conceptions of justice than ours, and who may be guided by different kinds of comprehensive doctrines.[13] However, this apparent respect of ‘other societies organized by comprehensive doctrines’ effectively forfeits our social contract with them, meaning that there is no clear burden under the ‘veil of ignorance’ for a rational person to suggest that economic assistance must be given to poor people in illiberal nations. The rational person knows that she will not become a member of an illiberal society under the ‘veil of ignorance’ because the veil does not apply to illiberal societies. This then means that she has no good reason to make allowances for these people unless they will somehow improve her lot, which in many cases, is highly improbable.

The second objection to Rawl’s theory ties in strongly with the first objection. Rawls’ theory of international justice is based on the social contract. While any theory based upon the social contract should be first seen as contractarian rather than moral, it is unavoidable for a theory like Rawls’ to have many moral implications, imperatives, and restrictions. Strictly speaking, it is not immoral to decide under the ‘veil of ignorance’ that there will be a small portion of people who control a great deal of society’s wealth, this should be seen as irrational. However, making a decision under the ‘veil of ignorance’, then changing the decision when the veil is lifted, in favor of one’s self interest, could be seen as immoral. In short, Rawls’ theory has moral implications even though it is based on rationality. The morality drawn from Rawls’ theory could be summed up as ‘do unto others as they do unto me.’ This is unfortunate as any morality that gives an exemptions if other people choose not to follow it is flawed. Effectively, such a morality is dependent on the actions of another person rather than any deeply held conviction.

In Practical Ethics (Second Ed.) Singer argues that wealthy nations should be significantly more generous in their intake of asylum seekers, perhaps up until the point of marginal utility. He creates a scenario similar to the ‘drowning child’ thought experiment which was previously mentioned. Singer asks whether the investors in the hypothetical underground community called Fairhaven should allow non-investing people into their community, allowing them to escape the extreme radiation outside. Members of Fairhaven will have to give up their tennis courts, swimming pools, and their large gymnasium in order to give those outside some form of basic accommodation. Singer presents three options: (i) admit all 10,000 outsiders and lose all the sports and entertainment facilities, (ii) admit only 500 outsiders and lose a quarter of the tennis courts (which only had little use), or (iii) admit no outsiders and therefore accept no costs.[14] I find this to be a compelling argument for a more responsible and egalitarian approach to those fleeing persecution across borders. However, as a utilitarian, Singer is obliged to consider the consequences for all affected parties, which leads to a great deal of moral complexity when this issue could have been a simple matter. In the third edition of Practical Ethics, Singer removed the chapter Insiders and Outsiders, explaining why in the preface. He cites reasons such as the possibility of a ‘racist backlash’ if a country accepts large numbers of refugees as ‘highly relevant’ to the discussion, and no doubt, highly relevant to why he chose to omit this chapter in the third edition of Practical Ethics.[15] I find this argument to be both inconsistent with the Fairhaven hypothetical mentioned above and revealing of the limits of utilitarianism. If ‘racist backlashes’ are of genuine concern for Singer’s theory of international justice, his theory is little more than a Lifeboat Ethic.

As mentioned previously, and as noted by thinkers such as Pogge and Singer, Rawls’ main area of concern is the domestic sphere.[16] It is unfortunate that throughout The Law of Peoples, Rawls continually refers to the benefits of the ‘veil of ignorance’ only being conferred on to the citizen.[17] In a practical application of the ‘veil of ignorance’, as Rawls intends the device to be used, it seems inevitable that one would know that one will become a citizen of a liberal and democratic state, which would in turn justify self-interested and potentially deeply harmful policies towards outsiders. However, this goes against the very intention of the ‘veil of ignorance’ which aims to ‘nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage.’[18] In Carens’ critique of Rawls, he points out that ‘whether one is a citizen of a rich nation or a poor one, whether one is already a citizen of a particular state or an alien who wishes to become a citizen – this is the sort of specific contingency that could set people at odds … We should therefore take a global, not a national view of the original position.’[19] Carens’ approach is ironically more compatible with the ‘veil of ignorance’ than the approach that Rawls himself utilised.

In conclusion, I find Singer’s theory of international justice to be superior to Rawls’, as Rawls intended his theory to be understood. However, if Rawls’ conception of domestic justice were to be applied to the international sphere, it would have the potential to be far more robust that Singer’s. The ‘veil of ignorance’, as it has been critiqued by authors such as Pogge and Carens, could be incredibly useful in the international realm, but only if it is applied with consistency.

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Bibliography

Carens, Joseph H. “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders.” The Review of Politics 49, no. 2 (April 1, 1987): 251–273.

Pogge, Thomas W. Realizing Rawls. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1989.

Rawls, John. A theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.

———. Collected papers. Edited by Samuel Richard Freeman. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999.

———. “Justice as Fairness.” The Philosophical Review 67, no. 2 (April 1, 1958): 164–194.

———. “The Main Idea of the Theory of Justice.” In Ethics, edited by Peter Singer, 362–367. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Singer, Peter. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” In World hunger and moral obligation, edited by William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977.

———. Practical Ethics. Second ed. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

———. Practical Ethics. Third ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

[1] John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” The Philosophical Review 67, no. 2 (April 1, 1958): 164.

[2] Ibid., 165.

[3] John Rawls, “The Main Idea of the Theory of Justice,” in Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 363.

[4] Ibid., 365.

[5] Rawls and Freeman, Collected Papers, 540–541.

John Rawls, Collected papers, ed. Samuel Richard Freeman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 532–531.

[6] Ibid., 540.

[7] Ibid., 540–541.

[8] In using the term ‘moralist’, I do not seek to suggest that Singer has political affiliations with groups who call themselves moralists. Rather, I am pointing out that his theory is directly speaking about what is right and wrong rather than what is rational and irrational.

[9] Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” in World hunger and moral obligation, ed. William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 24.

[10] Ibid.

[11] All quoted material in the beginning of this paragraph can be found in: Ibid., 24–25.

[12] Ibid., 25–26.

[13] Rawls, Collected papers, 530.

[14] Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, Second ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

[15] Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, Third ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

[16] Thomas W Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1989), 1–14; Singer, Practical Ethics, 253.

[17] Rawls, Collected papers, 537–541.

[18] John Rawls, A theory of Justice. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 136.

[19] Joseph H. Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” The Review of Politics 49, no. 2 (April 1, 1987): 256.

Democracy & Equality

Many theorists of democracy think that there is an important connection between some ideal of equality and the desirability of democracy. Explain and discuss this connection. Do you think it is sufficient to justify democratic institutions?

This paper shows why both democracy and equality are desirable, and why democracy, in its true sense, is an important step to achieve greater equality. There are many reasons why political philosophers need to look beyond the ‘one person, one vote’ conception of democracy to understand why such theories have allowed social and economic inequality to prevail. While many democracies do not live up to our expectations in regards to providing equality, there are explanations for this and methods of overcoming such problems.

Is equality desirable?

The first thing to consider is whether equality is desirable, and if so, what kinds of equality are desirable. For example, should young children have equal voting rights with adult persons? The consensus around this issue in most democracies is that there is an age where children should not be able to vote (even if there is disagreement on exactly what the age should be). However, it does not follow that it is permissible for children to be discriminated against by the law because they are unable to vote. For example, if an election is held when Bob is 17 and 11 months, and James has just turned 18, James is by no means worth more than Bob. James may in fact know a lot less about politics than Bob. An individual can be excluded from the demos yet still have equal value as a person. Therefore, the crucial issue is that there is that in similar circumstances, different people are treated equally. To determine whether equality is, in the first instance, desirable we must consider what is meant by the term ‘equality.’

Equality is often considered to be important exclusively within a designated demos. This is important because it facilitates an ongoing conversation and reflection on individual preferences. The laws created by the demos are seen as binding upon them. This is partially where our obligation to follow the laws of the government arises – because we voted them in and are bound by the social contract. Of course, there will always be questions of legitimacy and what obliges the disenfranchised minority to follow the laws of the majority. However, when there has been some effective compromise and deliberation which has influenced the outcome, there seems to be a morally binding obligation to follow the law.[1]

Consider the case of the recently proposed Malaysia solution. The proposed deal between Malaysia and Australia would have meant that 800 asylum seekers who travel to Australia by boat would be sent to Malaysia in order to deter others, while Australia, in exchange would take 4000 refugees from one of Malaysia’s refugee camps. The intended effect was to ‘stop the boats’ and save the Australian government from political turmoil. The people who this legislation has the greatest effect on are the asylum seekers who plan to travel to Australia by boat, and the asylum seekers who are waiting in refugee camps in Malaysia. However, because these groups of people are not part of the demos creating the law, and have no influence on the legislation, are they obliged to follow it? While the interests of those seeking asylum in Australia should be considered by the demos in a democracy, this does not give anyone who interacts with the state the automatic right to the ballot and citizenship. In summary, there is a type of equality which each person has, but it does not always follow that every person in the world is entitled to have citizenship of a nation-state in order for the state to acknowledge the equality of persons. It may seem arbitrary to argue that a demos is constituted by a particular geographical location, but this is not the case. It is in fact quite pragmatic, as the geographical relationship between each member of a nation-state helps form the nation’s life.

Myers points out that there are ‘virtually limitless ways in which human beings might be equal or unequal.’[2] From birth, individuals develop and pursue different talents and strengths, yet their individual uniqueness does not render them unequal. Some individual differences, like illness or disability will, however, mean that the individuals concerned are on unequal footing to pursue their respective interests. If one was to divide the medication belonging to a sick person into portions so that the healthy person receives some of the medication too, they would not be pursuing equality. Ensuring that both the sick and healthy do not have access to medical supplies is to not act equally. Equality demands different responses to unequal situations.

The principle of equal consideration

The principle of equal consideration is sometimes thought to be compatible with democracy. This principle, attributed to Jeremy Bentham, suggests that ‘everyone must count for one and no more than one.’[3] In a procedural sense, this is true of most liberal democracies. Everyone has equal rights to vote, free speech, freedom of assembly, and so on. While procedural equality grants each person rights to be able to express their political views in various manners, these rights are not obligations. Therefore, government responsiveness to each citizen will not be equal, as some citizens participate more than others. Is this an issue for democracy? It is arguable that this is not an issue because each person still has equality of opportunity; it seems that they can each participate if they choose to. However, there are other factors in play. As Green notes, there is a class of people who write to their representatives and receive an impersonal response. Their opinions have been ‘hopelessly devalued’. On the other hand, there is another class of people who will be consulted without request.[4] This seems to be straying away from Bentham’s suggestion that each person only count for one, and for no more than one.

Although there is a sense of procedural equality in many liberal democracies, correlative substantive equality among individual citizens does not always follow. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with citizens participating different amounts, this is surely inevitable in any conceivable construction of society.  The point of concern is why participation levels differ. Verba and Nie suggest that participation levels differ because ‘motivation, skills, [and] resources are not equally distributed.’ According to their empirical study, the authors found that upper-status citizens are six times more likely to be in the category of ‘highest participant’ than citizens from low socioeconomic backgrounds.  The study concludes that this leads to an ‘unequal distribution of participation.’[5]

Brighouse asks the reader: ‘Why should it matter if Julian, who has boundless enthusiasm for participation in public life , wields more influence than Sandy, who prefers to hone his psychic talents?’[6] The author suggests that this is perfectly compatible with what he coins the ‘equal availability of political influence’. While it is tempting to agree with Brighouse from the outset, there are reasons as to why we should be cautious. Every inequality of political influence is not reconcilable, and every element of substantive equality is not achievable from political equality (nor is it necessarily desirable). However, there is a strong case to reduce political inequalities and substantive inequalities in order to attain a society where one really does count for one. Therefore, if Sandy chooses not to participate in the political process our concern is not with forcing him to increase his participation so that he may realise equality, but rather, our concern regards to whether there are other external factors that have caused him to be less involved and caused Julian to have a greater involvement. For example, if Sandy had never learnt in school that he was able to run for political office, this would concern the advocate of equality. If he had ingrained into him from a young age, the belief that people of his race, class, area, or intelligence were unable to cause any significant change through political institutions, this would concern the proponent of equality. Therefore, while Sandy and Julian both have equal opportunity to participate in the procedural system, the political philosopher must look beyond this assertion to ask why various groups are less inclined to practice their democratic rights.

Qualitative and normative equality

Christiano proposes a solution to the problem of the procedural equality paradox by valuing qualitative equality over normative equality. Qualitative equality has a greater focus on supply, while normative equality has a greater focus on demand. If we are to only focus on demand, then the views of the minority will be given less consideration. The principle of equal consideration suggests that each person, Mary, John, and Jane, should have an equal say. However, the concept of substantive equality proposes that if Mary and John both support idea A, while Jane supports idea B, there should not necessarily be twice as many resources put into idea A. If Mary has put forward her view, John does not need to put forward the same argument again, whereas, it is important that Jane puts forth her  view. Christiano suggests that in discourse we can learn a lot from hearing the views of others, and therefore, we should focus on the fact that there is supply of both idea A and B, and not on the fact that there is greater demand for idea A.[7] Focussing on qualitative equality in discourse is one step to addressing the inequalities created by the varying participation levels of groups with diverse ideas. However, it prescribes nothing on how one ought to decide.

Philosophical problems with the current situation

The following section will focus on how procedural equality is adversely hampered by substantive inequality. The first issue to be tackled is the problem of political elites. Green notes that those making decisions for the vast majority of society don’t actually represent their constituents. He writes that ‘transportation policies are made by people who fly in (subsidised) private planes, are driven by chauffeurs, and generally travel first class in every way possible.’[8] In addition to this, it is visible in Australia that those making laws on refugee policies have never been refugees, those making decisions on climate change are not the poor who are most reliant on the land, and those who decide how much money goes to public housing have never been homeless. Political elites are ‘of a different effective social class from the bulk of their constituents.’[9]

Is this a bad thing for democracy and equality? Surely there is some expectation that those who are elected to the highest offices have expert skills, enabling them to make considered decisions? It is possible to have equality without democracy, and perhaps complete equality is more compatible with benevolent dictatorship. However, as was pointed out previously in this paper, the people have less of an obligation to follow laws that they did not help make. Often, dictatorships are not benevolent, or only benevolent to few, so it appears to be rather utopian to suggest that a functioning liberal democracy will not be the best form of government to implement equality. Therefore, proper representation through electing leaders who do not just represent the peoples’ views but also represent the peoples’ material status is important. To grasp a solution to this problem, the political philosopher must ask why the public elect people who are of a different social class to their constituents.

As noted earlier by Verba and Nie, there is not an equal distribution of participation among voters, and this can be broken up into social class. The rich are typically able to exercise greater influence over politics and how society is constructed as compared to the poor. Brighouse gives some clear reasons for why this is the case: ‘they (the rich) usually have more access to mass media, a more suitable educational background and more leisure time to develop considered views about political issues.’[10] Therefore, the rich typically have a greater ability to persuade others to their views. Christiano suggests that deliberation among equals is one of the most effective ways to gain democratic equality.[11] However, with the rich having better access to education, media, and other resources, it does not seem that deliberation among equals is currently occurring.

Examples of procedural and substantive issues

Over the past few months the world has seen unusually large numbers of people rising up, arguing that there is too much socioeconomic inequality, and furthermore, that money is infiltrating democracy leaving the big decisions in the hands of wealthy corporations. There is not merely a problem in theory with wealth and democracy, but as we shall see, it is a very serious problem in practice for democratic nation-states, now more than ever. The proposed mining super-profits tax is an example of where an advertising campaign by wealthy corporations was able to sway public opinion, arguably in a manner which was unhealthy for democracy.[12] In regard to the tax, The Australian provocatively asked the reader ‘How much does it cost to bring down a prime minister? The answer a tad over $22 million.’[13] It seems that the effect of the advertising was what Brighouse described as ‘subliminal manipulation that bypassed the rational capacities of the voter.’[14] He distinguishes this from coming to a decision ‘through a process of ratiocination in conditions of free and equal debate.’[15] While there were multiple factors at play in the ousting of Rudd and the dilution of the super-profits tax, it seems that in this instance, as predicted, the rich won.

Currently, the issue of how to best to tackle problem gambling is receiving attention in the Australian media after Independent Member Andrew Wilkie and Independent Senator Nick Xenophon proposed tougher regulation and limits on how much people can bet. Tim Costello, chairman of the Australian Churches Gambling Taskforce, argues that the $11.8 billion industry is in dire need of reform.[16] With four in every ten dollars coming from problem gamblers, it is understandable as to why change is unattractive to the industry. And while the industry have every right, as equals, to voice their concern, their voice should not be a roar which masks the possibility for progress. Unfortunately, this has been the case. Costello writes that Clubs NSW used ‘political donations to buy government access’ and that Clubs Australia has ‘mounted a sustained campaign of personal attacks’ against the politicians who suggested reform to current pokies legislation.[17] Similar to the campaign by the mining industry against Rudd’s proposed super-profits tax, Clubs Australia will do what they need to do to ensure that their shareholders are satisfied. As often happens when money enters into politics, this leads to an ‘ends justify the means’ scenario. Few of the most virtuous men or women can survive sustained, belligerent, personal attacks of an expensive marketing campaign. This is particularly harmful to democracy.

In summary, democracy is a good way of ensuring a basic standard of equality. However, as shown throughout this paper, there are different levels of democracy. The case studies above have shown that for true democracy to exist, and for correlative equality to come about, the government must ensure that the rich are not drowning out the poor and the working-class. An effective way of bringing this about is by ensuring that equality is a major focus of democratic institutions. This essay supports Myer’s proposition, that ‘government intervention in the economic realm is necessary for the promotion of equal freedom.’[18] True procedural equality cannot be achieved until the substantive problems adversely affecting it are fixed. Once these problems are fixed through better regulation and a higher priority on the supply of ideas rather than just demand, only then will we see the flow on effects from procedural equality.

Bibliography

Brighouse, H. (1996). "Egalitarianism and Equal Availability of Political Influence." Journal of Political Philosophy 4(2): 118-141. 2, 4. Retrieved http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.1996.tb00045.x.

Christiano, T. (1996). Deliberative Equality and Democratic Order. Political order. I. Shapiro and R. Hardin. New York, New York University Press: 251-287.

Costello, T. (2011). "Clubs use tricky numbers to outfox pokies reform."   Retrieved November 3, 2011, from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/clubs-use-tricky-numbers-to-outfox-pokies-reform/story-e6frgd0x-1226183977007.

Davis, M. (2011). "A snip at $22m to get rid of PM."   Retrieved November 3, 2011, from http://www.smh.com.au/business/a-snip-at-22m-to-get-rid-of-pm-20110201-1acgj.html.

Green, P. (1985). Retrieving democracy : in search of civic equality. Totowa, N.J., Rowman & Allanheld.

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (2011). "Jeremy Bentham."   Retrieved November 3, 2011, from http://www.iep.utm.edu/bentham/.

Megalogenis, G. (2010). "Trivial Pursuit: Leadership and the End of the Reform Era." Quarterly Essay(40): 1-83. 40. Retrieved November 1, 2011 from http://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=586827778419771;res=IELHSS.

Myers, J. C. (2010). The politics of equality : an introduction. London; New York; New York, Zed Books ; Distributed in the USA exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan.

Singer, P. (1973). Democracy and disobedience. Oxford, Clarendon Press.

Verba, S. and N. H. Nie (1972). Participation in America: political democracy and social equality. New York, Harper & Row.

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[1] Singer, Democracy and disobedience, Oxford, 1973, p. 43.

[2] Myers, The politics of equality : an introduction, London; New York; New York, 2010, p. 34.

[3] Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Jeremy Bentham, 2011.

[4] Green, Retrieving democracy : in search of civic equality, Totowa, N.J., 1985, p. 172.

[5] Verba and Nie, Participation in America: political democracy and social equality, New York, 1972, pp. 336-337.

[6] Brighouse, Egalitarianism and Equal Availability of Political Influence, 1996, p. 126.

[7] Christiano, Deliberative Equality and Democratic Order, New York, 1996, pp. 258-259.

[8] Green, Retrieving democracy : in search of civic equality, 1985, p. 177.

[9] Ibid., p. 178.

[10] Brighouse, Egalitarianism and Equal Availability of Political Influence, 1996, p. 120.

[11] Christiano, Deliberative Equality and Democratic Order, 1996, p. 252.

[12] Megalogenis, Trivial Pursuit: Leadership and the End of the Reform Era, 2010, p. 4.

[13] Davis, A snip at $22m to get rid of PM, 2011.

[14] Brighouse, Egalitarianism and Equal Availability of Political Influence, 1996, p. 126.

[15] Ibid., p. 126.

[16] Costello, Clubs use tricky numbers to outfox pokies reform, Sydney, 2011.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Myers, The politics of equality : an introduction, 2010, p. 83.

Singer and the principle of equality

note: i would love to hear your views on whether you think utilitarianism can undermine equality. comments are greatly appreciated. here's a picture that sum's up Mr Singer:

image taken from http://goo.gl/r1wMC

The principle of equality that Singer defends has radical consequences. Critically discuss the principle, explaining some of its consequences, and assess whether Singer is right that we  ought to adopt it.

Singer’s principle of equality can have radical consequences. The principle of equality has practical and intuitive appeal as it is able to eliminate many forms of discrimination based on characteristics such as race or sex. Singer’s ideas have also been described as useful for normative ethics as they are based on simple and widely accepted presuppositions (Schaler, 2009, p. 405.).  However, this paper shows how Singer’s principle of equality is inconsistent with his ‘utilitarian exemption’ that allows for the prioritisation of the equal interests of one person above the equal interests of another person based on the consequences of the prioritisation.

According to Singer (1993, p. 21.), the principle of equality can be briefly described as ‘the principle of equal consideration of equal interests’. Singer (1993, p. 21.) suggests that it is morally irrelevant who the interest is held by, asserting that ‘an interest is an interest, whoever’s interest it may be’. For example, If Bob and myself were to both be affected by a possible act, and if Bob stands more to lose than I stand to gain, then it is better not to do the act. I should not favour myself above Bob because I hold the belief that my interests are of greater importance than Bob’s. This example shows how the principle of equality demands impartiality on the part of the one scrutinising the act. Singer (1993, pp. 22-23.) acknowledges that different people have different interests which may ‘vary according to their abilities or other characteristics’. This is a helpful practical consideration as we can draw a distinction between the following two examples: if I am a professional piano player, it can be argued according to this rule, that my interest in not having my index fingers chopped off is greater than another person’s interest in not having their index fingers chopped off. In contrast, if I have an interest in cheap clothing at the expense of atrocious working conditions for the producer of my clothes, I cannot claim that my interest is weightier. Singer would suggest that my interest in cheap clothing is of significantly less moral weighting than the producer’s interest in fair working conditions.

There are occasions where Singer permits exceptions to the principle of equality. The following example illustrates one of these circumstances. Two people may both be suffering a great deal of pain in the wake of a natural disaster. One of the two victims of the natural disaster happens to be a doctor. Singer suggests that it is permissible to prioritise the relief of the doctor’s pain over the relief of the non-doctor person’s pain. Singer (1993, pp. 21-22.) suggest this, because by relieving the suffering of the doctor, utility will be able to be maximised as the doctor will then be able to relieve the suffering of others. Political philosopher John Rawls uses a similar widely accepted justification for income inequality. Rawls suggests that any structural socio-economic inequalities attached to certain positions, like being a doctor, must be to the maximum benefit of the least advantaged. Positions such as being a doctor must also, according to Rawls, be open to all (Rawls, 2000, pp. 52-53.). For Singer, the case of the natural disaster illustrated above is simply a situation where there is an inequality is allowed (prioritising the doctors relief from suffering) in order to maximise utility. In the following example I will show how Singer’s principle of equality erroneously prioritises the interests of the doctor above the interests of the non-doctors and how this in fact breaches the principle of equality.

Utilitarianism and the principle of equality cannot always be reconciled with one another. An asymmetry can be drawn between the doctor who Singer chooses to save in the case of the natural disaster and the beam-fitter in Thomson’s Trolley case. I will briefly explain the Beam Fitter scenario: in this version of the trolley case, there are five people who are assigned each day to work on track A while there is one person who always works on track B as a ‘beam-fitter’. The workmen always work on the same track each day. Thomson suggests that if a trolley was to come towards the workmen on track A, Bloggs is not justified in changing the trolley’s direction to track B. Bloggs is not justified in ‘saving’ the five people on track A because the Beam Fitter always works on track B and therefore, unless the Beam Fitter was very altruistic, he never would have consented to the trolley being diverted towards himself (Thomson, 1990, pp. 131-136.).

Consider once again the case of the doctor and the natural disaster. Elaborating on the previous example, in this case one hundred people are all be in need of medical attention within three hours. Unfortunately there is only one ‘special lifesaving pill’ which can only save one person. Within three hours, without medical attention, the other ninety-nine people will die. Singer would argue that the pill should go to the one doctor, who then can within the three hours, treat two more people. These two patients will then be able to live for one more year each. This would end up satisfying the most preferences by satisfying one major preference; the doctor’s desire to live a full and complete life, and two relatively minor preferences; the non-doctor peoples’ desires to live one more year. However the parallel with Thomson’s beam-fitter case would suggest that such a view is not entirely fair. If you are the doctor in this case you are guaranteed survival, while if you are one of the ninety-nine other people you will only have a very small chance of surviving only one more year of life. It is likely that the ninety-nine non-doctors would prefer to have a small but equal chance of receiving the life-giving pill rather than having no chance of receiving the pill and a small chance of living for one more year. There is not an equal consideration of equal interests if the one-hundred people do not have equal chance of receiving the pill. Singer (1993, pp. 20-21.) writes that ‘there is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we give to their interests’. Singer’s ‘utilitarian exemption’ to the principle of equality contradicts itself by not allowing the principle to give equal consideration to equal interests. In essence, this exemption means that higher value is placed on lives of doctors over other non-doctor people. Like racism or sexism, this is a bad thing firstly because the position of being a doctor is not open to all, and secondly, because arbitrary attributes such as one’s career choice should not determine one’s chances of survival. An alternate distribution of the pill by method of lottery can much better synthesise with the principle of equality, yet such a distribution would not be able to synthesise with utilitarianism.

Singer’s principle of equality contains significant prima facie appeal in that it is accessible, intuitive, and convincing. However, Singer’s poor attempt at reconciling utilitarianism with the principle of equality shows the principle’s weakness. The doctor case illustrated above reveals inconsistencies within the principle of equality as per how Singer describes it. I therefore conclude that, although the principle of equality may be useful if reconsidered separate from utilitarianism, due to its problematic nature we have no reason to accept or adopt it.

Bibliography

JAMIESON, D. 1999. Singer and his critics, Oxford, UK; Malden, Mass., Blackwell Publishers.

RAWLS, J. 2000. A theory of justice, Cambridge, Mass, Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press.

SCHALER, J. A. 2009. Peter Singer under fire : the moral iconoclast faces his critics, Chicago, Open Court.

SINGER, P. 1993. Practical ethics, Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press.

SINGER, P. 2001. Writings on an ethical life, London, Fourth Estate.

THOMSON, J. J. 1990. The trolley problem. In: HANDFIELD, T. (ed.) Life, Death and Morality Reader. Melbourne: Monash University.