Rawls and the Abolition of the Family

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Does justice as fairness imply the abolition the family?

Justice as fairness has had a profound effect on political theory. This essay seeks to establish whether justice as fairness implies the abolition of the family or whether justice as fairness implies the more modest action of reform. The essay begins with an explanation of the key concepts such as the ‘basic structure’ and the ‘veil of ignorance’ in Justice As Fairness: A Restatement by John Rawls. The ideas of Susan Moller Okin and Veronique Munoz-Dardée will be discussed in order to go beyond Rawls’s limited writings on the topic in order to consider more fully how his principles of justice interact with the institution of the family. For this topic I will attempt to separate the normative elements from the empirical elements while acknowledging that one’s perspective on the empirical elements of the institution of the family may influence their perspective of what justice as fairness requires for the institution in a normative sense.

Rawls uses a device called the ‘veil of ignorance’ through which he suggests that risk-averse and rational participants would choose the following two principles of justice to apply to the basic structure. The two principles of justice are as follows

a)                  ‘Each person has the same indefensible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and

b)                  Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).’[1]

The basic structure, which Rawls seeks to apply these principles of justice to, ‘is the way in which the main political and social institutions of society fit together into one system of social cooperation, and the way they assign basic rights and duties and regulate the division of advantages that arises from social cooperation over time.’ The basic structure consists of ‘the political constitution with an independent judiciary, the legally recognised forms of property, and the structure of the economy (for example, as a system of competitive markets with private property in the means of production), as well as the family in some form.’ [2]

Rawls includes the family in the basic structure because ‘one of its essential roles is to establish the orderly production and reproduction of society and of its culture from one generation to the next.’[3] Rawls suggests that ‘no particular form of the family (monogamous, heterosexual, or otherwise) is so far required by a political conception of justice so long as it is arranged to fulfil these tasks effectively and does not run afoul of other political values.’[4] However, Rawls, somewhat ambiguously limits the scope that the principles of justice have in their affect upon the family by suggesting that ‘political principles do not apply directly to its [the family’s] internal life but they do impose essential constraints on the family as an institution and guarantee the basic rights and liberties and fair opportunities for all its members.’[5]

One may question how the substance of this formal equality can arise without directly affecting the internal life of the institution. If the family, in its current and historical modes is perceived to be moderately unjust and in need of minor reform, Rawls’s approach would seem reasonable and remain consistent with values of liberty. Whereas, if the family, in its current and historical modes is perceived to be severely unjust and in need of major reform or abolition, then one would be more sympathetic to an approach where the family is directly the subject matter of the principles of justice.

In Justice, Gender, and the Family, Okin provides a generally constructive critique of Rawls’s Justice As Fairness from a feminist perspective. In her response to Justice As Fairness and Rawls’s other works she suggests that Rawls uses sexist language and largely ignores historical injustices directed towards women and their subjugation within the family. This has led Okin to feel obliged to ask, ‘does this theory of justice apply to women?’[6] Okin’s drawn out critique of Rawls’s sexist language, while accurate and somewhat relevant, is on the weaker side of her criticism. The strongest challenge that she presents to Rawls is questioning what grounding he has to omit the institution of the family from the direct impact of the principles of justice as they apply to the rest of the basic structure.

Rawls suggests that the principles of justice apply to broader political and economic institutions rather than to the internal life of private groups and associations such as ‘firms and labour unions, churches, universities, and the family.’[7] He uses the example of a church being able to excommunicate heretics but not being allowed to burn them. This, according to Rawls, is compatible with justice as fairness. Although Rawls may not personally believe such an action is justified, he is seeking to establish a system of political justice rather than a moral framework such as utilitarianism which is significantly more comprehensive in its scope. In the same way, Rawls sees the institution of the family as ‘bound by the constraints arising from the principles of justice’, but only ‘indirectly from just background institutions within which associations and groups exist, and by which the conduct of their members is restricted.’[8] He points out that women and men ‘are equal citizens and have equal basic rights,’ and goes on to state that ‘to establish equality between men and women in sharing the work of society, in preserving its culture and in reproducing itself over time, special provisions are needed in family law (and no doubt elsewhere) so that the burden of bearing, raising, and educating children does not fall more heavily on women, thereby undermining their fair equality of opportunity.’[9]

Rawls explicitly argues for reform as opposed to more radical change such as abolition in securing justice for all peoples including those who form part of a family institution. While Okin does not directly call for the abolition of the family in Justice, Gender, And The Family, she does believe that ‘a consistent and wholehearted application of Rawls’s liberal principles of justice can lead us to challenge fundamentally the gender system of our society.’[10] It is apparent that this is not the purpose of justice as fairness as intended by Rawls. However, if Okin is right in suggesting that Rawl’s principles of justice would ‘fundamentally change the gender system of our society’, then these same principles would ultimately impact on the family which is an institution which has historically been largely shaped through the gender system.

Another important analysis of what Rawls’s theory means for the institution of the family is presented by Munoz-Dardé in Is the Family to Be Abolished Then?. She makes several empirical claims as background to her argument. The article begins with the assertion that ‘the family is one of the main causes of morally arbitrary inequality. Moreover, it is not inequality which makes everyone better off.’[11] This empirical claim is directly appealing to Rawls’s ‘difference principle’ which was explained earlier. The same claim could also be made about private property. It seems likely that private property also does not satisfy the difference principle in being of the ‘greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.’[12] In the same way, the author suggests that the difference principle should lead us to question whether the family is to the greatest benefit of its lest well-off members. To satisfy the ‘difference principle’ in this case, one may need to consider whether the institution of the family benefits women and children, or at least, whether the inequalities created by the institution are to their maximum benefit. Such a broad empirical assertion cannot be made here, but it will suffice to say that there are conceivable instances of the family working to either the advantage or the disadvantage of its least well-off members.

Munoz-Dardé views child rearing by elders within a community as an essential function of the family and she describes the family by this function. Understanding that children must still be cared for if the family were to be abolished, she contrasts the institution of the family with a well-run orphanage. In Marriage and Morals, Russel suggests the state substitution of the family would come with both positive and negative consequences. He argues that health and education have improved due to state intervention in Western nations. However, he also point to ‘grave dangers’ in trusting the state in the role of ‘parenting’ children. The main issue of concern for Russell is that the state is likely to treat children as a means rather than an ends, whereas, due to individual bonds between parents and their children, parents are more likely to treat their children as an ends in themselves. After referring to Russell’s argument, Munoz-Dardé concedes that the abolition of the family in favour of a well run orphanage ‘would probably pose such extreme threats to individual liberty and capacity for self-determination, that it would defeat the very purpose that made us envisage its substitution by a well-run orphanage.’[13]

Munoz-Dardé does suggest that state marriage should be abolished because it ‘creates inequalities which are not beneficial to the worst-off.’[14] However, she does not see any need to intervene upon the institution as a ritual or religious ceremony. Allowing the institution of marriage to continue yet abolishing state recognition of marriage does not abolish the institution itself. Therefore, the steps that Munoz-Dardé is proposing to take in regards to both the family and marriage are closer to reform than abolition. While either reform or abolition could be invoked to achieve justice in the institution of the family, a Rawlsian political approach, both through explication and implication, would suggest that reform would be the preferred option.[15]

Rawls does not provide a strong and comprehensive defence of the family in Justice As Fairness: A Restatement. Indeed Rawls does not intend his political theory to be comprehensive and to explicitly intrude upon the domains of the private sphere or the moral sphere so long as his egalitarian political conception of the good can still be met. However, several authors, such as Okin have noted similar sentiments as this: ‘the critical force of the original position becomes evident when one considers that some of the most creative critiques of Rawls’s theory have resulted from more radical or broad interpretations of the original position than his own.’[16] The Rawlsian method has proved useful for both Okin and Munoz-Dardé in highlighting the failures of the institution of the family. However, given the unattractiveness of the alternative possibilities and their associated threats to liberty, I will conclude by suggesting that justice as fairness does not imply the abolition of the family but significant reform.

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[1] Rawls and Kelly, Justice as fairness, 42–43.

[2] Ibid., 10.

[3] Ibid., 162.

[4] Ibid., 163.

[5] Ibid., 164.

[6] Susan Moller Okin, Justice, gender, and the family, 91.

[7] Rawls and Kelly, Justice as fairness, 10.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid., 11.

[10] Susan Moller Okin, Justice, gender, and the family, 89.

[11] Munoz-Dardée, “Is the Family to Be Abolished Then?,” 37.

[12] Rawls and Kelly, Justice as fairness, 42–43.

[13] Munoz-Dardée, “Is the Family to Be Abolished Then?,” 216.

[14] Ibid., 54.

[15] Rawls and Freeman, Collected papers, 600. Such an approach is discussed in Collected Papers in direct response to authors such as Okin.

[16] Susan Moller Okin, Justice, gender, and the family, 101; see also: Okin, “Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender,” 42.

Munoz-Darde, Veronique. “Is the Family to Be Abolished Then?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99, no. 1 (1999): 37–56.

Okin, Susan Moller. “Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender.” Ethics 105, no. 1 (1994): 23–43.

Rawls, John, and Samuel Richard Freeman. Collected papers. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999.

Rawls, John, and Erin Kelly. Justice as fairness : a restatement. Cambridge, Mass [u.a.]: Harvard Univ. Press, 2003.

Susan Moller Okin. Justice, gender, and the family. New York: Basic Books, 1989.

Singer and Rawls on International Justice

Compare the conception of international justice held by Peter Singer and John Rawls. Indicate which thinker’s conception is superior and why.

John Rawls and Peter Singer both hold to the view that society should be constructed in an egalitarian manner. In this essay I will explore the differing methodologies which Rawls and Singer use to develop their respective theories of international justice. I will argue that Rawl’s approach has stronger potential if the ‘difference principle’ were to be applied to the international justice sphere. I will also explore Singer’s theory and suggest that as they both stand, Singer provides a more responsible and egalitarian conception of international justice. Throughout this essay, I will work from the assumption that a philosophically consistent, egalitarian and responsible theory is superior to the alternative options.

First, I will briefly describe the core components of Justice as Fairness which is Rawls’ domestic conception of justice. A basic understanding of Rawls’ domestic conception of justice will help us better understand the potential of a Rawls-based conception of international justice. Rawls’ domestic understanding of justice applies primarily to how the ‘basic structure’ of society should be set out and regulated. The term constructivism can be appropriately applied to his theory as he considers justice ‘only as a virtue of social institutions.’[1] The two primary principles that Rawls seeks to fulfill are as follows: (i) an ‘equal right to extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all’, and (ii) that ‘inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone’s advantage, and provided the positions and offices to which they attach, or from which they may be gained, are open to all.’[2] It is important to note that the second principle is not utilitarian (average or total) in the sense that disadvantaging the least well-off can be counterbalanced by advantaging the most well-off equal amounts. According to Rawls, if there is an inequality it must benefit all people including the least well-off. This will be referred to as the difference principle.

These principles are what Rawls believes a rational, risk-averse, and self-interested person would choose in the original position. According to Rawls, in the original position ‘no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.’[3] He goes on to state that ‘the principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.’ Behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ people are unknowing of particular factors which should when applied nullify ‘the accidents of natural endowment and the contingencies of social circumstance as counters in quest for political and economic advantage.’[4]

The aforementioned elements of Rawls’ thinking are to be applied in full to the domestic realm, yet, they are only granted limited applicability by Rawls in the international realm. The difference principle is especially relevant to my later discussion of the potential of a Rawlsian understanding of international justice. Law of Peoples is Rawls’ attempt to extend Justice as Fairness to the international sphere. He endeavors to develop a framework of international justice which is ecumenical, and one which is not partisan to ‘societies whose political institutions and culture are liberal.’ Rawls states that a ‘liberal society must respect other societies organized by comprehensive doctrines, provided that their political and social institutions meet certain conditions that lead the society to adhere to a reasonable law of peoples.’[5] He provides seven principles in regards to international relations which include respect for freedom and independence, equality among persons, rights to self-defense (but not aggression), duty of nonintervention, duty to observe treaties and undertakings, restrictions within war, and a duty to honor human rights.[6] While Rawls does suggest that there ‘should be certain provisions for mutual assistance between peoples in times of famine and drought’, his theory of international justice emphasizes restrictions rather than prescriptions; negative duties of justice rather than positive duties of distributive justice, like his domestic theory.[7]

Peter Singer, unlike Rawls, uses a moralist approach to support his arguments surrounding international justice. These arguments are not tied in with a social contract.[8] His views are broadly utilitarian, although, one could easily accept the argument he gives in Famine, Affluence, and Morality without having a commitment to utilitarianism. Singer begins with the assumption that ‘suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care’ are bad things. His argument then follows that ‘if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.’ [9] The qualifier he uses in the strong version of the principle, ‘without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance’ (my emphasis) is particularly important. [10] Singer is essentially suggesting that we must give foreign aid to the point of marginal utility whereby to give any more resources would sacrifice something which of equal moral worth, either for us or our dependents. Following this principle to its logical conclusions would have radical implications for how many people, especially those of us who reside in richer nations, would have to live in order to be moral.

The principle is most simply articulated by the drowning child example which Singer provides in Famine, Affluence, and Morality. He puts forward the deceptively uncontroversial assertion that ‘if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out.’ Singer goes on to suggest that the distance between me and the child ‘makes no moral difference.’ Since Singer, like most practical philosophers, subscribes to principles of ‘impartiality, universalisability,’ and ‘equality,’ it seems reasonable to state that distance either makes very little difference or no difference at all in situations where people who have access to vast resources can easily support famine relief in places like Bangladesh. [11] He also refutes the argument that says ‘there are other people either equally or better placed to give money and this therefore exempts me from owing anything to the worlds’ poor.’ While it may be the case that there are people better placed than I to help, it is clear that many of those people have chosen not to address the problem and therefore the conclusion is based upon a hypothetical premise which presumes that the very rich will do all that they can to address poverty. As Singer points out, such an argument is ‘an ideal excuse for inactivity’ which does nothing to address the situation which we currently find ourselves in.[12]

The question regarding which author provides a better framework for dealing with poverty is a difficult one. I will argue that as their respective theories stand, Peter Singer provides a better theory in regards to international justice. However, if John Rawls took his theory of domestic justice as it is outlined in A Theory Of Justice and applied it consistently to the realm of international justice, his theory would be able to address poverty equally, if not better than Singer’s theory. There are two main reasons why Rawls’ theory of international justice is incomplete: (i) he attempts to synthesize liberal tolerance with prescriptive egalitarianism, and (ii) he effectively creates a morality based upon the social contract.

In order to gain ecumenical support, Rawls compromises and waters down many of the logical conclusions that one would reach if they were to apply the ‘veil of ignorance’ hypothetical scenario to shape international governance.  Rawls attempts to be tolerant with societies whose members may have different conceptions of justice than ours, and who may be guided by different kinds of comprehensive doctrines.[13] However, this apparent respect of ‘other societies organized by comprehensive doctrines’ effectively forfeits our social contract with them, meaning that there is no clear burden under the ‘veil of ignorance’ for a rational person to suggest that economic assistance must be given to poor people in illiberal nations. The rational person knows that she will not become a member of an illiberal society under the ‘veil of ignorance’ because the veil does not apply to illiberal societies. This then means that she has no good reason to make allowances for these people unless they will somehow improve her lot, which in many cases, is highly improbable.

The second objection to Rawl’s theory ties in strongly with the first objection. Rawls’ theory of international justice is based on the social contract. While any theory based upon the social contract should be first seen as contractarian rather than moral, it is unavoidable for a theory like Rawls’ to have many moral implications, imperatives, and restrictions. Strictly speaking, it is not immoral to decide under the ‘veil of ignorance’ that there will be a small portion of people who control a great deal of society’s wealth, this should be seen as irrational. However, making a decision under the ‘veil of ignorance’, then changing the decision when the veil is lifted, in favor of one’s self interest, could be seen as immoral. In short, Rawls’ theory has moral implications even though it is based on rationality. The morality drawn from Rawls’ theory could be summed up as ‘do unto others as they do unto me.’ This is unfortunate as any morality that gives an exemptions if other people choose not to follow it is flawed. Effectively, such a morality is dependent on the actions of another person rather than any deeply held conviction.

In Practical Ethics (Second Ed.) Singer argues that wealthy nations should be significantly more generous in their intake of asylum seekers, perhaps up until the point of marginal utility. He creates a scenario similar to the ‘drowning child’ thought experiment which was previously mentioned. Singer asks whether the investors in the hypothetical underground community called Fairhaven should allow non-investing people into their community, allowing them to escape the extreme radiation outside. Members of Fairhaven will have to give up their tennis courts, swimming pools, and their large gymnasium in order to give those outside some form of basic accommodation. Singer presents three options: (i) admit all 10,000 outsiders and lose all the sports and entertainment facilities, (ii) admit only 500 outsiders and lose a quarter of the tennis courts (which only had little use), or (iii) admit no outsiders and therefore accept no costs.[14] I find this to be a compelling argument for a more responsible and egalitarian approach to those fleeing persecution across borders. However, as a utilitarian, Singer is obliged to consider the consequences for all affected parties, which leads to a great deal of moral complexity when this issue could have been a simple matter. In the third edition of Practical Ethics, Singer removed the chapter Insiders and Outsiders, explaining why in the preface. He cites reasons such as the possibility of a ‘racist backlash’ if a country accepts large numbers of refugees as ‘highly relevant’ to the discussion, and no doubt, highly relevant to why he chose to omit this chapter in the third edition of Practical Ethics.[15] I find this argument to be both inconsistent with the Fairhaven hypothetical mentioned above and revealing of the limits of utilitarianism. If ‘racist backlashes’ are of genuine concern for Singer’s theory of international justice, his theory is little more than a Lifeboat Ethic.

As mentioned previously, and as noted by thinkers such as Pogge and Singer, Rawls’ main area of concern is the domestic sphere.[16] It is unfortunate that throughout The Law of Peoples, Rawls continually refers to the benefits of the ‘veil of ignorance’ only being conferred on to the citizen.[17] In a practical application of the ‘veil of ignorance’, as Rawls intends the device to be used, it seems inevitable that one would know that one will become a citizen of a liberal and democratic state, which would in turn justify self-interested and potentially deeply harmful policies towards outsiders. However, this goes against the very intention of the ‘veil of ignorance’ which aims to ‘nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage.’[18] In Carens’ critique of Rawls, he points out that ‘whether one is a citizen of a rich nation or a poor one, whether one is already a citizen of a particular state or an alien who wishes to become a citizen – this is the sort of specific contingency that could set people at odds … We should therefore take a global, not a national view of the original position.’[19] Carens’ approach is ironically more compatible with the ‘veil of ignorance’ than the approach that Rawls himself utilised.

In conclusion, I find Singer’s theory of international justice to be superior to Rawls’, as Rawls intended his theory to be understood. However, if Rawls’ conception of domestic justice were to be applied to the international sphere, it would have the potential to be far more robust that Singer’s. The ‘veil of ignorance’, as it has been critiqued by authors such as Pogge and Carens, could be incredibly useful in the international realm, but only if it is applied with consistency.

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Bibliography

Carens, Joseph H. “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders.” The Review of Politics 49, no. 2 (April 1, 1987): 251–273.

Pogge, Thomas W. Realizing Rawls. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1989.

Rawls, John. A theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.

———. Collected papers. Edited by Samuel Richard Freeman. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999.

———. “Justice as Fairness.” The Philosophical Review 67, no. 2 (April 1, 1958): 164–194.

———. “The Main Idea of the Theory of Justice.” In Ethics, edited by Peter Singer, 362–367. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Singer, Peter. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” In World hunger and moral obligation, edited by William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977.

———. Practical Ethics. Second ed. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

———. Practical Ethics. Third ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

[1] John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” The Philosophical Review 67, no. 2 (April 1, 1958): 164.

[2] Ibid., 165.

[3] John Rawls, “The Main Idea of the Theory of Justice,” in Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 363.

[4] Ibid., 365.

[5] Rawls and Freeman, Collected Papers, 540–541.

John Rawls, Collected papers, ed. Samuel Richard Freeman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 532–531.

[6] Ibid., 540.

[7] Ibid., 540–541.

[8] In using the term ‘moralist’, I do not seek to suggest that Singer has political affiliations with groups who call themselves moralists. Rather, I am pointing out that his theory is directly speaking about what is right and wrong rather than what is rational and irrational.

[9] Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” in World hunger and moral obligation, ed. William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 24.

[10] Ibid.

[11] All quoted material in the beginning of this paragraph can be found in: Ibid., 24–25.

[12] Ibid., 25–26.

[13] Rawls, Collected papers, 530.

[14] Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, Second ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

[15] Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, Third ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

[16] Thomas W Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1989), 1–14; Singer, Practical Ethics, 253.

[17] Rawls, Collected papers, 537–541.

[18] John Rawls, A theory of Justice. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 136.

[19] Joseph H. Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” The Review of Politics 49, no. 2 (April 1, 1987): 256.