My Religion

‘Religion’ [inverted commas]

Religion is a term that can refer to many different things including belief, philosophies, culture and community. Here I am going to talk about ‘religion’ in terms of a personal belief that exists in all people (including both those who do and do not believe they encounter a spiritual realm) which gives us a framework to function. Religion as I will refer to it is the driving force behind the christian, muslim, jew, atheist, agnostic, etc. Religion is not the monopoly of those who call themselves ‘religious’ but the meaning that each of us find. It is the truth that points us to a capital ‘T’ Truth.

Loss of innocence

My basis in religion stems from growing up in a baptist church with my immediate family members involved in churches of various denominations. There are some critical points in my lived experience which caused me to deconstruct what I once knew to be infallible truth, and have in turn pointed me to what I understand to be Truth.

Hell

Hell for me was a place where people who hadn’t committed their lives to Jesus ended up. I was never really sure whether it was fire and brimstone, or simply a separation from God. But I was taught that it is the place my friends end up if I don’t convert them. When someone who mentored me in the social justice space hung himself, I tried to synthesise my belief with a new lived reality. My friend wrote on his note ‘if there is a God, I hope he forgives me.’

I only have my lived experience to back this up. I know that a God who deeply loves humanity and could even deeply love me would not be a God who would throw my friend into the depths of hell for eternity for not towing the party line. Like Rob Bell, I began asking ‘does God get what God wants?’, and believing in the God who wants relationship and restoration, I could only answer yes.

So from that perspective, I don’t actually care whether Hell exists in another realm. It could, but nothing in my world would fall apart if it didn’t. What I do know is that hell exists on earth now - in Australia’s detention centres, in occupied Palestine, and for people trapped in situations of domestic violence.

Depravity

Though I may have struggled to admit this, depravity was the lens through which I saw the world. I believed that humans at their very core were broken not bent. The only way to resolve this brokenness was to wrap it up with orthodoxy (right belief), and then fix other people’s brokenness through orthopraxy (right practice). I had to remind myself and others of our shared depravity, and that I had the magical cure to offer them.

It was a radical change for me to come to the understanding that at our very core, at our deepest level, we are the image of God. We have within us the Truth that we are seeking. It’s the Truth which other truths guide us towards. Rather than adding doctrine, theology and religious practices into our lives, we must strip back the lies, hurt and pain which stand in the way of us becoming at one with our very essence. Only then can we delve into and derive energy from the image of God inside us.

This has lead me to believe that good can exist where I was told God was not. There is the capacity within every living human to contribute to a wider vision of what could be. There is nothing I can do to remove the image of God and truth within me from myself or from another human.

Reconstruction

It’s much easier to deconstruct than to reconstruct. For many of us, our lived experience propels us into deconstructing the systematic religion we once believed. A life without reconstructed religion or philosophy is appealing. It presents itself as freedom gives the illusion that happiness is attainable.

Perhaps more problematically, such a deconstructed understanding tends to hold up happiness as the central virtue. Yet it cannot derive meaning or purpose in suffering, and it doesn’t have the foresight to sacrifice for the ‘other’. The identity of the deconstructed self is entirely fluid, unreliable, and is unable to hold to principal through trials in order to better understand itself. The deconstructed self can only exist in the immediacy and no one should dare to predict where it may be tomorrow.

While at our very core we have only the capacity to love and to do good, surrounded by this is are our capacities to be selfish, to hate, and to destroy. I believe we can be active in engaging the deepest level of ourselves and others and in doing so bring about a kind of ‘heaven’ on earth and to some degree, within our own lived experience. This could have many facets, but for me includes:

1. A commitment to a specific community to draw energy from
2. Seeing the outsider as sacred and inviting them in (the greatest example I perceive of this 'enemy love' is the Crucifixion of Jesus and the way he responded to a violent system)
3. An openness to learn and adopt the truths of others which point to Truth.
4. Understanding heaven and hell are lived realities for many people
5. Pursuing a world which releases people from manmade ‘hells on earth’ and enables heaven to take root among us.

'Generosity Cap' : stepping towards a refugee solution

I have been involved in refugee advocacy for over three years. I have said a lot about what is morally wrong with how the state of Australia treats asylum seekers, and how the nation of Australia views them. I have also discovered that many on ‘my side’ of the fence, as it were, are somewhat more reluctant in putting forward a tenable ‘solution’, or at least a step in what we may believe is the right direction.

This is understandable as there are many contradictory ideological perspectives that can group together to attack how the state and nation view those seeking asylum. It is far easier to bond together on what we are against, rather than what we stand for. The reality is that those who are against the current treatment of asylum seekers do not all stand for the same thing, so we have grouped together around what unifies us.

Saul Alinsky says that ‘the price of a successful attack is a constructive alternative.' Many of us are terrified of the word ‘solution’, because its heritage in Australian political discourse makes it seem synonymous with ‘deterrence’ rather than something that actually addresses the reasons as to why people are seeking our protection.

So here is my first try at a ‘solution’. I think this is humane, realistic, and a step in the right direction.

Refugee Camp: Sven Torfinn for the Guardian

'Generosity Cap' : a refugee solution

7.5% of Australia’s gross population increase should be reserved for protection visas with a minimum of 30,000 to be granted each year. Currently Australia’s population is increasing by approximately 400,000 people each year. 30,000 is a reasonable figure - we need the numbers regardless.

An additional 10,000 places should be made available for permanent protection reunion visas, where a refugee in Australia can sponsor a family member when they have the means to independently support those who they are being reunited with.

It’s difficult to come up with a number like 30,000 or 7.5%. One way of looking at it is to first consider that Australia has about a 1% share of global wealth.  There are just over 50,000,000 refugees in the world. This means that Australia’s fair share is around 500,000. It is difficult to assess over how many years the 50 million refugees have been ‘produced’. The UNHCR reports that there were 10 million new refugees last year along. It would take us about 17 years to become host to over 500,000 first generation refugees or 13 years if we are to include reunion visas. 

It is worth noting that resettlement is not always the best option. Many refugees are looking for peace, not resettlement. It would seem that the 5 million Palestinian refugees are not all desiring resettlement in Australia. But for many of the 50 million refugees in the world, resettlement is their only option.

This intake can only be increased by individuals or communities committing to hosting an asylum seeker, or asylum seeker families for periods of at least 3 years. Those who are hosted for three years by members of the public will not count towards the 30,000 cap. This is a fair compromise between collective responsibility towards those in need and individual. This is a ‘cap’ that is determined by the generosity of Australian citizens.

Maximum 10,000 refugees can be resettled through arriving by boat or claiming protection once in Australian territory. Only those who are found to be genuine will be resettled. Once the 10,000 cap is reached, asylum seekers will be forced to relocate either back to their home country or to a regional refugee camp which is co-sponsored by the Australian government unless Australian individuals and communities are willing to commit to hosting them.

Those who arrive by boat and are found to not be genuine should have the right to appeal. If they are unsuccessful or choose not to appeal, they should be sent back to their home country where possible. In the rare cases that they are unable to be sent back, they should be given temporary residency in Australia.

The Australian government should once a year check on the status of those who have been sent back through a trusted humanitarian organisation over the course of five years. If it is found that forced deportations have resulted in those who were thought to have not been refugees being persecuted then this policy must be reconsidered.

At least 20,000 refugees from camps, primarily in the Asia-Pacific region should be resettled in Australia each year. This should lower the number of boat arrivals and drownings at sea. There should be incentives for employers to hire refugees so that they can become ‘economic contributors’ as soon as possible (acknowledging that various studies have shown that refugees are currently contributing greatly towards Australia’s economy).

The Australian government should invest in online infrastructure to make it simple for members of the public to be able to host refugee families during their initial resettlement in Australia.

What are your thoughts?

The uninvited neighbour: A Christian response to modern refugee issues

I would like to thank Jessie Taylor & Gordon Preece for helping me to think about this issue in a clearer manner.

Refugees on Nauru during the 'Pacific Solution' era

Biblical teaching suggests that Christians have a special duty to love those who are foreigners and refugees (Deuteronomy 10:19). How should this teaching be understood and applied by Christian citizens in Australia's current political context?  

Introduction

This article seeks to examine if and to what extent the normative elements of the Christian texts are relevant to the context of the current debate surrounding uninvited asylum seekers in Australia. I begin by providing a brief outline of the current political situation. Then, I explore the relationship between the biblical narrative, Christian principles of justice, and the politics of asylum. Finally I will consider the normative implications of applying Christian principles of justice within the Australian political context and what issues this may raise.

The Australian context

Many Australians will remember the famous words of John Howard in 2001 when he declared ‘we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come.’[1] Thus began, or at least brought to the surface, a nation’s fear of so-called ‘illegals’, ‘queue-jumpers’, ‘aliens’, or the all-inclusive term ‘boat people’. In August of that same year, a small fishing boat called ‘Palapa I’ was discovered by MV Tampa as it carried 433 asylum seekers who were ‘mostly Hazaras escaping the Taliban.’ MV Tampa, the Norwegian fishing vessel proceeded to take the asylum seekers to Christmas Island, However, the SAS forcefully gained control of the vessel. On September 11, 2001, the Federal court ruled that ‘the government was obliged to bring the asylum seekers ashore and assess their claims.[2] Later, that decision was reversed and the refugees recued by MV Tampa were taken to Nauru. The ‘Tampa affair’ presented Howard with the perfect opportunity to reassure Australians that the government was in control of the nation’s borders.[3]

The offshore processing of the refugees discovered by MV Tampa in the Indian Ocean marked the beginnings of the ‘Pacific Solution’, which would a decade later be reinvented by the Gillard-Labour government in response to political turmoil over an apparent ‘influx’ of ‘boat people’. This costly endeavour of sending those who ask for our help to offshore detention centres has been praised for its effectiveness, or more precisely, its ability to ‘stop the boats’. The slogan ‘stop the boats’ has been embraced by both major Australian political parties.[4] Digging beneath the surface of such a slogan reveals the troubling normative issues in deterring asylum seekers through what is effectively indefinite imprisonment (or more diplomatically, detention). The costs associated with offshore processing are not just financial but also moral, psychological, and spiritual. I believe the Christian metaphysical underpinning that can operate from a non-consequentialist basis has something unique to offer the ethical discourse on this matter.

A biblical narrative

The narrative of the biblical texts are crucial for developing a holistic understanding of what a biblical response to this seemingly complex issue could look like. Rev. Dr. Gordon Preece emphasises that ‘we are all boat people,’ and that like us, ‘the Israelites needed repeated reminding that they were originally refugees.’[5] William Cavanaugh goes further in suggesting that the church itself is ‘already constituted by refugees,’ not merely originally, but is continually a body of refugees.[6]

The Old testament provides countless images of refugee stories. The Hebrew word ‘ger’ appears 92 times in the text. The word is translated to mean ‘stranger’ (Gen15:13, 23:4), ‘sojourner’ (Exod 2:22, 1 Chron 29:15), ‘alien’ (Exod 12:19, 2 Chron 2:17), or ‘foreigner’ (1 Chron 22:2).[7] Nearly all appearances of this word are accompanied by normative commands. Examples of these normative commands can be found when God orders no preferential treatment for the native-born over the alien (Lev 24:16, Num 9:14), when God orders the Israelites to love the foreigners (Deut 10:19), and when God commands the Israelites to leave enough food ‘for the foreigners, orphans, and widows (Deut 24:20).[8] Rather than top down charity which reinforces existing power relations, there is a strong emphasis on empathetic solidarity in the biblical text.[9]

Furthermore, Jesus is presented as a refugee who is fleeing a despotic dictator who gave orders ‘to kill all the boys in Bethlehem and its vicinity who were two years old and under.’[10] As a refugee King, Jesus recapitulated the normative themes explored in relation to refugees in the Old Testament texts. In Matthew 25, for example, Jesus tells his followers that we must view actions which are to the benefit of the least advantaged members of society as our duties as people who claim to love God.[11] It is in this crucial passage where Jesus explicitly states that there is no difference between an act of commission and an act of omission. Not doing something good, in Jesus’ ethical framework, is doing something bad. In other words, ignorance is not bliss.

Christians are far from united on the specific issue of ‘boat people’, perhaps even more so than other modern political and ethical issues that the churches are tackling. Tony Abbott, the leader of the federal Liberal party, when responding to a question about ‘why his attitude to asylum seekers was unchristian’ responded by suggesting: ‘I don’t think it’s a very Christian thing to come in by the back door rather than the front door.’[12] But as Preece points out, there have been plenty of Christian Refugees at Maribynong, Woomera, and Curtin detention centres.[13] Others, such as the Anglican Archbishop of Sydney, Peter Jensen, have endorsed the Houston and Aristotle reports, effectively supporting the reintroduction of the ‘Pacific Solution’ even though Jensen opposed offshore processing a decade earlier, arguing that ‘illegal’ actions of asylum seekers were caused by necessity.[14]

Normative issues

The consequences of a policy of deterrence can be severe and the policy can cost lives. On the other hand, the consequences of having no deterrence mechanism in place could also cost lives. In a normative sense, all I have suggested thus far is that we should be nice to refugees, which I presume is fairly uncontroversial. The next section seeks to establish which moral theory is most compatible with a biblical response to this issue.

The justifications given in support of coercive deterrence mechanisms in regards to those seeking asylum are largely utilitarian. The utilitarian perspective suggests that the means can be compromised in order to achieve the desired ends. This means that a utilitarian would find it acceptable to strive towards an ideal through non-ideal means. This is the first and most obvious clash between Christianity and utilitarianism. If Jesus wanted us to ‘love our neighbours’ or ‘love our enemies’ only when it was effective, then the command itself is ruled invalid by a greater command of ‘do what is most effective’. Martin Luther King, Jr. noticed this contradiction between Christian thought and utilitarianism, contending, ‘ultimately you can’t reach good ends through evil means, because the means represent the seed and the end represents the tree.’[15] Elsewhere he suggests that ‘the means represent the ideal in making and the end in process ... So as you seek justice as an end, you use just methods to get there.’[16] Paul writes in Romans that the people who think the Christians are teaching ‘let’s do evil so that good will come from it’ will be justly condemned.[17] Sending asylum seekers to detention centres in third world countries is the most explicit example of doing evil, in the hope that good will eventuate.

The second problem associated with the utilitarian justification for sending asylum seekers to places like Nauru is that it treats the individual asylum seekers who are sent to Nauru as mere means rather than ends in themselves.[18] This is a separate problem from the first issue raised which is specifically about the inconsistency of the means. The second problem differentiates the common asylum seeker from the common criminal. The common criminal has her liberty denied firstly for her own sake (rehabilitation, inability to reoffend), and the secondly, as a means to deter other people from committing that same crime.[19] For example, I would agree to live in a society where if I murdered someone I would then be incarcerated. Even if I am not rational at the time I murder someone, I can say now that it would be in my best interests to be separated from society for a time and to receive compulsory counselling and behavioural training so that I can be rehabilitated. Whereas, the common asylum seeker differs from the common criminal in that the asylum seeker has committed no moral or legal wrong, does not need rehabilitation, and imprisonment, (particularly in places like Nauru) and imprisonment is not in the asylum seekers’ interests. Imprisoning people who have committed no crime in order to deter other people from asking for our help treats the imprisoned people as a means rather than an end and strips them of their personhood and equality under God.

It is important to remark, that even if the utilitarian framework is accepted, one still needs to consider whether the empirical data shows that coercive deterrence leads to the maximisation of welfare. In a similar way, a utilitarian would only support torture in circumstances where welfare is maximised (eg., torturing one person to save the lives of two others). Authors such as Andy Lamey point out that Australia’s deterrence system causes asylum seekers to suffer from high stress levels and an increased risk of committing suicide.[20] He also points out that it gives them a status lower than criminals which is detrimental to their identity.[21] This shows that even from a utilitarian perspective (which does not generally synthesise with biblical teaching) it is difficult to justify ‘stopping the boats’.

A common objection to applying biblical principles to national security policies is the radical and demanding outcomes they infer. Unfortunately Christian thinkers such as Preece and Ralston have done very little to address the objection which asks: ‘at what point ought we turn people away?’ Preece inaccurately suggests that ‘even the most bleeding hearted, naive liberal is not saying ‘let everyone in’.’[22] Perhaps most liberals are not arguing this approach, but some of them are, and they should be considered. Still, it is unclear as to when Preece thinks we should begin to refuse asylum seekers protection and what means we should use to keep uninvited asylum seekers out of Australia. Ralston suggests that it is not necessary for the church to ‘advocate for a complete open-door policy to refugees,’ pointing out that the break-even point may arise if resettling refugees has a negative outcome for the ‘existing marginalised populations.’[23]

One suggestion would be that our obligations begin at the point where we have to sacrifice something significant, but they should not exceed the point where our self-care diminishes. In regards to where our obligations begin, we should take seriously Carens’s claim that ‘we have an obligation to open our borders more fully than we do now,’ and especially more fully to those who are in need.[24] Carens suggests that ‘open immigration would change the character of the community, but it would not leave the community without character.’[25] We must avoid holding on to our ideals of a static hegemonic culture when displaced people require our assistance. In regards to the upper constraints of our obligations, we should not require of ourselves more than God has called us to. God has called all believers to love their neighbour as themselves, which requires a basic level of self-love and self-care as a means to fulfil his work on earth.

Conclusion

In terms of acting upon our obligations as Christians to care for the refugee, I will briefly note one model which Ralston believes is compatible with a Christian understanding of justice. Ralston suggests that one of the most effective ways of communicating God’s ‘love and presence’ is through living with refugees, as exemplified by the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS). He believes that the church is lacking in genuine encounters with refugees, and I am not inclined to disagree with him. This same model is being replicated through the ‘First Home Project’ in Perth, Australia. The Christian call is, however, not limited to one particular model (which some may find too demanding in their current context). Political activism and financial donations, or offerings of skills training and language development are all ways that Christians can live out the community and compassion they have been called to.

In conclusion, the Christian narrative and principles of justice encourage Christians to treat asylum seekers as humans who hold inalienable rights. This essay has shown the incompatibility of utilitarianism and the Christian ethical framework. First, coercive deterrence mechanisms severely compromise the commands which have been given to us in regards to how we ought to treat our neighbours. Second, people should not be treated as mere means due to their mode of transport and their legal status. Therefore, the Christian cannot endorse a policy which seeks to coercively use one lot of people purely as a means to deter others from asking for our assistance.

Works Cited

ABC. “Seek and Ye Shall Submit (Transcript).” Q&A, September 10, 2012. http://www.abc.net.au/tv/qanda/txt/s3581623.htm.

Biblos.com. “Online Parallel Bible”, 2011. http://bible.cc/.

Burnside, Julian. “Australians Don’t Fully Understand What Is Being Done in Their Name.” The Age, August 26, 2011. http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/australians-dont-fully-understand-what-is-being-done-in-their-name-20110825-1jcbn.html#ixzz28TZW5Dm7.

Carens, Joseph H. “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders.” The Review of Politics 49, no. 2 (April 1, 1987): 251–273.

Cavanaugh, William T. “Migrant, Tourist, Pilgrim, Monk: Mobility and Identity in a Global Age.” Theological Studies 69, no. 2 (June 2008): 340–356.

Clarke, Sarah. “Liberals Accused of Trying to Rewrite History.” Lateline. ABC, November 21, 2001. http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2001/s422692.htm.

Jensen, Peter. “Interview with Amy Butler on Australia’s Treatment of Asylum Seekers and Refugees”, 2001. http://sydneyanglicans.net/seniorclergy/archbishop_jensen/48a.

Kant, Immanuel. “The Categorical Imperative.” In Ethics, edited by Peter Singer, 274–279. Oxford University Press, USA, 1994.

King, Martin Luther. “A Christmas Sermon on Peace” (n.d.).

———. Methodist Student Leadership Conference Address. September 10, 2011. American Rhetoric, 1964.

Lamey, Andy. Frontier justice : the global refugee crisis and what to do about it. Canada: Doubleday Canada, 2011.

Maccullum, Mungo. “‘Stop the Boats’ Has Become Bipartisan Policy.” ABC, July 2, 2012. http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/4105116.html.

Mares, Peter. Borderline : Australia’s Treatment of Refugees and Asylum Seekers. Sydney, Australia: UNSW Press, 2001.

Preece, Gordon. “We Are All Boat People: An Exposition of a Biblical View.” In Refugees : justice or compassion?, edited by Hilary D Regan, Andrew Hamilton, Mark Raper, and Australian Theological Forum. Hindmarsh, S. Aust.: Australian Theological Forum, 2002.

Ralston, Joshua. “Toward a political theology of refugee resettlement.” Theological Studies 73, no. 2 (June 2012): 363+.

“Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers”, n.d. http://expertpanelonasylumseekers.dpmc.gov.au/report.

The Australian. “Abbott Slams Boatpeople as un-Christian”, n.d. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/abbott-slams-boatpeople-as-un-christian/story-fn9hm1gu-1226422034305.

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[1] Clarke, “Liberals Accused of Trying to Rewrite History.”

[2] Burnside, “Australians Don’t Fully Understand What Is Being Done in Their Name.”

[3] Mares, Borderline : Australia’s Treatment of Refugees and Asylum Seekers.

[4] Maccullum, “‘Stop the Boats’ Has Become Bipartisan Policy.”

[5] Preece, Gordon, “We Are All Boat People: An Exposition of a Biblical View,” 73. I must thank Gordon for the time he has spent with me discussing these issues.

[6] Ralston, “Toward a political theology of refugee resettlement,” 373.

[7] Strong’s Hebrew: 1616 in Biblos.com, “Online Parallel Bible”, see: http://concordances.org/hebrew/strongs_1616.htm.

[8] Strong’s Hebrew: 1616 in ibid., see: http://concordances.org/hebrew/strongs_1616.htm.

[9] Cavanaugh, “Migrant, Tourist, Pilgrim, Monk,” 352.

[10] Biblos.com, “Online Parallel Bible”, Matt 2:16.

[11] Ibid., Matt 25.

[12] The Australian, “Abbott Slams Boatpeople as un-Christian.”

[13] Preece, Gordon, “We Are All Boat People: An Exposition of a Biblical View,” 82.

[14] Jensen, “Interview with Amy Butler on Australia’s Treatment of Asylum Seekers and Refugees”; ABC, “Seek and Ye Shall Submit (Transcript)”; “Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers.”

[15] King, “A Christmas Sermon on Peace.”

[16] King, Methodist Student Leadership Conference Address.

[17] Biblos.com, “Online Parallel Bible”, Romans 3:8 and 6:1.

[18] Kant, “The Categorical Imperative,” 279. Kant suggest that “every rational being exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will.”

[19] At least, this is how one would expect the legal system to function.

[20] Lamey, Frontier justice, 118.

[21] Ibid., 129.

[22] Preece, Gordon, “We Are All Boat People: An Exposition of a Biblical View,” 70.

[23] Ralston, “Toward a political theology of refugee resettlement,” 386.

[24] Carens, “Aliens and Citizens,” 270.

[25] Ibid., 271.

Rawls and the Abolition of the Family

...just a quick side note, I hope to have more peace podcasts out soon once I have finished my next two essays. Thanks for your interest. Stay tuned and leave lots of comments :)

Does justice as fairness imply the abolition the family?

Justice as fairness has had a profound effect on political theory. This essay seeks to establish whether justice as fairness implies the abolition of the family or whether justice as fairness implies the more modest action of reform. The essay begins with an explanation of the key concepts such as the ‘basic structure’ and the ‘veil of ignorance’ in Justice As Fairness: A Restatement by John Rawls. The ideas of Susan Moller Okin and Veronique Munoz-Dardée will be discussed in order to go beyond Rawls’s limited writings on the topic in order to consider more fully how his principles of justice interact with the institution of the family. For this topic I will attempt to separate the normative elements from the empirical elements while acknowledging that one’s perspective on the empirical elements of the institution of the family may influence their perspective of what justice as fairness requires for the institution in a normative sense.

Rawls uses a device called the ‘veil of ignorance’ through which he suggests that risk-averse and rational participants would choose the following two principles of justice to apply to the basic structure. The two principles of justice are as follows

a)                  ‘Each person has the same indefensible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and

b)                  Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).’[1]

The basic structure, which Rawls seeks to apply these principles of justice to, ‘is the way in which the main political and social institutions of society fit together into one system of social cooperation, and the way they assign basic rights and duties and regulate the division of advantages that arises from social cooperation over time.’ The basic structure consists of ‘the political constitution with an independent judiciary, the legally recognised forms of property, and the structure of the economy (for example, as a system of competitive markets with private property in the means of production), as well as the family in some form.’ [2]

Rawls includes the family in the basic structure because ‘one of its essential roles is to establish the orderly production and reproduction of society and of its culture from one generation to the next.’[3] Rawls suggests that ‘no particular form of the family (monogamous, heterosexual, or otherwise) is so far required by a political conception of justice so long as it is arranged to fulfil these tasks effectively and does not run afoul of other political values.’[4] However, Rawls, somewhat ambiguously limits the scope that the principles of justice have in their affect upon the family by suggesting that ‘political principles do not apply directly to its [the family’s] internal life but they do impose essential constraints on the family as an institution and guarantee the basic rights and liberties and fair opportunities for all its members.’[5]

One may question how the substance of this formal equality can arise without directly affecting the internal life of the institution. If the family, in its current and historical modes is perceived to be moderately unjust and in need of minor reform, Rawls’s approach would seem reasonable and remain consistent with values of liberty. Whereas, if the family, in its current and historical modes is perceived to be severely unjust and in need of major reform or abolition, then one would be more sympathetic to an approach where the family is directly the subject matter of the principles of justice.

In Justice, Gender, and the Family, Okin provides a generally constructive critique of Rawls’s Justice As Fairness from a feminist perspective. In her response to Justice As Fairness and Rawls’s other works she suggests that Rawls uses sexist language and largely ignores historical injustices directed towards women and their subjugation within the family. This has led Okin to feel obliged to ask, ‘does this theory of justice apply to women?’[6] Okin’s drawn out critique of Rawls’s sexist language, while accurate and somewhat relevant, is on the weaker side of her criticism. The strongest challenge that she presents to Rawls is questioning what grounding he has to omit the institution of the family from the direct impact of the principles of justice as they apply to the rest of the basic structure.

Rawls suggests that the principles of justice apply to broader political and economic institutions rather than to the internal life of private groups and associations such as ‘firms and labour unions, churches, universities, and the family.’[7] He uses the example of a church being able to excommunicate heretics but not being allowed to burn them. This, according to Rawls, is compatible with justice as fairness. Although Rawls may not personally believe such an action is justified, he is seeking to establish a system of political justice rather than a moral framework such as utilitarianism which is significantly more comprehensive in its scope. In the same way, Rawls sees the institution of the family as ‘bound by the constraints arising from the principles of justice’, but only ‘indirectly from just background institutions within which associations and groups exist, and by which the conduct of their members is restricted.’[8] He points out that women and men ‘are equal citizens and have equal basic rights,’ and goes on to state that ‘to establish equality between men and women in sharing the work of society, in preserving its culture and in reproducing itself over time, special provisions are needed in family law (and no doubt elsewhere) so that the burden of bearing, raising, and educating children does not fall more heavily on women, thereby undermining their fair equality of opportunity.’[9]

Rawls explicitly argues for reform as opposed to more radical change such as abolition in securing justice for all peoples including those who form part of a family institution. While Okin does not directly call for the abolition of the family in Justice, Gender, And The Family, she does believe that ‘a consistent and wholehearted application of Rawls’s liberal principles of justice can lead us to challenge fundamentally the gender system of our society.’[10] It is apparent that this is not the purpose of justice as fairness as intended by Rawls. However, if Okin is right in suggesting that Rawl’s principles of justice would ‘fundamentally change the gender system of our society’, then these same principles would ultimately impact on the family which is an institution which has historically been largely shaped through the gender system.

Another important analysis of what Rawls’s theory means for the institution of the family is presented by Munoz-Dardé in Is the Family to Be Abolished Then?. She makes several empirical claims as background to her argument. The article begins with the assertion that ‘the family is one of the main causes of morally arbitrary inequality. Moreover, it is not inequality which makes everyone better off.’[11] This empirical claim is directly appealing to Rawls’s ‘difference principle’ which was explained earlier. The same claim could also be made about private property. It seems likely that private property also does not satisfy the difference principle in being of the ‘greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.’[12] In the same way, the author suggests that the difference principle should lead us to question whether the family is to the greatest benefit of its lest well-off members. To satisfy the ‘difference principle’ in this case, one may need to consider whether the institution of the family benefits women and children, or at least, whether the inequalities created by the institution are to their maximum benefit. Such a broad empirical assertion cannot be made here, but it will suffice to say that there are conceivable instances of the family working to either the advantage or the disadvantage of its least well-off members.

Munoz-Dardé views child rearing by elders within a community as an essential function of the family and she describes the family by this function. Understanding that children must still be cared for if the family were to be abolished, she contrasts the institution of the family with a well-run orphanage. In Marriage and Morals, Russel suggests the state substitution of the family would come with both positive and negative consequences. He argues that health and education have improved due to state intervention in Western nations. However, he also point to ‘grave dangers’ in trusting the state in the role of ‘parenting’ children. The main issue of concern for Russell is that the state is likely to treat children as a means rather than an ends, whereas, due to individual bonds between parents and their children, parents are more likely to treat their children as an ends in themselves. After referring to Russell’s argument, Munoz-Dardé concedes that the abolition of the family in favour of a well run orphanage ‘would probably pose such extreme threats to individual liberty and capacity for self-determination, that it would defeat the very purpose that made us envisage its substitution by a well-run orphanage.’[13]

Munoz-Dardé does suggest that state marriage should be abolished because it ‘creates inequalities which are not beneficial to the worst-off.’[14] However, she does not see any need to intervene upon the institution as a ritual or religious ceremony. Allowing the institution of marriage to continue yet abolishing state recognition of marriage does not abolish the institution itself. Therefore, the steps that Munoz-Dardé is proposing to take in regards to both the family and marriage are closer to reform than abolition. While either reform or abolition could be invoked to achieve justice in the institution of the family, a Rawlsian political approach, both through explication and implication, would suggest that reform would be the preferred option.[15]

Rawls does not provide a strong and comprehensive defence of the family in Justice As Fairness: A Restatement. Indeed Rawls does not intend his political theory to be comprehensive and to explicitly intrude upon the domains of the private sphere or the moral sphere so long as his egalitarian political conception of the good can still be met. However, several authors, such as Okin have noted similar sentiments as this: ‘the critical force of the original position becomes evident when one considers that some of the most creative critiques of Rawls’s theory have resulted from more radical or broad interpretations of the original position than his own.’[16] The Rawlsian method has proved useful for both Okin and Munoz-Dardé in highlighting the failures of the institution of the family. However, given the unattractiveness of the alternative possibilities and their associated threats to liberty, I will conclude by suggesting that justice as fairness does not imply the abolition of the family but significant reform.

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[1] Rawls and Kelly, Justice as fairness, 42–43.

[2] Ibid., 10.

[3] Ibid., 162.

[4] Ibid., 163.

[5] Ibid., 164.

[6] Susan Moller Okin, Justice, gender, and the family, 91.

[7] Rawls and Kelly, Justice as fairness, 10.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid., 11.

[10] Susan Moller Okin, Justice, gender, and the family, 89.

[11] Munoz-Dardée, “Is the Family to Be Abolished Then?,” 37.

[12] Rawls and Kelly, Justice as fairness, 42–43.

[13] Munoz-Dardée, “Is the Family to Be Abolished Then?,” 216.

[14] Ibid., 54.

[15] Rawls and Freeman, Collected papers, 600. Such an approach is discussed in Collected Papers in direct response to authors such as Okin.

[16] Susan Moller Okin, Justice, gender, and the family, 101; see also: Okin, “Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender,” 42.

Munoz-Darde, Veronique. “Is the Family to Be Abolished Then?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99, no. 1 (1999): 37–56.

Okin, Susan Moller. “Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender.” Ethics 105, no. 1 (1994): 23–43.

Rawls, John, and Samuel Richard Freeman. Collected papers. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999.

Rawls, John, and Erin Kelly. Justice as fairness : a restatement. Cambridge, Mass [u.a.]: Harvard Univ. Press, 2003.

Susan Moller Okin. Justice, gender, and the family. New York: Basic Books, 1989.