Compare the conception of international justice held
by Peter Singer and John Rawls. Indicate which thinker’s conception is superior
and why.
John Rawls
and Peter Singer both hold to the view that society should be constructed in an
egalitarian manner. In this essay I will explore the differing methodologies
which Rawls and Singer use to develop their respective theories of international
justice. I will argue that Rawl’s approach has stronger potential if the
‘difference principle’ were to be applied to the international justice sphere.
I will also explore Singer’s theory and suggest that as they both stand, Singer
provides a more responsible and egalitarian conception of international justice.
Throughout this essay, I will work from the assumption that a philosophically
consistent, egalitarian and responsible theory is superior to the alternative
options.
First, I
will briefly describe the core components of Justice as Fairness which
is Rawls’ domestic conception of justice. A basic understanding of Rawls’
domestic conception of justice will help us better understand the potential of
a Rawls-based conception of international justice. Rawls’ domestic
understanding of justice applies primarily to how the ‘basic structure’ of
society should be set out and regulated. The term constructivism can be
appropriately applied to his theory as he considers justice ‘only as a virtue
of social institutions.’[1]
The two primary principles that Rawls seeks to fulfill are as follows: (i) an
‘equal right to extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all’, and
(ii) that ‘inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that
they will work out for everyone’s advantage, and provided the positions and
offices to which they attach, or from which they may be gained, are open to
all.’[2]
It is important to note that the second principle is not utilitarian (average
or total) in the sense that disadvantaging the least well-off can be counterbalanced
by advantaging the most well-off equal amounts. According to Rawls, if there is
an inequality it must benefit all people including the least well-off. This
will be referred to as the difference principle.
These
principles are what Rawls believes a rational, risk-averse, and self-interested
person would choose in the original position. According to Rawls, in the
original position ‘no one knows his place in society, his class position or
social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural
assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.’[3]
He goes on to state that ‘the principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of
ignorance.’ Behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ people are unknowing of particular
factors which should when applied nullify ‘the accidents of natural endowment
and the contingencies of social circumstance as counters in quest for political
and economic advantage.’[4]
The
aforementioned elements of Rawls’ thinking are to be applied in full to the
domestic realm, yet, they are only granted limited applicability by Rawls in
the international realm. The difference principle is especially relevant to my
later discussion of the potential of a Rawlsian understanding of international
justice. Law of Peoples is Rawls’ attempt to extend Justice as
Fairness to the international sphere. He endeavors to develop a framework
of international justice which is ecumenical, and one which is not partisan to
‘societies whose political institutions and culture are liberal.’ Rawls states
that a ‘liberal society must respect other societies organized by comprehensive
doctrines, provided that their political and social institutions meet certain
conditions that lead the society to adhere to a reasonable law of peoples.’[5]
He provides seven principles in regards to international relations which
include respect for freedom and independence, equality among persons, rights to
self-defense (but not aggression), duty of nonintervention, duty to observe
treaties and undertakings, restrictions within war, and a duty to honor human
rights.[6]
While Rawls does suggest that there ‘should be certain provisions for mutual
assistance between peoples in times of famine and drought’, his theory of international
justice emphasizes restrictions rather than prescriptions; negative duties of
justice rather than positive duties of distributive justice, like his domestic
theory.[7]
Peter
Singer, unlike Rawls, uses a moralist approach to support his arguments
surrounding international justice. These arguments are not tied in with a
social contract.[8]
His views are broadly utilitarian, although, one could easily accept the
argument he gives in Famine, Affluence, and Morality without having a
commitment to utilitarianism. Singer begins with the assumption that ‘suffering
and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care’ are bad things. His
argument then follows that ‘if it is in our power to prevent something bad from
happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance,
we ought, morally, to do it.’ [9]
The qualifier he uses in the strong version of the principle, ‘without thereby
sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance’ (my emphasis) is
particularly important. [10]
Singer is essentially suggesting that we must give foreign aid to the point of
marginal utility whereby to give any more resources would sacrifice
something which of equal moral worth, either for us or our dependents.
Following this principle to its logical conclusions would have radical
implications for how many people, especially those of us who reside in richer
nations, would have to live in order to be moral.
The
principle is most simply articulated by the drowning child example which Singer
provides in Famine, Affluence, and Morality. He puts forward the
deceptively uncontroversial assertion that ‘if I am walking past a shallow pond
and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out.’
Singer goes on to suggest that the distance between me and the child ‘makes no
moral difference.’ Since Singer, like
most practical philosophers, subscribes to principles of ‘impartiality,
universalisability,’ and ‘equality,’ it seems reasonable to state that distance
either makes very little difference or no difference at all in situations where
people who have access to vast resources can easily support famine relief in
places like Bangladesh. [11] He
also refutes the argument that says ‘there are other people either equally or
better placed to give money and this therefore exempts me from owing anything
to the worlds’ poor.’ While it may be the case that there are people better
placed than I to help, it is clear that many of those people have chosen not to
address the problem and therefore the conclusion is based upon a hypothetical
premise which presumes that the very rich will do all that they can to address
poverty. As Singer points out, such an argument is ‘an ideal excuse for
inactivity’ which does nothing to address the situation which we currently find
ourselves in.[12]
The
question regarding which author provides a better framework for dealing with
poverty is a difficult one. I will argue that as their respective theories
stand, Peter Singer provides a better theory in regards to international
justice. However, if John Rawls took his theory of domestic justice as it is
outlined in A Theory Of Justice and applied it consistently to
the realm of international justice, his theory would be able to address poverty
equally, if not better than Singer’s theory. There are two main reasons why
Rawls’ theory of international justice is incomplete: (i) he attempts to
synthesize liberal tolerance with prescriptive egalitarianism, and (ii) he
effectively creates a morality based upon the social contract.
In order
to gain ecumenical support, Rawls compromises and waters down many of the
logical conclusions that one would reach if they were to apply the ‘veil of
ignorance’ hypothetical scenario to shape international governance. Rawls attempts to be tolerant with societies whose
members may have different conceptions of justice than ours, and who may be
guided by different kinds of comprehensive doctrines.[13]
However, this apparent respect of ‘other societies organized by comprehensive
doctrines’ effectively forfeits our social contract with them, meaning that
there is no clear burden under the ‘veil of ignorance’ for a rational person to
suggest that economic assistance must be given to poor people in illiberal
nations. The rational person knows that she will not become a member of an
illiberal society under the ‘veil of ignorance’ because the veil does not apply
to illiberal societies. This then means that she has no good reason to make
allowances for these people unless they will somehow improve her lot, which in
many cases, is highly improbable.
The second
objection to Rawl’s theory ties in strongly with the first objection. Rawls’
theory of international justice is based on the social contract. While any
theory based upon the social contract should be first seen as contractarian
rather than moral, it is unavoidable for a theory like Rawls’ to have many
moral implications, imperatives, and restrictions. Strictly speaking, it is not
immoral to decide under the ‘veil of ignorance’ that there will be a small
portion of people who control a great deal of society’s wealth, this should be
seen as irrational. However, making a decision under the ‘veil of ignorance’,
then changing the decision when the veil is lifted, in favor of one’s self
interest, could be seen as immoral. In short, Rawls’ theory has moral
implications even though it is based on rationality. The morality drawn from
Rawls’ theory could be summed up as ‘do unto others as they do unto me.’ This
is unfortunate as any morality that gives an exemptions if other people choose
not to follow it is flawed. Effectively, such a morality is dependent on the
actions of another person rather than any deeply held conviction.
In Practical
Ethics (Second Ed.) Singer argues that wealthy nations should be
significantly more generous in their intake of asylum seekers, perhaps up until
the point of marginal utility. He creates a scenario similar to the ‘drowning
child’ thought experiment which was previously mentioned. Singer asks whether
the investors in the hypothetical underground community called Fairhaven should
allow non-investing people into their community, allowing them to escape the
extreme radiation outside. Members of Fairhaven will have to give up their
tennis courts, swimming pools, and their large gymnasium in order to give those
outside some form of basic accommodation. Singer presents three options: (i)
admit all 10,000 outsiders and lose all the sports and entertainment
facilities, (ii) admit only 500 outsiders and lose a quarter of the tennis
courts (which only had little use), or (iii) admit no outsiders and therefore
accept no costs.[14] I
find this to be a compelling argument for a more responsible and egalitarian
approach to those fleeing persecution across borders. However, as a utilitarian,
Singer is obliged to consider the consequences for all affected parties, which
leads to a great deal of moral complexity when this issue could have been a
simple matter. In the third edition of Practical Ethics, Singer removed
the chapter Insiders and Outsiders, explaining why in the preface.
He cites reasons such as the possibility of a ‘racist backlash’ if a country
accepts large numbers of refugees as ‘highly relevant’ to the discussion, and
no doubt, highly relevant to why he chose to omit this chapter in the third
edition of Practical Ethics.[15]
I find this argument to be both inconsistent with the Fairhaven hypothetical
mentioned above and revealing of the limits of utilitarianism. If ‘racist
backlashes’ are of genuine concern for Singer’s theory of international
justice, his theory is little more than a Lifeboat Ethic.
As
mentioned previously, and as noted by thinkers such as Pogge and Singer, Rawls’
main area of concern is the domestic sphere.[16]
It is unfortunate that throughout The Law of Peoples, Rawls continually
refers to the benefits of the ‘veil of ignorance’ only being conferred on to
the citizen.[17]
In a practical application of the ‘veil of ignorance’, as Rawls intends the
device to be used, it seems inevitable that one would know that one will become
a citizen of a liberal and democratic state, which would in turn justify
self-interested and potentially deeply harmful policies towards outsiders. However,
this goes against the very intention of the ‘veil of ignorance’ which aims to
‘nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt
them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage.’[18]
In Carens’ critique of Rawls, he points out that ‘whether one is a citizen of a
rich nation or a poor one, whether one is already a citizen of a particular
state or an alien who wishes to become a citizen – this is the sort of specific
contingency that could set people at odds … We should therefore take a global,
not a national view of the original position.’[19]
Carens’ approach is ironically more compatible with the ‘veil of ignorance’
than the approach that Rawls himself utilised.
In conclusion, I find
Singer’s theory of international justice to be superior to Rawls’, as Rawls
intended his theory to be understood. However, if Rawls’ conception of domestic
justice were to be applied to the international sphere, it would have the
potential to be far more robust that Singer’s. The ‘veil of ignorance’, as it
has been critiqued by authors such as Pogge and Carens, could be incredibly
useful in the international realm, but only if it is applied with consistency.
Bibliography
Carens,
Joseph H. “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders.” The Review of
Politics 49, no. 2 (April 1, 1987): 251–273.
Pogge,
Thomas W. Realizing Rawls. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1989.
Rawls,
John. A theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.
———.
Collected papers. Edited by Samuel Richard Freeman. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1999.
———.
“Justice as Fairness.” The Philosophical Review 67, no. 2 (April 1,
1958): 164–194.
———.
“The Main Idea of the Theory of Justice.” In Ethics, edited by Peter
Singer, 362–367. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Singer,
Peter. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” In World hunger and moral
obligation, edited by William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977.
———.
Practical Ethics. Second ed. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1993.
———.
Practical Ethics. Third ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
[1] John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” The
Philosophical Review 67, no. 2 (April 1, 1958): 164.
[2] Ibid., 165.
[3] John Rawls, “The Main Idea of the Theory of
Justice,” in Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford; New York: Oxford
University Press, 1994), 363.
[4] Ibid., 365.
[5] Rawls
and Freeman, Collected Papers, 540–541.
John Rawls, Collected papers, ed.
Samuel Richard Freeman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999),
532–531.
[6] Ibid.,
540.
[7] Ibid., 540–541.
[8] In using the term
‘moralist’, I do not seek to suggest that Singer has political affiliations
with groups who call themselves moralists. Rather, I am pointing out that his
theory is directly speaking about what is right and wrong rather than what is
rational and irrational.
[9] Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” in
World hunger and moral obligation, ed. William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 24.
[10] Ibid.
[11] All quoted material in the beginning of this
paragraph can be found in: Ibid., 24–25.
[12] Ibid., 25–26.
[13] Rawls, Collected papers, 530.
[14] Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, Second ed.
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
[15] Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, Third ed.
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
[16] Thomas W Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca,
N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1989), 1–14; Singer, Practical Ethics,
253.
[17] Rawls, Collected papers, 537–541.
[18] John Rawls, A theory of Justice. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1973), 136.
[19] Joseph H. Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case
for Open Borders,” The Review of Politics 49, no. 2 (April 1, 1987):
256.
