Showing posts with label utilitarianism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label utilitarianism. Show all posts

Monday, October 8, 2012

The uninvited neighbour: A Christian response to modern refugee issues

I would like to thank Jessie Taylor & Gordon Preece for helping me to think about this issue in a clearer manner.

Refugees on Nauru during the 'Pacific Solution' era


Biblical teaching suggests that Christians have a special duty to love those who are foreigners and refugees (Deuteronomy 10:19). How should this teaching be understood and applied by Christian citizens in Australia's current political context?  


Introduction

This article seeks to examine if and to what extent the normative elements of the Christian texts are relevant to the context of the current debate surrounding uninvited asylum seekers in Australia. I begin by providing a brief outline of the current political situation. Then, I explore the relationship between the biblical narrative, Christian principles of justice, and the politics of asylum. Finally I will consider the normative implications of applying Christian principles of justice within the Australian political context and what issues this may raise.

The Australian context

Many Australians will remember the famous words of John Howard in 2001 when he declared ‘we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come.’[1] Thus began, or at least brought to the surface, a nation’s fear of so-called ‘illegals’, ‘queue-jumpers’, ‘aliens’, or the all-inclusive term ‘boat people’. In August of that same year, a small fishing boat called ‘Palapa I’ was discovered by MV Tampa as it carried 433 asylum seekers who were ‘mostly Hazaras escaping the Taliban.’ MV Tampa, the Norwegian fishing vessel proceeded to take the asylum seekers to Christmas Island, However, the SAS forcefully gained control of the vessel. On September 11, 2001, the Federal court ruled that ‘the government was obliged to bring the asylum seekers ashore and assess their claims.[2] Later, that decision was reversed and the refugees recued by MV Tampa were taken to Nauru. The ‘Tampa affair’ presented Howard with the perfect opportunity to reassure Australians that the government was in control of the nation’s borders.[3]

The offshore processing of the refugees discovered by MV Tampa in the Indian Ocean marked the beginnings of the ‘Pacific Solution’, which would a decade later be reinvented by the Gillard-Labour government in response to political turmoil over an apparent ‘influx’ of ‘boat people’. This costly endeavour of sending those who ask for our help to offshore detention centres has been praised for its effectiveness, or more precisely, its ability to ‘stop the boats’. The slogan ‘stop the boats’ has been embraced by both major Australian political parties.[4] Digging beneath the surface of such a slogan reveals the troubling normative issues in deterring asylum seekers through what is effectively indefinite imprisonment (or more diplomatically, detention). The costs associated with offshore processing are not just financial but also moral, psychological, and spiritual. I believe the Christian metaphysical underpinning that can operate from a non-consequentialist basis has something unique to offer the ethical discourse on this matter.

A biblical narrative

The narrative of the biblical texts are crucial for developing a holistic understanding of what a biblical response to this seemingly complex issue could look like. Rev. Dr. Gordon Preece emphasises that ‘we are all boat people,’ and that like us, ‘the Israelites needed repeated reminding that they were originally refugees.’[5] William Cavanaugh goes further in suggesting that the church itself is ‘already constituted by refugees,’ not merely originally, but is continually a body of refugees.[6]

The Old testament provides countless images of refugee stories. The Hebrew word ‘ger’ appears 92 times in the text. The word is translated to mean ‘stranger’ (Gen15:13, 23:4), ‘sojourner’ (Exod 2:22, 1 Chron 29:15), ‘alien’ (Exod 12:19, 2 Chron 2:17), or ‘foreigner’ (1 Chron 22:2).[7] Nearly all appearances of this word are accompanied by normative commands. Examples of these normative commands can be found when God orders no preferential treatment for the native-born over the alien (Lev 24:16, Num 9:14), when God orders the Israelites to love the foreigners (Deut 10:19), and when God commands the Israelites to leave enough food ‘for the foreigners, orphans, and widows (Deut 24:20).[8] Rather than top down charity which reinforces existing power relations, there is a strong emphasis on empathetic solidarity in the biblical text.[9]

Furthermore, Jesus is presented as a refugee who is fleeing a despotic dictator who gave orders ‘to kill all the boys in Bethlehem and its vicinity who were two years old and under.’[10] As a refugee King, Jesus recapitulated the normative themes explored in relation to refugees in the Old Testament texts. In Matthew 25, for example, Jesus tells his followers that we must view actions which are to the benefit of the least advantaged members of society as our duties as people who claim to love God.[11] It is in this crucial passage where Jesus explicitly states that there is no difference between an act of commission and an act of omission. Not doing something good, in Jesus’ ethical framework, is doing something bad. In other words, ignorance is not bliss.

Christians are far from united on the specific issue of ‘boat people’, perhaps even more so than other modern political and ethical issues that the churches are tackling. Tony Abbott, the leader of the federal Liberal party, when responding to a question about ‘why his attitude to asylum seekers was unchristian’ responded by suggesting: ‘I don’t think it’s a very Christian thing to come in by the back door rather than the front door.’[12] But as Preece points out, there have been plenty of Christian Refugees at Maribynong, Woomera, and Curtin detention centres.[13] Others, such as the Anglican Archbishop of Sydney, Peter Jensen, have endorsed the Houston and Aristotle reports, effectively supporting the reintroduction of the ‘Pacific Solution’ even though Jensen opposed offshore processing a decade earlier, arguing that ‘illegal’ actions of asylum seekers were caused by necessity.[14]

Normative issues

The consequences of a policy of deterrence can be severe and the policy can cost lives. On the other hand, the consequences of having no deterrence mechanism in place could also cost lives. In a normative sense, all I have suggested thus far is that we should be nice to refugees, which I presume is fairly uncontroversial. The next section seeks to establish which moral theory is most compatible with a biblical response to this issue.
The justifications given in support of coercive deterrence mechanisms in regards to those seeking asylum are largely utilitarian. The utilitarian perspective suggests that the means can be compromised in order to achieve the desired ends. This means that a utilitarian would find it acceptable to strive towards an ideal through non-ideal means. This is the first and most obvious clash between Christianity and utilitarianism. If Jesus wanted us to ‘love our neighbours’ or ‘love our enemies’ only when it was effective, then the command itself is ruled invalid by a greater command of ‘do what is most effective’. Martin Luther King, Jr. noticed this contradiction between Christian thought and utilitarianism, contending, ‘ultimately you can’t reach good ends through evil means, because the means represent the seed and the end represents the tree.’[15] Elsewhere he suggests that ‘the means represent the ideal in making and the end in process ... So as you seek justice as an end, you use just methods to get there.’[16] Paul writes in Romans that the people who think the Christians are teaching ‘let’s do evil so that good will come from it’ will be justly condemned.[17] Sending asylum seekers to detention centres in third world countries is the most explicit example of doing evil, in the hope that good will eventuate.

The second problem associated with the utilitarian justification for sending asylum seekers to places like Nauru is that it treats the individual asylum seekers who are sent to Nauru as mere means rather than ends in themselves.[18] This is a separate problem from the first issue raised which is specifically about the inconsistency of the means. The second problem differentiates the common asylum seeker from the common criminal. The common criminal has her liberty denied firstly for her own sake (rehabilitation, inability to reoffend), and the secondly, as a means to deter other people from committing that same crime.[19] For example, I would agree to live in a society where if I murdered someone I would then be incarcerated. Even if I am not rational at the time I murder someone, I can say now that it would be in my best interests to be separated from society for a time and to receive compulsory counselling and behavioural training so that I can be rehabilitated. Whereas, the common asylum seeker differs from the common criminal in that the asylum seeker has committed no moral or legal wrong, does not need rehabilitation, and imprisonment, (particularly in places like Nauru) and imprisonment is not in the asylum seekers’ interests. Imprisoning people who have committed no crime in order to deter other people from asking for our help treats the imprisoned people as a means rather than an end and strips them of their personhood and equality under God.

It is important to remark, that even if the utilitarian framework is accepted, one still needs to consider whether the empirical data shows that coercive deterrence leads to the maximisation of welfare. In a similar way, a utilitarian would only support torture in circumstances where welfare is maximised (eg., torturing one person to save the lives of two others). Authors such as Andy Lamey point out that Australia’s deterrence system causes asylum seekers to suffer from high stress levels and an increased risk of committing suicide.[20] He also points out that it gives them a status lower than criminals which is detrimental to their identity.[21] This shows that even from a utilitarian perspective (which does not generally synthesise with biblical teaching) it is difficult to justify ‘stopping the boats’.

A common objection to applying biblical principles to national security policies is the radical and demanding outcomes they infer. Unfortunately Christian thinkers such as Preece and Ralston have done very little to address the objection which asks: ‘at what point ought we turn people away?’ Preece inaccurately suggests that ‘even the most bleeding hearted, naive liberal is not saying ‘let everyone in’.’[22] Perhaps most liberals are not arguing this approach, but some of them are, and they should be considered. Still, it is unclear as to when Preece thinks we should begin to refuse asylum seekers protection and what means we should use to keep uninvited asylum seekers out of Australia. Ralston suggests that it is not necessary for the church to ‘advocate for a complete open-door policy to refugees,’ pointing out that the break-even point may arise if resettling refugees has a negative outcome for the ‘existing marginalised populations.’[23]

One suggestion would be that our obligations begin at the point where we have to sacrifice something significant, but they should not exceed the point where our self-care diminishes. In regards to where our obligations begin, we should take seriously Carens’s claim that ‘we have an obligation to open our borders more fully than we do now,’ and especially more fully to those who are in need.[24] Carens suggests that ‘open immigration would change the character of the community, but it would not leave the community without character.’[25] We must avoid holding on to our ideals of a static hegemonic culture when displaced people require our assistance. In regards to the upper constraints of our obligations, we should not require of ourselves more than God has called us to. God has called all believers to love their neighbour as themselves, which requires a basic level of self-love and self-care as a means to fulfil his work on earth.

Conclusion

In terms of acting upon our obligations as Christians to care for the refugee, I will briefly note one model which Ralston believes is compatible with a Christian understanding of justice. Ralston suggests that one of the most effective ways of communicating God’s ‘love and presence’ is through living with refugees, as exemplified by the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS). He believes that the church is lacking in genuine encounters with refugees, and I am not inclined to disagree with him. This same model is being replicated through the ‘First Home Project’ in Perth, Australia. The Christian call is, however, not limited to one particular model (which some may find too demanding in their current context). Political activism and financial donations, or offerings of skills training and language development are all ways that Christians can live out the community and compassion they have been called to.

In conclusion, the Christian narrative and principles of justice encourage Christians to treat asylum seekers as humans who hold inalienable rights. This essay has shown the incompatibility of utilitarianism and the Christian ethical framework. First, coercive deterrence mechanisms severely compromise the commands which have been given to us in regards to how we ought to treat our neighbours. Second, people should not be treated as mere means due to their mode of transport and their legal status. Therefore, the Christian cannot endorse a policy which seeks to coercively use one lot of people purely as a means to deter others from asking for our assistance.

Works Cited

ABC. “Seek and Ye Shall Submit (Transcript).” Q&A, September 10, 2012. http://www.abc.net.au/tv/qanda/txt/s3581623.htm.
Biblos.com. “Online Parallel Bible”, 2011. http://bible.cc/.
Burnside, Julian. “Australians Don’t Fully Understand What Is Being Done in Their Name.” The Age, August 26, 2011. http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/australians-dont-fully-understand-what-is-being-done-in-their-name-20110825-1jcbn.html#ixzz28TZW5Dm7.
Carens, Joseph H. “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders.” The Review of Politics 49, no. 2 (April 1, 1987): 251–273.
Cavanaugh, William T. “Migrant, Tourist, Pilgrim, Monk: Mobility and Identity in a Global Age.” Theological Studies 69, no. 2 (June 2008): 340–356.
Clarke, Sarah. “Liberals Accused of Trying to Rewrite History.” Lateline. ABC, November 21, 2001. http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2001/s422692.htm.
Jensen, Peter. “Interview with Amy Butler on Australia’s Treatment of Asylum Seekers and Refugees”, 2001. http://sydneyanglicans.net/seniorclergy/archbishop_jensen/48a.
Kant, Immanuel. “The Categorical Imperative.” In Ethics, edited by Peter Singer, 274–279. Oxford University Press, USA, 1994.
King, Martin Luther. “A Christmas Sermon on Peace” (n.d.).
———. Methodist Student Leadership Conference Address. September 10, 2011. American Rhetoric, 1964.
Lamey, Andy. Frontier justice : the global refugee crisis and what to do about it. Canada: Doubleday Canada, 2011.
Maccullum, Mungo. “‘Stop the Boats’ Has Become Bipartisan Policy.” ABC, July 2, 2012. http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/4105116.html.
Mares, Peter. Borderline : Australia’s Treatment of Refugees and Asylum Seekers. Sydney, Australia: UNSW Press, 2001.
Preece, Gordon. “We Are All Boat People: An Exposition of a Biblical View.” In Refugees : justice or compassion?, edited by Hilary D Regan, Andrew Hamilton, Mark Raper, and Australian Theological Forum. Hindmarsh, S. Aust.: Australian Theological Forum, 2002.
Ralston, Joshua. “Toward a political theology of refugee resettlement.” Theological Studies 73, no. 2 (June 2012): 363+.
“Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers”, n.d. http://expertpanelonasylumseekers.dpmc.gov.au/report.
The Australian. “Abbott Slams Boatpeople as un-Christian”, n.d. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/abbott-slams-boatpeople-as-un-christian/story-fn9hm1gu-1226422034305.


[1] Clarke, “Liberals Accused of Trying to Rewrite History.”
[2] Burnside, “Australians Don’t Fully Understand What Is Being Done in Their Name.”
[3] Mares, Borderline : Australia’s Treatment of Refugees and Asylum Seekers.
[4] Maccullum, “‘Stop the Boats’ Has Become Bipartisan Policy.”
[5] Preece, Gordon, “We Are All Boat People: An Exposition of a Biblical View,” 73. I must thank Gordon for the time he has spent with me discussing these issues.
[6] Ralston, “Toward a political theology of refugee resettlement,” 373.
[7] Strong’s Hebrew: 1616 in Biblos.com, “Online Parallel Bible”, see: http://concordances.org/hebrew/strongs_1616.htm.
[8] Strong’s Hebrew: 1616 in ibid., see: http://concordances.org/hebrew/strongs_1616.htm.
[9] Cavanaugh, “Migrant, Tourist, Pilgrim, Monk,” 352.
[10] Biblos.com, “Online Parallel Bible”, Matt 2:16.
[11] Ibid., Matt 25.
[12] The Australian, “Abbott Slams Boatpeople as un-Christian.”
[13] Preece, Gordon, “We Are All Boat People: An Exposition of a Biblical View,” 82.
[14] Jensen, “Interview with Amy Butler on Australia’s Treatment of Asylum Seekers and Refugees”; ABC, “Seek and Ye Shall Submit (Transcript)”; “Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers.”
[15] King, “A Christmas Sermon on Peace.”
[16] King, Methodist Student Leadership Conference Address.
[17] Biblos.com, “Online Parallel Bible”, Romans 3:8 and 6:1.
[18] Kant, “The Categorical Imperative,” 279. Kant suggest that “every rational being exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will.”
[19] At least, this is how one would expect the legal system to function.
[20] Lamey, Frontier justice, 118.
[21] Ibid., 129.
[22] Preece, Gordon, “We Are All Boat People: An Exposition of a Biblical View,” 70.
[23] Ralston, “Toward a political theology of refugee resettlement,” 386.
[24] Carens, “Aliens and Citizens,” 270.
[25] Ibid., 271.

Thursday, May 31, 2012

Singer and Rawls on International Justice


Compare the conception of international justice held by Peter Singer and John Rawls. Indicate which thinker’s conception is superior and why.

John Rawls and Peter Singer both hold to the view that society should be constructed in an egalitarian manner. In this essay I will explore the differing methodologies which Rawls and Singer use to develop their respective theories of international justice. I will argue that Rawl’s approach has stronger potential if the ‘difference principle’ were to be applied to the international justice sphere. I will also explore Singer’s theory and suggest that as they both stand, Singer provides a more responsible and egalitarian conception of international justice. Throughout this essay, I will work from the assumption that a philosophically consistent, egalitarian and responsible theory is superior to the alternative options.

First, I will briefly describe the core components of Justice as Fairness which is Rawls’ domestic conception of justice. A basic understanding of Rawls’ domestic conception of justice will help us better understand the potential of a Rawls-based conception of international justice. Rawls’ domestic understanding of justice applies primarily to how the ‘basic structure’ of society should be set out and regulated. The term constructivism can be appropriately applied to his theory as he considers justice ‘only as a virtue of social institutions.’[1] The two primary principles that Rawls seeks to fulfill are as follows: (i) an ‘equal right to extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all’, and (ii) that ‘inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone’s advantage, and provided the positions and offices to which they attach, or from which they may be gained, are open to all.’[2] It is important to note that the second principle is not utilitarian (average or total) in the sense that disadvantaging the least well-off can be counterbalanced by advantaging the most well-off equal amounts. According to Rawls, if there is an inequality it must benefit all people including the least well-off. This will be referred to as the difference principle.

These principles are what Rawls believes a rational, risk-averse, and self-interested person would choose in the original position. According to Rawls, in the original position ‘no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.’[3] He goes on to state that ‘the principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.’ Behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ people are unknowing of particular factors which should when applied nullify ‘the accidents of natural endowment and the contingencies of social circumstance as counters in quest for political and economic advantage.’[4]

The aforementioned elements of Rawls’ thinking are to be applied in full to the domestic realm, yet, they are only granted limited applicability by Rawls in the international realm. The difference principle is especially relevant to my later discussion of the potential of a Rawlsian understanding of international justice. Law of Peoples is Rawls’ attempt to extend Justice as Fairness to the international sphere. He endeavors to develop a framework of international justice which is ecumenical, and one which is not partisan to ‘societies whose political institutions and culture are liberal.’ Rawls states that a ‘liberal society must respect other societies organized by comprehensive doctrines, provided that their political and social institutions meet certain conditions that lead the society to adhere to a reasonable law of peoples.’[5] He provides seven principles in regards to international relations which include respect for freedom and independence, equality among persons, rights to self-defense (but not aggression), duty of nonintervention, duty to observe treaties and undertakings, restrictions within war, and a duty to honor human rights.[6] While Rawls does suggest that there ‘should be certain provisions for mutual assistance between peoples in times of famine and drought’, his theory of international justice emphasizes restrictions rather than prescriptions; negative duties of justice rather than positive duties of distributive justice, like his domestic theory.[7]

Peter Singer, unlike Rawls, uses a moralist approach to support his arguments surrounding international justice. These arguments are not tied in with a social contract.[8] His views are broadly utilitarian, although, one could easily accept the argument he gives in Famine, Affluence, and Morality without having a commitment to utilitarianism. Singer begins with the assumption that ‘suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care’ are bad things. His argument then follows that ‘if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.’ [9] The qualifier he uses in the strong version of the principle, ‘without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance’ (my emphasis) is particularly important. [10] Singer is essentially suggesting that we must give foreign aid to the point of marginal utility whereby to give any more resources would sacrifice something which of equal moral worth, either for us or our dependents. Following this principle to its logical conclusions would have radical implications for how many people, especially those of us who reside in richer nations, would have to live in order to be moral.

The principle is most simply articulated by the drowning child example which Singer provides in Famine, Affluence, and Morality. He puts forward the deceptively uncontroversial assertion that ‘if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out.’ Singer goes on to suggest that the distance between me and the child ‘makes no moral difference.’ Since Singer, like most practical philosophers, subscribes to principles of ‘impartiality, universalisability,’ and ‘equality,’ it seems reasonable to state that distance either makes very little difference or no difference at all in situations where people who have access to vast resources can easily support famine relief in places like Bangladesh. [11] He also refutes the argument that says ‘there are other people either equally or better placed to give money and this therefore exempts me from owing anything to the worlds’ poor.’ While it may be the case that there are people better placed than I to help, it is clear that many of those people have chosen not to address the problem and therefore the conclusion is based upon a hypothetical premise which presumes that the very rich will do all that they can to address poverty. As Singer points out, such an argument is ‘an ideal excuse for inactivity’ which does nothing to address the situation which we currently find ourselves in.[12]

The question regarding which author provides a better framework for dealing with poverty is a difficult one. I will argue that as their respective theories stand, Peter Singer provides a better theory in regards to international justice. However, if John Rawls took his theory of domestic justice as it is outlined in A Theory Of Justice and applied it consistently to the realm of international justice, his theory would be able to address poverty equally, if not better than Singer’s theory. There are two main reasons why Rawls’ theory of international justice is incomplete: (i) he attempts to synthesize liberal tolerance with prescriptive egalitarianism, and (ii) he effectively creates a morality based upon the social contract.

In order to gain ecumenical support, Rawls compromises and waters down many of the logical conclusions that one would reach if they were to apply the ‘veil of ignorance’ hypothetical scenario to shape international governance.  Rawls attempts to be tolerant with societies whose members may have different conceptions of justice than ours, and who may be guided by different kinds of comprehensive doctrines.[13] However, this apparent respect of ‘other societies organized by comprehensive doctrines’ effectively forfeits our social contract with them, meaning that there is no clear burden under the ‘veil of ignorance’ for a rational person to suggest that economic assistance must be given to poor people in illiberal nations. The rational person knows that she will not become a member of an illiberal society under the ‘veil of ignorance’ because the veil does not apply to illiberal societies. This then means that she has no good reason to make allowances for these people unless they will somehow improve her lot, which in many cases, is highly improbable.

The second objection to Rawl’s theory ties in strongly with the first objection. Rawls’ theory of international justice is based on the social contract. While any theory based upon the social contract should be first seen as contractarian rather than moral, it is unavoidable for a theory like Rawls’ to have many moral implications, imperatives, and restrictions. Strictly speaking, it is not immoral to decide under the ‘veil of ignorance’ that there will be a small portion of people who control a great deal of society’s wealth, this should be seen as irrational. However, making a decision under the ‘veil of ignorance’, then changing the decision when the veil is lifted, in favor of one’s self interest, could be seen as immoral. In short, Rawls’ theory has moral implications even though it is based on rationality. The morality drawn from Rawls’ theory could be summed up as ‘do unto others as they do unto me.’ This is unfortunate as any morality that gives an exemptions if other people choose not to follow it is flawed. Effectively, such a morality is dependent on the actions of another person rather than any deeply held conviction.

In Practical Ethics (Second Ed.) Singer argues that wealthy nations should be significantly more generous in their intake of asylum seekers, perhaps up until the point of marginal utility. He creates a scenario similar to the ‘drowning child’ thought experiment which was previously mentioned. Singer asks whether the investors in the hypothetical underground community called Fairhaven should allow non-investing people into their community, allowing them to escape the extreme radiation outside. Members of Fairhaven will have to give up their tennis courts, swimming pools, and their large gymnasium in order to give those outside some form of basic accommodation. Singer presents three options: (i) admit all 10,000 outsiders and lose all the sports and entertainment facilities, (ii) admit only 500 outsiders and lose a quarter of the tennis courts (which only had little use), or (iii) admit no outsiders and therefore accept no costs.[14] I find this to be a compelling argument for a more responsible and egalitarian approach to those fleeing persecution across borders. However, as a utilitarian, Singer is obliged to consider the consequences for all affected parties, which leads to a great deal of moral complexity when this issue could have been a simple matter. In the third edition of Practical Ethics, Singer removed the chapter Insiders and Outsiders, explaining why in the preface. He cites reasons such as the possibility of a ‘racist backlash’ if a country accepts large numbers of refugees as ‘highly relevant’ to the discussion, and no doubt, highly relevant to why he chose to omit this chapter in the third edition of Practical Ethics.[15] I find this argument to be both inconsistent with the Fairhaven hypothetical mentioned above and revealing of the limits of utilitarianism. If ‘racist backlashes’ are of genuine concern for Singer’s theory of international justice, his theory is little more than a Lifeboat Ethic.

As mentioned previously, and as noted by thinkers such as Pogge and Singer, Rawls’ main area of concern is the domestic sphere.[16] It is unfortunate that throughout The Law of Peoples, Rawls continually refers to the benefits of the ‘veil of ignorance’ only being conferred on to the citizen.[17] In a practical application of the ‘veil of ignorance’, as Rawls intends the device to be used, it seems inevitable that one would know that one will become a citizen of a liberal and democratic state, which would in turn justify self-interested and potentially deeply harmful policies towards outsiders. However, this goes against the very intention of the ‘veil of ignorance’ which aims to ‘nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage.’[18] In Carens’ critique of Rawls, he points out that ‘whether one is a citizen of a rich nation or a poor one, whether one is already a citizen of a particular state or an alien who wishes to become a citizen – this is the sort of specific contingency that could set people at odds … We should therefore take a global, not a national view of the original position.’[19] Carens’ approach is ironically more compatible with the ‘veil of ignorance’ than the approach that Rawls himself utilised.

In conclusion, I find Singer’s theory of international justice to be superior to Rawls’, as Rawls intended his theory to be understood. However, if Rawls’ conception of domestic justice were to be applied to the international sphere, it would have the potential to be far more robust that Singer’s. The ‘veil of ignorance’, as it has been critiqued by authors such as Pogge and Carens, could be incredibly useful in the international realm, but only if it is applied with consistency.





Bibliography

Carens, Joseph H. “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders.” The Review of Politics 49, no. 2 (April 1, 1987): 251–273.
Pogge, Thomas W. Realizing Rawls. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1989.
Rawls, John. A theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.
———. Collected papers. Edited by Samuel Richard Freeman. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999.
———. “Justice as Fairness.” The Philosophical Review 67, no. 2 (April 1, 1958): 164–194.
———. “The Main Idea of the Theory of Justice.” In Ethics, edited by Peter Singer, 362–367. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Singer, Peter. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” In World hunger and moral obligation, edited by William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977.
———. Practical Ethics. Second ed. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
———. Practical Ethics. Third ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
[1] John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” The Philosophical Review 67, no. 2 (April 1, 1958): 164.
[2] Ibid., 165.
[3] John Rawls, “The Main Idea of the Theory of Justice,” in Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 363.
[4] Ibid., 365.
[5] Rawls and Freeman, Collected Papers, 540–541.
John Rawls, Collected papers, ed. Samuel Richard Freeman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 532–531.
[6] Ibid., 540.
[7] Ibid., 540–541.
[8] In using the term ‘moralist’, I do not seek to suggest that Singer has political affiliations with groups who call themselves moralists. Rather, I am pointing out that his theory is directly speaking about what is right and wrong rather than what is rational and irrational.
[9] Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” in World hunger and moral obligation, ed. William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 24.
[10] Ibid.
[11] All quoted material in the beginning of this paragraph can be found in: Ibid., 24–25.
[12] Ibid., 25–26.
[13] Rawls, Collected papers, 530.
[14] Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, Second ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
[15] Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, Third ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
[16] Thomas W Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1989), 1–14; Singer, Practical Ethics, 253.
[17] Rawls, Collected papers, 537–541.
[18] John Rawls, A theory of Justice. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 136.
[19] Joseph H. Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” The Review of Politics 49, no. 2 (April 1, 1987): 256.

Wednesday, August 3, 2011

Revelations

I wrote this song after reading an article by Tim Foster that I recommend you check out if you get the chance. 


Revelations
June 16, 2011
9:21 PM 16/06/2011
Christiansz
Capo 2

Verse 1

Is this just the way we're programmed or how we're meant to be?
For what purpose do we surface spreading our disease?
The claim is empirical and the findings spark belief
The motives for our actions must be something more than me

Have we captured our future selves, foreshadowed by our deeds?
How can love come of evil when people are our means?
Are we more than vessels in a cumulative sea?
Adding to the question of what being really means.

Chorus
The world is waiting, for transformation
A new beginning, REVELATIONS
Kingdom descending, the broken mending
Our hearts are anchored, in REVELATIONS

Verse 2
The ontology of biology is more than meets the eye
It's when the consciences of creatures suddenly come alive
Living in a vacuum of all that i can hide
Forbearing every weakness with an disembodied guise

Chorus
The world is waiting, for transformation
A new beginning, REVELATIONS
Kingdom descending, the broken mending
Our hearts are anchored, in REVELATIONS

Bridge
Your will be done
Your Kingdom come
Your will be done
Your Kingdom come



Friday, June 17, 2011

Why we cannot accept the Malaysia Solution

Recently, the Gillard-Labour government announced the ‘Malaysia Solution’. The deal proposes that the next 800 boat people to arrive on Australia’s shores will be sent to Malaysia. I won't delve into the details of the deal here, but rather focus on its ethical implications



      1.       We are taking vulnerable people and using them as a means to an ends to deter other people from taking the journey to our country.

This is a Kantian based concept, derived from deontology, yet it has been around much longer. Doing unto another, as one would do to oneself, has implications for the above statement. Why would I want someone to use me with no consideration to the effects that their actions will have on me? Is it ever justified to exploit one person to ‘save’ other people from taking the hazardous journey to Australia? I would suggest no, it is not. Whether we are doing it for our economic gain or for the safety of the next wave of boats, it is not ethical to use people as a means for the ends of other people with no consideration of that persons ends.

      2.      Rather than appealing to a good principle, we are using utilitarian methods to support this flawed scheme.

An appeal to the ‘greatest good’ as shown in statement above, in my mind, is completely misguided and very dangerous. Can we as Christians, or people who claim to be ethical, support the Malaysia solution when its appeal rests in its consequences? Paul thinks not. In Romans 3:8, some people suggested that Christians thought it was permissible for ‘us [to] do evil so that good may result’. Paul wrote that such ideas are slanderous. We are, as voters and as a country, doing evil so that ‘good’ will result by buying into this ‘solution’.

      3.      We’re treating some people better than others.

James (2:1) writes  'My friends, if you have faith in our glorious Lord Jesus Christ, you won't treat some people better than others'. He continues on to say treating some people better than others is a ‘sin’. If we are bible believers, we are walking on a tight-rope by arguing that it is permissible to treat a poor (if not materially, then otherwise) asylum seeker badly, and yet it is impermissible for the government to treat us (who are presumably richer – financially, security, etc.)  in the same manner. Our allegiance is not with nations, it is with the Kingdom.

I could go on about other implications, especially from a biblical point of view, but I won’t right now. From these three points I think it is clear that any policy that attempts to ‘stop the boats’ by harming innocent and vulnerable people is not one that can be supported by those who take morality seriously.

Make sure you check out Go Back To Where You Came From if you would like to get a more in depth and challenging experience of asylum seeker issues. It is a three part series that commences on Tuesday June 21, 8.30pm on SBS (Australia).

Friday, May 27, 2011

Singer and the principle of equality

note: i would love to hear your views on whether you think utilitarianism can undermine equality. comments are greatly appreciated. here's a picture that sum's up Mr Singer:

image taken from http://goo.gl/r1wMC

The principle of equality that Singer defends has radical consequences. Critically discuss the principle, explaining some of its consequences, and assess whether Singer is right that we  ought to adopt it.


Singer’s principle of equality can have radical consequences. The principle of equality has practical and intuitive appeal as it is able to eliminate many forms of discrimination based on characteristics such as race or sex. Singer’s ideas have also been described as useful for normative ethics as they are based on simple and widely accepted presuppositions (Schaler, 2009, p. 405.).  However, this paper shows how Singer’s principle of equality is inconsistent with his ‘utilitarian exemption’ that allows for the prioritisation of the equal interests of one person above the equal interests of another person based on the consequences of the prioritisation.

According to Singer (1993, p. 21.), the principle of equality can be briefly described as ‘the principle of equal consideration of equal interests’. Singer (1993, p. 21.) suggests that it is morally irrelevant who the interest is held by, asserting that ‘an interest is an interest, whoever’s interest it may be’. For example, If Bob and myself were to both be affected by a possible act, and if Bob stands more to lose than I stand to gain, then it is better not to do the act. I should not favour myself above Bob because I hold the belief that my interests are of greater importance than Bob’s. This example shows how the principle of equality demands impartiality on the part of the one scrutinising the act. Singer (1993, pp. 22-23.) acknowledges that different people have different interests which may ‘vary according to their abilities or other characteristics’. This is a helpful practical consideration as we can draw a distinction between the following two examples: if I am a professional piano player, it can be argued according to this rule, that my interest in not having my index fingers chopped off is greater than another person’s interest in not having their index fingers chopped off. In contrast, if I have an interest in cheap clothing at the expense of atrocious working conditions for the producer of my clothes, I cannot claim that my interest is weightier. Singer would suggest that my interest in cheap clothing is of significantly less moral weighting than the producer’s interest in fair working conditions.

There are occasions where Singer permits exceptions to the principle of equality. The following example illustrates one of these circumstances. Two people may both be suffering a great deal of pain in the wake of a natural disaster. One of the two victims of the natural disaster happens to be a doctor. Singer suggests that it is permissible to prioritise the relief of the doctor’s pain over the relief of the non-doctor person’s pain. Singer (1993, pp. 21-22.) suggest this, because by relieving the suffering of the doctor, utility will be able to be maximised as the doctor will then be able to relieve the suffering of others. Political philosopher John Rawls uses a similar widely accepted justification for income inequality. Rawls suggests that any structural socio-economic inequalities attached to certain positions, like being a doctor, must be to the maximum benefit of the least advantaged. Positions such as being a doctor must also, according to Rawls, be open to all (Rawls, 2000, pp. 52-53.). For Singer, the case of the natural disaster illustrated above is simply a situation where there is an inequality is allowed (prioritising the doctors relief from suffering) in order to maximise utility. In the following example I will show how Singer’s principle of equality erroneously prioritises the interests of the doctor above the interests of the non-doctors and how this in fact breaches the principle of equality.

Utilitarianism and the principle of equality cannot always be reconciled with one another. An asymmetry can be drawn between the doctor who Singer chooses to save in the case of the natural disaster and the beam-fitter in Thomson’s Trolley case. I will briefly explain the Beam Fitter scenario: in this version of the trolley case, there are five people who are assigned each day to work on track A while there is one person who always works on track B as a ‘beam-fitter’. The workmen always work on the same track each day. Thomson suggests that if a trolley was to come towards the workmen on track A, Bloggs is not justified in changing the trolley’s direction to track B. Bloggs is not justified in ‘saving’ the five people on track A because the Beam Fitter always works on track B and therefore, unless the Beam Fitter was very altruistic, he never would have consented to the trolley being diverted towards himself (Thomson, 1990, pp. 131-136.).

Consider once again the case of the doctor and the natural disaster. Elaborating on the previous example, in this case one hundred people are all be in need of medical attention within three hours. Unfortunately there is only one ‘special lifesaving pill’ which can only save one person. Within three hours, without medical attention, the other ninety-nine people will die. Singer would argue that the pill should go to the one doctor, who then can within the three hours, treat two more people. These two patients will then be able to live for one more year each. This would end up satisfying the most preferences by satisfying one major preference; the doctor’s desire to live a full and complete life, and two relatively minor preferences; the non-doctor peoples’ desires to live one more year. However the parallel with Thomson’s beam-fitter case would suggest that such a view is not entirely fair. If you are the doctor in this case you are guaranteed survival, while if you are one of the ninety-nine other people you will only have a very small chance of surviving only one more year of life. It is likely that the ninety-nine non-doctors would prefer to have a small but equal chance of receiving the life-giving pill rather than having no chance of receiving the pill and a small chance of living for one more year. There is not an equal consideration of equal interests if the one-hundred people do not have equal chance of receiving the pill. Singer (1993, pp. 20-21.) writes that ‘there is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we give to their interests’. Singer’s ‘utilitarian exemption’ to the principle of equality contradicts itself by not allowing the principle to give equal consideration to equal interests. In essence, this exemption means that higher value is placed on lives of doctors over other non-doctor people. Like racism or sexism, this is a bad thing firstly because the position of being a doctor is not open to all, and secondly, because arbitrary attributes such as one’s career choice should not determine one’s chances of survival. An alternate distribution of the pill by method of lottery can much better synthesise with the principle of equality, yet such a distribution would not be able to synthesise with utilitarianism.

Singer’s principle of equality contains significant prima facie appeal in that it is accessible, intuitive, and convincing. However, Singer’s poor attempt at reconciling utilitarianism with the principle of equality shows the principle’s weakness. The doctor case illustrated above reveals inconsistencies within the principle of equality as per how Singer describes it. I therefore conclude that, although the principle of equality may be useful if reconsidered separate from utilitarianism, due to its problematic nature we have no reason to accept or adopt it.


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