Singer and Rawls on International Justice

Compare the conception of international justice held by Peter Singer and John Rawls. Indicate which thinker’s conception is superior and why.

John Rawls and Peter Singer both hold to the view that society should be constructed in an egalitarian manner. In this essay I will explore the differing methodologies which Rawls and Singer use to develop their respective theories of international justice. I will argue that Rawl’s approach has stronger potential if the ‘difference principle’ were to be applied to the international justice sphere. I will also explore Singer’s theory and suggest that as they both stand, Singer provides a more responsible and egalitarian conception of international justice. Throughout this essay, I will work from the assumption that a philosophically consistent, egalitarian and responsible theory is superior to the alternative options.

First, I will briefly describe the core components of Justice as Fairness which is Rawls’ domestic conception of justice. A basic understanding of Rawls’ domestic conception of justice will help us better understand the potential of a Rawls-based conception of international justice. Rawls’ domestic understanding of justice applies primarily to how the ‘basic structure’ of society should be set out and regulated. The term constructivism can be appropriately applied to his theory as he considers justice ‘only as a virtue of social institutions.’[1] The two primary principles that Rawls seeks to fulfill are as follows: (i) an ‘equal right to extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all’, and (ii) that ‘inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone’s advantage, and provided the positions and offices to which they attach, or from which they may be gained, are open to all.’[2] It is important to note that the second principle is not utilitarian (average or total) in the sense that disadvantaging the least well-off can be counterbalanced by advantaging the most well-off equal amounts. According to Rawls, if there is an inequality it must benefit all people including the least well-off. This will be referred to as the difference principle.

These principles are what Rawls believes a rational, risk-averse, and self-interested person would choose in the original position. According to Rawls, in the original position ‘no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.’[3] He goes on to state that ‘the principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.’ Behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ people are unknowing of particular factors which should when applied nullify ‘the accidents of natural endowment and the contingencies of social circumstance as counters in quest for political and economic advantage.’[4]

The aforementioned elements of Rawls’ thinking are to be applied in full to the domestic realm, yet, they are only granted limited applicability by Rawls in the international realm. The difference principle is especially relevant to my later discussion of the potential of a Rawlsian understanding of international justice. Law of Peoples is Rawls’ attempt to extend Justice as Fairness to the international sphere. He endeavors to develop a framework of international justice which is ecumenical, and one which is not partisan to ‘societies whose political institutions and culture are liberal.’ Rawls states that a ‘liberal society must respect other societies organized by comprehensive doctrines, provided that their political and social institutions meet certain conditions that lead the society to adhere to a reasonable law of peoples.’[5] He provides seven principles in regards to international relations which include respect for freedom and independence, equality among persons, rights to self-defense (but not aggression), duty of nonintervention, duty to observe treaties and undertakings, restrictions within war, and a duty to honor human rights.[6] While Rawls does suggest that there ‘should be certain provisions for mutual assistance between peoples in times of famine and drought’, his theory of international justice emphasizes restrictions rather than prescriptions; negative duties of justice rather than positive duties of distributive justice, like his domestic theory.[7]

Peter Singer, unlike Rawls, uses a moralist approach to support his arguments surrounding international justice. These arguments are not tied in with a social contract.[8] His views are broadly utilitarian, although, one could easily accept the argument he gives in Famine, Affluence, and Morality without having a commitment to utilitarianism. Singer begins with the assumption that ‘suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care’ are bad things. His argument then follows that ‘if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.’ [9] The qualifier he uses in the strong version of the principle, ‘without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance’ (my emphasis) is particularly important. [10] Singer is essentially suggesting that we must give foreign aid to the point of marginal utility whereby to give any more resources would sacrifice something which of equal moral worth, either for us or our dependents. Following this principle to its logical conclusions would have radical implications for how many people, especially those of us who reside in richer nations, would have to live in order to be moral.

The principle is most simply articulated by the drowning child example which Singer provides in Famine, Affluence, and Morality. He puts forward the deceptively uncontroversial assertion that ‘if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out.’ Singer goes on to suggest that the distance between me and the child ‘makes no moral difference.’ Since Singer, like most practical philosophers, subscribes to principles of ‘impartiality, universalisability,’ and ‘equality,’ it seems reasonable to state that distance either makes very little difference or no difference at all in situations where people who have access to vast resources can easily support famine relief in places like Bangladesh. [11] He also refutes the argument that says ‘there are other people either equally or better placed to give money and this therefore exempts me from owing anything to the worlds’ poor.’ While it may be the case that there are people better placed than I to help, it is clear that many of those people have chosen not to address the problem and therefore the conclusion is based upon a hypothetical premise which presumes that the very rich will do all that they can to address poverty. As Singer points out, such an argument is ‘an ideal excuse for inactivity’ which does nothing to address the situation which we currently find ourselves in.[12]

The question regarding which author provides a better framework for dealing with poverty is a difficult one. I will argue that as their respective theories stand, Peter Singer provides a better theory in regards to international justice. However, if John Rawls took his theory of domestic justice as it is outlined in A Theory Of Justice and applied it consistently to the realm of international justice, his theory would be able to address poverty equally, if not better than Singer’s theory. There are two main reasons why Rawls’ theory of international justice is incomplete: (i) he attempts to synthesize liberal tolerance with prescriptive egalitarianism, and (ii) he effectively creates a morality based upon the social contract.

In order to gain ecumenical support, Rawls compromises and waters down many of the logical conclusions that one would reach if they were to apply the ‘veil of ignorance’ hypothetical scenario to shape international governance.  Rawls attempts to be tolerant with societies whose members may have different conceptions of justice than ours, and who may be guided by different kinds of comprehensive doctrines.[13] However, this apparent respect of ‘other societies organized by comprehensive doctrines’ effectively forfeits our social contract with them, meaning that there is no clear burden under the ‘veil of ignorance’ for a rational person to suggest that economic assistance must be given to poor people in illiberal nations. The rational person knows that she will not become a member of an illiberal society under the ‘veil of ignorance’ because the veil does not apply to illiberal societies. This then means that she has no good reason to make allowances for these people unless they will somehow improve her lot, which in many cases, is highly improbable.

The second objection to Rawl’s theory ties in strongly with the first objection. Rawls’ theory of international justice is based on the social contract. While any theory based upon the social contract should be first seen as contractarian rather than moral, it is unavoidable for a theory like Rawls’ to have many moral implications, imperatives, and restrictions. Strictly speaking, it is not immoral to decide under the ‘veil of ignorance’ that there will be a small portion of people who control a great deal of society’s wealth, this should be seen as irrational. However, making a decision under the ‘veil of ignorance’, then changing the decision when the veil is lifted, in favor of one’s self interest, could be seen as immoral. In short, Rawls’ theory has moral implications even though it is based on rationality. The morality drawn from Rawls’ theory could be summed up as ‘do unto others as they do unto me.’ This is unfortunate as any morality that gives an exemptions if other people choose not to follow it is flawed. Effectively, such a morality is dependent on the actions of another person rather than any deeply held conviction.

In Practical Ethics (Second Ed.) Singer argues that wealthy nations should be significantly more generous in their intake of asylum seekers, perhaps up until the point of marginal utility. He creates a scenario similar to the ‘drowning child’ thought experiment which was previously mentioned. Singer asks whether the investors in the hypothetical underground community called Fairhaven should allow non-investing people into their community, allowing them to escape the extreme radiation outside. Members of Fairhaven will have to give up their tennis courts, swimming pools, and their large gymnasium in order to give those outside some form of basic accommodation. Singer presents three options: (i) admit all 10,000 outsiders and lose all the sports and entertainment facilities, (ii) admit only 500 outsiders and lose a quarter of the tennis courts (which only had little use), or (iii) admit no outsiders and therefore accept no costs.[14] I find this to be a compelling argument for a more responsible and egalitarian approach to those fleeing persecution across borders. However, as a utilitarian, Singer is obliged to consider the consequences for all affected parties, which leads to a great deal of moral complexity when this issue could have been a simple matter. In the third edition of Practical Ethics, Singer removed the chapter Insiders and Outsiders, explaining why in the preface. He cites reasons such as the possibility of a ‘racist backlash’ if a country accepts large numbers of refugees as ‘highly relevant’ to the discussion, and no doubt, highly relevant to why he chose to omit this chapter in the third edition of Practical Ethics.[15] I find this argument to be both inconsistent with the Fairhaven hypothetical mentioned above and revealing of the limits of utilitarianism. If ‘racist backlashes’ are of genuine concern for Singer’s theory of international justice, his theory is little more than a Lifeboat Ethic.

As mentioned previously, and as noted by thinkers such as Pogge and Singer, Rawls’ main area of concern is the domestic sphere.[16] It is unfortunate that throughout The Law of Peoples, Rawls continually refers to the benefits of the ‘veil of ignorance’ only being conferred on to the citizen.[17] In a practical application of the ‘veil of ignorance’, as Rawls intends the device to be used, it seems inevitable that one would know that one will become a citizen of a liberal and democratic state, which would in turn justify self-interested and potentially deeply harmful policies towards outsiders. However, this goes against the very intention of the ‘veil of ignorance’ which aims to ‘nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage.’[18] In Carens’ critique of Rawls, he points out that ‘whether one is a citizen of a rich nation or a poor one, whether one is already a citizen of a particular state or an alien who wishes to become a citizen – this is the sort of specific contingency that could set people at odds … We should therefore take a global, not a national view of the original position.’[19] Carens’ approach is ironically more compatible with the ‘veil of ignorance’ than the approach that Rawls himself utilised.

In conclusion, I find Singer’s theory of international justice to be superior to Rawls’, as Rawls intended his theory to be understood. However, if Rawls’ conception of domestic justice were to be applied to the international sphere, it would have the potential to be far more robust that Singer’s. The ‘veil of ignorance’, as it has been critiqued by authors such as Pogge and Carens, could be incredibly useful in the international realm, but only if it is applied with consistency.

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Bibliography

Carens, Joseph H. “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders.” The Review of Politics 49, no. 2 (April 1, 1987): 251–273.

Pogge, Thomas W. Realizing Rawls. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1989.

Rawls, John. A theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.

———. Collected papers. Edited by Samuel Richard Freeman. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999.

———. “Justice as Fairness.” The Philosophical Review 67, no. 2 (April 1, 1958): 164–194.

———. “The Main Idea of the Theory of Justice.” In Ethics, edited by Peter Singer, 362–367. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Singer, Peter. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” In World hunger and moral obligation, edited by William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977.

———. Practical Ethics. Second ed. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

———. Practical Ethics. Third ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

[1] John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” The Philosophical Review 67, no. 2 (April 1, 1958): 164.

[2] Ibid., 165.

[3] John Rawls, “The Main Idea of the Theory of Justice,” in Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 363.

[4] Ibid., 365.

[5] Rawls and Freeman, Collected Papers, 540–541.

John Rawls, Collected papers, ed. Samuel Richard Freeman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 532–531.

[6] Ibid., 540.

[7] Ibid., 540–541.

[8] In using the term ‘moralist’, I do not seek to suggest that Singer has political affiliations with groups who call themselves moralists. Rather, I am pointing out that his theory is directly speaking about what is right and wrong rather than what is rational and irrational.

[9] Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” in World hunger and moral obligation, ed. William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 24.

[10] Ibid.

[11] All quoted material in the beginning of this paragraph can be found in: Ibid., 24–25.

[12] Ibid., 25–26.

[13] Rawls, Collected papers, 530.

[14] Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, Second ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

[15] Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, Third ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

[16] Thomas W Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1989), 1–14; Singer, Practical Ethics, 253.

[17] Rawls, Collected papers, 537–541.

[18] John Rawls, A theory of Justice. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 136.

[19] Joseph H. Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” The Review of Politics 49, no. 2 (April 1, 1987): 256.

America's foreign policy and Christian values

A protester questions whether Bush's policies reflect 'Christian values' http://goo.gl/tVFiF

Preface: There is no way to do justice to a topic like this in 2000 words. Absolutely no way. Maybe 200,000 words. I have chosen to write critically as this is a university assignment. However, I do still hold to my conclusion - that the exegesis of Christian values which Martin Luther King, Jr. and Jim Wallis support, is closer to the law of Christ as it is written in the Gospels. I would love to hear your feedback, as always!

Critically discuss the relationship between America's foreign policy and the concept of 'Christian values'.

The Judeo-Christian narrative has historically been at the heart of the American story. The United States of America has often considered themselves to be a ‘redeemer nation’, a ‘city on a hill’, a ‘righteous empire’, and the ‘last hope.’[1] All of these terms have deeply religious connotations. This narrative which the USA so strongly feels a part of has helped raise leaders who view the world in ‘moralistic, highly dualistic, and frequently apocalyptical ways.’[2] Leaders of the Christian tradition from across the political spectrum, from Martin Luther King, Jr. to George W. Bush have all incorporated a Judeo-Christian narrative into their respective political ideologies.[3] What is of concern in this paper is how leaders and believers who claim to follow the same religion and teachings can reach radically different conclusions on how to respond to issues of international justice, especially those that are specifically related to America’s foreign policy. In this essay I will explore a selection of the diverse political ideologies held by Christians in America and consider how, if at all, they relate to the Christian narrative.

In recent years, a vast amount of research has taken place in regard to the influence that a person’s religious identity has on their political ideology. A great deal of this research separates Christian groups into Catholic and Protestant, Progressive and Conservative, Fundamental and Liberal, and the list goes on. Unfortunately some of the literature is quite circular in its approach and does not fully recognise the dynamic nature of religious identity. For example, an ‘evangelical’ may gain this label because they are politically conservative, and furthermore, a political conservative who is a Christian will sometimes be described as an ‘evangelical’. Naturally, all that one can derive from this logic is that ‘a’ is equal to ‘a’, and we arrive at no greater truth. For the purposes of this essay I will use the terms as the literature on the subject uses them, but with full recognition that all that is observable about particular political religious identities are patterns and trends, rather than categorical absolutes.

Christianity in the USA does have particular patterns and trends among its believers and leaders; there is a deep connection between religious identity and political ideologies. Such a deep connection between religion and politics in a quasi-secular democracy gives America a unique standing amongst world democracies. Lienesch suggests that the ‘Conservative Christian’ American citizen feels it to be her duty to ‘save other nations from religious backwardness and political corruption.’[4] While the view that America has a special role ‘to carry its values to other lands’ is widely held amongst her citizens, it appears that this view is held most strongly amongst those of the Christian tradition.[5] However, amongst the diverse Christian groups in America, there is a massive gulf between thoughts on what a special role entails and in particular, whether a special relationship gives America the privilege to use force to propagate its agenda.

Pat Robertson is a massively influential televangelist who sought nomination from the Republican party for President. Pilgrim argues that this indicated a ‘revamped relationship between the Christian Right and mainstream politics.’[6] In a speech two years prior to his 1988 presidential bid, Robertson described conservatism as ‘greater than the sum of the many rights we protect and defend.’[7] In 1996, a Pew Centre report found that nearly 47% of Republican voters identified themselves as ‘born again or evangelical Christians.’ The report suggests that Republican voters were most likely to be enterprisers, moralists, or libertarians who were predominately white, pro-business, anti-government, anti-social welfare and militaristic. The only strong divide between them was that the libertarians (which made up the smaller group of the three) were more likely to be tolerant and ‘very low on religious faith.’[8] Robertson sought to defend the ‘moralist’ version of evangelical Christianity.

In terms of foreign policy, Robertson is a committed Zionist, believing that ‘the technological marvels of Israeli industry, the military prowess, the bounty of Israeli agriculture, the fruits and flowers and abundance of the land are a testimony to God's watchful care over this new nation and the genius of this people.’^[9] He gives uncritical support for Israel, linking the sovereignty of the state in with the Judeo-Christian narrative. Robertson, in a 2004 speech quoted the biblical prophet Ezekiel who wrote ‘for I will take you out of the nations; I will gather you from all countries and bring you back into your own land.’[10] However, it is not clear whether this is a geographical land or a spiritual land. Moreover, the prophet Ezekiel also writes that ‘since you did not hate bloodshed, bloodshed will pursue you’ and ‘you rely on your sword ... should you then possess the land?’[11] Whether or not believers of the Judeo-Christian narrative must support Israel as the chosen nation is debatable, however, it seems to be excruciatingly obvious that the narrative cannot be synthesised with support for oppressive and expansionist governments. Sacred texts which prophesy the beating of swords into ploughshares have been twisted into the most dangerous of political weapons.[12]

George W. Bush is slightly more nuanced than Pat Robertson in regards to issues like the Israel and Palestine conflict. In a 2002 speech Bush suggested that he may be in support of a two state solution to the conflict, however, the conditions under which he would support such a solution are unrealistic and unfair. In essence, a ‘Bush solution’ to the Israeli-Palestine conflict would permit Israel to act as a sovereign state with military power yet it would not afford Palestine the same privileges. In his speech on the conflict he reaffirmed his deeply held conviction that you are either ‘with us or against us’, reinforcing a highly dualistic view of the world which sees only good or evil, and no shades of grey.

Bush’s view of America as a ‘redeemer nation’ is far less nuanced than his support for Israel. In a 2004 electoral campaign speech, Bush passionately stated ‘I have a clear vision to win the war on terror, and to extend peace and freedom throughout the world’, pitting himself against torture, violence, and weapons of mass destruction.[13] However, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute found that the America’s military spending accounted for 47 per cent of the world total in 2004.[14] It is clear from these figures that there is a strongly held view, particularly among ‘Christian conservatives’ who Bush claims to represent, that ideals can be spread in a less than ideal manner; that fire can put out fire.

Author, theologian, and CEO of Sojourners Jim Wallis provides a radically different understanding of the relationship between Christianity and politics in comparison to Pat Robertson and George W. Bush. In the synopsis for God’s Politics he questions: ‘in America why do moral values and a belief in God seem to make people pro-war, pro-rich and pro-republican?’[15] He maintains that ‘God is personal, but never private’, and wonders ‘where would America be if the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. had kept his faith to himself?’[16] Like Robertson and Bush, Wallis believes that faith-based political views should not be excluded from the public square, however, Wallis qualifies this by suggesting that faith-based political views that are brought into the public square must be ‘better for the common good.’[17]

Unlike Robertson and Bush, Wallis believes that there should be a ‘clear timetable’ for a genuine two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. Recalling his visit to Israel and Palestine, he describes the Israeli settlements as ‘aggressive forays into Palestinian territory by people who believe that God has given them all the land.’[18] Wallis acknowledges that there has been violence from Palestinians against the Israeli settlements, describing some of the violence as ‘terrorism’ which ‘can never be morally justified.’ However, he also contends that the violence from the Israeli side of the conflict ‘must also be called terrorism’ as the Israelis react ‘in massive, disproportionate retaliation’ to Palestinian violence.[19]

Wallis publically moved against the narrow evangelical stereotype in a letter co-authored by over forty American evangelical Christians in 2002 which stated ‘Mr. President, the American evangelical community is not a monolithic bloc in full and firm support of present Israeli policy.’[20] This further confuses the relationship between the evangelical Christian community and conservative, right wing, and violent foreign policies. Throughout his work, Jim Wallis makes a strong case for active nonviolence which is part pragmatic and part theological. His pragmatism is akin to that of Stephen Zunes who through his extensive research on nonviolent movements found that ‘armed resistance often backfires by legitimating the state’s use of repressive tactics’, and that there is ‘an increasing realisation that the benefits of waging an armed insurrection may not be worth the costs’ by proponents of human rights and social change.[21] Theologically, Wallis’ views are similar to that of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s which will be explored in the next section.

Martin Luther King, Jr. was one of the most prominent Christian leaders of his time. King is best known for his involvement with the American civil rights movement. He embraced the biblical narrative throughout his campaigning claiming that ‘if we are wrong, God Almighty is wrong ... If we are wrong, Jesus of Nazareth was merely a utopian dreamer that never came down to Earth.’[22] While King was known for his nonviolent leadership in the domestic realm through the civil rights movement, often his leadership on foreign policy matters went unnoticed. King only became vocal about nonviolence in the international sphere later in his career, most notably after being challenged about his beliefs by Malcolm X in Message to Grassroots. In the 1963 speech Malcolm X exclaimed, ‘if violence is wrong in America, violence is wrong abroad.’[23] This led King to adopt an approach to nonviolence which would be consistent in the domestic and international sphere.

It was just a few years after Message to Grassroots when King publically expressed his opposition to the Vietnam War in a sermon at Riverside Church in New York City describing the war as ‘madness.’[24] He went on to say ‘we can no longer afford to worship the god of hate or bow before the alter of retaliation.’[25] Unfortunately King’s view on the Israel-Palestine conflict has been twisted and de-contextualised, as one writer described, the ‘quotes’ that are spread by Zionists are a ‘hoax.’ However it is clear that while he would ‘no doubt roundly condemn Palestinian violence against innocent civilians, he would also condemn the state of Israel.’[26] King’s view of Christian values and how they relate to foreign policy are radically different from the views of Robertson and Bush.

The problem is not whether America’s foreign policy aligns with ‘Christian values’, but rather, whose ‘Christian values’ the policies are aligned with. Unfortunately throughout recent history many leaders in the United States of America have seen the world in a similar way to George W. Bush and Pat Robertson: black and white; good and evil. It seems as though those Christian leaders with a black and white world view have had the louder voice and greater say over America’s foreign policy. This is peculiar in one sense, since there are a considerable number of people from diverse faith backgrounds, including evangelical Christianity, who actively disagreed with the war in Iraq, who protested against torture, and who desire nonviolent conflict transformation as an alternative to violence.[27] However, it is the case that the media will continually give greater attention to people on political and religious extremes, and ignore the countless people of faith and no faith who, in less attention-seeking ways, strive to create a more peaceful planet.

In conclusion, ‘Christian values’ provide a problem for American foreign policy, but they may also provide a solution. In 2006 Barack Obama described Jesus’ Sermon On The Mount as ‘so radical that it’s doubtful that our own Defence Department would survive its application.’[28] Perhaps it is this kind of applied literal interpretation of the Christian ethic that is needed for America’s foreign policy to truly reflect ‘Christian values’. There will inevitably be broad interpretations of the comprehensive doctrine of Christianity which will provide challenges for democracy. These challenges are worth confronting rather than ignoring.

Bibliography

Burke, Daniel. “Obama Uses Sermon on the Mount to Elevate Speeches.” Christianity Today, 2009. http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2009/aprilweb-only/116-51.0.html.

Bush, George W. “Defending the War.” Presidential Rhetoric, 2004. http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/campaign/speeches/bush_july9.html.

———. “September 11 Anniversary Address.” Presidential Rhetoric, 2002. http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.11.02.html.

“Fraud Fit for a King: Israel, Zionism, and the Misuse of MLK.” The Electronic Intifada, n.d. http://electronicintifada.net/content/fraud-fit-king-israel-zionism-and-misuse-mlk/4373.

Lienesch, Michael. Redeeming America : Piety and Politics in the New Christian Right. Chapel Hill [u.a.]: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1996.

Martin Luther King, Jr. I’ve Been to the Mountaintop. August 27, 2011. American Rhetoric, 1968.

———. “Address to First Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA) Mass Meeting, at Holt Street Baptist Church.” A Call to Conscience: The Landmark Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr., 1955. http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu/kingweb/publications/speeches/MIA_mass_meeting_at_holt_street.html.

———. “Beyond Vietnam -- A Time to Break Silence”, 1967. http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkatimetobreaksilence.htm.

Pew Research Center. Energized Democrats Backing Clinton. Washington: Pew Research Center, 1995. http://www.people-press.org/1995/11/14/about-the-typology/.

Pilgrim, David. “Pat Robertson and the Oval Office.” Journal of American Studies 22, no. 2 (1988): 258–262.

Robertson, Pat. “Conservatism Will Triumph.” The Official Site of Pat Robertson, 1986. http://www.patrobertson.com/speeches/ConservatismWillTriumph.asp.

———. “Pat Robertson Receives Zionist Award.” The Official Site of Pat Robertson, 1986. http://www.patrobertson.com/PressReleases/ZionistAward.asp.

———. “Why Evangelical Christians Support Israel.” The Official Site of Pat Robertson, 2004. http://www.patrobertson.com/Speeches/IsraelLauder.asp.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. “Military Expenditure.” Yearbook, 2005. http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2005/08.

Sullivan, Julie. “From Protesting Abortion Clinics to Protesting the War.” Christianity Today, 2007. http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2007/marchweb-only/111-52.0.html.

Wallis, Jim. God’s Politics : Why the American Right Gets It Wrong and the Left Doesn’t Get It. Oxford: Lion, 2006.

X, Malcolm. “Message to Grassroots.” Teaching American History, 1963. http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=1145.

Zondervan Publishing House. The Holy Bible : New International Version Containing the Old Testament and the New Testament. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2010.

Zunes, Stephen. “Nonviolent Action and Human Rights.” PS: Political Science and Politics 33, no. 2 (June 1, 2000): 181–187.

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[1] Lienesch, Redeeming America, 196.

[2] Ibid., 195–196.

[3] See for examples: Martin Luther King, I’ve Been to the Mountaintop; Bush, “September 11 Anniversary Address.”

[4] Lienesch, Redeeming America, 195.

[5] Ibid., 196.

[6] Pilgrim, “Pat Robertson and the Oval Office,” 258.

[7] Robertson, “Conservatism Will Triumph.”

[8] Pew Research Center, Energized Democrats Backing Clinton.

[9] Robertson, “Why Evangelical Christians Support Israel”; Robertson, “Pat Robertson Receives Zionist Award.”

[10] Robertson, “Why Evangelical Christians Support Israel”; Translation quoted: Zondervan Publishing House, The Holy Bible, v.  Ez 36:24.

[11] Zondervan Publishing House, The Holy Bible, v. Ez 35:5; 33:26; see also Ez 22:13; Ez 22:6; and Ez 18.

[12] See ibid., v. Isaiah 2:4.

[13] Bush, “Defending the War.”

[14] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Military Expenditure.”

[15] Wallis, God’s Politics, 386.

[16] Ibid., 31, 57.

[17] Ibid., 71.

[18] Ibid., 173.

[19] Ibid., 175.

[20] Ibid., 186.

[21] Zunes, “Nonviolent Action and Human Rights,” 183–184.

[22] Martin Luther King, “Address to First Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA) Mass Meeting, at Holt Street Baptist Church.”

[23] X, “Message to Grassroots.”

[24] Martin Luther King, “Beyond Vietnam -- A Time to Break Silence.”

[25] Ibid.

[26] “Fraud Fit for a King.”

[27] Sullivan, “From Protesting Abortion Clinics to Protesting the War.”

[28] Burke, “Obama Uses Sermon on the Mount to Elevate Speeches.”

Political Forgiveness

Apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation will be discussed in this essay
Picture from http://goo.gl/k1dbm

I found this to be a very interesting essay to write. I have considered what forgiveness could mean in a secular democratic environment. However, I'm not sure whether a secular democratic environment is actually the best for society, so I'm not completely sure whether I agree with my conclusion. I think forgiveness could be less limited than I have defined it throughout this essay, however, this is as far as I can justify it through words. This paper was submitted for the subject 'Politics, Violence and Memory'.

Is there such thing as political forgiveness?

Political forgiveness is limited and problematic, but with appropriate reflection, it can become a valuable mechanism for reconciliation and transition. I will argue that there is such thing as political forgiveness, and I will define the term in its many elements throughout the discussion. In this paper, I seek to validate the following seven claims: (i) that a commitment to the elimination of resentment is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition of forgiveness, (ii) the elimination of resentment therefore does not constitute as forgiveness, (iii) forgiveness may also require truth, respect, and an openness to reconciliation, (iv) forgiveness in isolation is not a virtuous characteristic of the citizen or state, (v) genuine forgiveness is not condonation, nor need it be pardon, (vi) it is not a victim’s duty to forgive, although it could be regarded as morally commendable, and (vii) that those who have inherited fortunes from the immoral actions committed by previous generations could be eligible for forgiveness due to the injury of illegitimate inheritance.

The concept of resentment appears regularly in the literature surrounding political forgiveness. The Oxford English Dictionary describes resentment as a ‘sense of grievance, an indignant sense of injury or insult received or perceived; (a feeling of) ill will, bitterness, or anger against a person or thing.’[1] For forgiveness to be relevant to a situation, one party must have injured another party. Often in such situations, the injured party will carry some kind of resentment or ‘ill will’ against the other party. Digeser has suggested that ‘forgiveness requires either the actual elimination of resentment or a commitment to the process of eliminating it.’[2] A great deal of my analysis will centre around this assertion.

In relation to political communities it is crucial to understand whether the only way to move beyond resentment is through an act of forgiveness, or whether there are means other than forgiveness that one could use to move beyond resentment. The second question is whether the elimination of resentment constitutes as forgiveness. I will contend in regard to the former point that forgiveness generally is a necessary, although not an entirely sufficient, condition of moving beyond resentment. In regards to the second question, I will contend that the elimination of resentment does not constitute as forgiveness.

Some authors such as Nir Eisikovits have argued that victims can ‘simply move on’ without being forgiving or resentful.[3] It is possible that the victim has had some form of memory loss, or fails to recognise the harm for what it is. However, it seems that in ordinary circumstances forgiveness from the victim is required for the victim to move beyond her resentment towards the perpetrator. The very act of abstaining from forgiveness feeds resentment.[4] One may ask an injured party, ‘so you still haven’t forgiven him for what he did to you?’, the injured party may respond by saying ‘no, I chose not to’, which implies that there is still resentment attached to the injury. If the injured party responds by saying ‘I saw no need to forgive him,’ the injured party must not consider the injury to be grave enough to warrant forgiveness. Only in the circumstance where the injured party does not fully recognise the extent of his injury (or in fact the injury was minimal in the first instance) could the injured party adequately move on without harbouring feelings of resentment in circumstances where the injured party chooses not to or is unable to offer forgiveness to her perpetrator.

In regard to the second point, it is possible for the elimination of resentment to be a necessary condition of forgiveness without the elimination of resentment being forgiveness in itself. For a victim to forgive his perpetrator, the victim must experience more than a lack of resentment. While committing to the elimination of resentment may be the first and most challenging condition of forgiveness, it does not appear to be adequately sufficient. Forgiveness may also require truth, respect, and an openness to reconciliation in addition to a commitment to the elimination of resentment.

Forgiveness has been described as a virtue of the saintly. While this may be the case in the private realm, the virtuous nature of forgiveness in the public-political realm is ambiguous. Downie suggests that ‘readiness to forgive is a virtue and inability to forgive, or at least unwillingness to try, a vice.’[5] However, it is also clear that being too quick to offer forgiveness ‘may result in the weakening of moral restraints on other people’s immoral conduct.’[6] Therefore, it is difficult to find the balance between embodying some kind of ‘forgiving spirit’ while not supporting an immoral act. This point, is particularly relevant to political forgiveness as the perception from the public that a state is condoning an act behind the masquerade of ‘political forgiveness’ is more than plausible, and may have a negative rather than positive effect on the overall situation. More often though, the state is the party who has either been active or complicit in a mass atrocity; the state is the party that is asking for forgiveness. This raises issues with accountability, especially in a political environment that is democratic. Hastily forgiving the wrongs committed by an elected political representative, if widely embraced, could potentially radically undermine the principles of democracy and citizenship as we know them. I will elaborate on this in the last part of the discussion. It will suffice for now to suggest that of the political virtues that have been expounded upon by thinkers such as John Rawls, John Locke, and Immanuel Kant, it would seem that forgiveness is not one of them, or perhaps more precisely, it is not on its own sufficient. Virtues such as respect, equality, dignity, and accountability have historically had a much stronger connection to political life.

It would be reasonable to suggest that if by the very nature of granting forgiveness one must also simultaneously grant pardon and condone the act of injury, forgiveness would have little, if no political appeal. Downie suggests that there are two main reasons why forgiveness and condonation have become confused. The first is in relation to the trivial definition of forgiveness, as in, ‘forgive me for interrupting your meal’, which is more similar to a soft apology which would not in normal circumstances require acceptance from the other party as there was no injury caused. This kind of forgiveness has more to do with courtesy and common language usage, which has little relevance with political forgiveness that may be requested or offered in the aftermath of a  mass atrocity. The second confusion relates specifically to condonation, ‘that condonation is frequently used as a morally inferior substitute for forgiving.’[7] The point which Downie is trying to draw out here is that there are often times when people ‘forgive’ an immoral practice because it is in their self-interest. It is, in the cruel sense of the term, in my self-interest to ‘forgive’ companies that use slave-made cocoa, blood diamonds, or natural rainforest materials. I am tempted to ‘forgive’ my government for her involvement in wars, the ill-treatment of asylum seekers, or the pollution of the environment because it is in my self-interest to make myself believe that I am kind-heartedly ‘forgiving’ these practices when I am in fact condoning them. In summary, the kind of forgiveness that is synonymous with condonation of an immoral act is not the kind of forgiveness which is being explored in this paper. Forgiveness is the condonation of the person behind the act while simultaneously being the condemnation of the act itself.[8] Unless the act and the person can be separated, it is unlikely that the victim will be able to forgive her offender.

Forgiveness in some cases may mean that pardon is granted, however, this is by no means a rule. If a person genuinely desires forgiveness she should still accept her dues. The victim or a judge who has authority over the matter may decide to lessen the punishment because of the perpetrator’s repentance. However, it is out of generosity that a level of pardon may be granted to the perpetrator. The perpetrator still ought to receive her just deserts, provided that they are not motivated by the victim’s sense of resentment. Downie suggests that ‘to pardon is in fact to condone’, or in other words, if to forgive is not to condone, and to pardon is to condone, then to forgive is not to pardon.[9] In some circumstances, especially in regard to personal acts of forgiveness, the victim has the liberty to pardon the offender. In regard to political forgiveness to pardon entirely is effectively to condone. However, the choices need not be between pardon and retribution. Reparations, compensation, and restitution are just a few examples of alternatives to retribution which would, all things being equal, not condone or pardon an immoral action. The distinct yet related concepts of forgiveness, pardon, and condonation should not be confused with one another.

Genuine forgiveness must flow from generosity rather than obligation. It may be morally commendable for a person to forgive her offender, but it could never be a moral obligation. The terms ‘charity’ and ‘duty’ have often been viewed as synonymous, however, this is an error in need of clarification. Duty relates to the debt that is owed, for example, the debt that the offender owes to the victim. As Marina suggests in her exposition on Kant, ‘if we have a moral claim on someone’s doing something, then for the person to grant what is due to us, it is to act justly, not graciously.’[10] If an offender compensates their victim, they do not do so out of ‘charity’ or from a kind heart (although the offender may happen to be a ‘charitable’ or ‘kind-hearted’ person), this is an act of justice. Forgiveness is not a duty or an act of equalising justice, but rather, it is an act similar to charity which could be viewed as morally commendable.

Lastly, I want to touch on the issue of identity. Forgiveness, apology, and reconciliation becomes more complex in the political realm, as the political realm has to deal with individuals, groups, and generations which have dynamic identities. This complexity was most recently brought under the spotlight in regard the apology by the Australian Government for the ill-treatment of Indigenous Australians. Former Prime Minister of Australia, John Howard, did not believe that ‘one generation can accept responsibility for the acts of earlier generation [sic]’, and he did so ‘as a matter of principle.’[11] This is a widely held criticism of the apology, that by apologising, we are effectively condemning the sons for the sins of their fathers. However, all societies inherit wealth, resources, and technology amongst other things from previous generations. It seems reasonable that if I gladly inherit goods which are derived from immoral actions, such as the mass slaughter and unjust treatment of indigenous Australians, then it follows that I also inherit the ‘costs’ as well. Therefore I may still owe a debt of restitution even though I am not explicitly blameworthy for the immoral actions of previous generations. It also follows that there are harms that Indigenous Australians could forgive ‘White Australia’ for, and equally, there are benefits received which ‘White Australia’ could ask to be forgiven for illegitimately inheriting.

My conclusion follows the seven claims that were initially mentioned in the introduction: forgiveness can be a valuable virtue of the citizen and the state if it is balanced appropriately with other political virtues, and other general virtues such as truth, respect, and an openness to reconciliation. Political forgiveness may contain elements of pardon, but for it to be virtuous, political forgiveness must not be synonymous with pardon or condonation. If it were synonymous with pardon or condonation, political forgiveness could radically undermine the core values that we associate with democracy and citizenship. Political forgiveness can only occur out of a sense of generosity rather than duty. There are times when it is morally commendable for citizens, states, or political communities to offer forgiveness. Finally, identity will inevitably be an issue for political forgiveness, however, there are times when identity is invoked as a reason to not offer or accept forgiveness when it is simply the atomisation and denial of responsibility.

Bibliography

Balázs, Zoltán. “Forgiveness and Repentance.” Public Affairs Quarterly 14, no. 2 (April 1, 2000): 105–127.

Davies, Anne. “Apology Was a Mistake, Says Feisty Howard.” The Age. Melbourne, March 12, 2008. http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2008/03/11/1205125911264.html.

Digeser, Peter. “Forgiveness and Politics: Dirty Hands and Imperfect Procedures.” Political Theory 26, no. 5 (October 1, 1998): 700–724.

Downie, R. S. “Forgiveness.” The Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 59 (April 1, 1965): 128–134.

Eisikovits, Nir. “Forget Forgiveness.” Theoria Theoria 51, no. 105 (2004): 31–63.

Mariña, Jacqueline. “Kant on Grace: A Reply to His Critics.” Religious Studies 33, no. 4 (December 1, 1997): 379–400.

Oxford English Dictionary. “‘Resentment, N.’.”, n.d. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/163487?redirectedFrom=resentment.

Smith, Roger W. “Redemption and Politics.” Political Science Quarterly 86, no. 2 (June 1, 1971): 205–231.

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[1] Oxford English Dictionary, “‘Resentment, N.’.”, n.d., http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/163487?redirectedFrom=resentment.

[2] Peter Digeser, “Forgiveness and Politics: Dirty Hands and Imperfect Procedures,” Political Theory 26, no. 5 (October 1, 1998): 700–724.

[3] Nir Eisikovits, “Forget Forgiveness,” Theoria Theoria 51, no. 105 (2004): 35.

[4] Generally speaking, abstaining from forgiveness is no less an active process as the act of forgiving. Neither can be appropriately viewed as omissions.

[5] R. S. Downie, “Forgiveness,” The Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 59 (April 1, 1965): 128.

[6] Zoltán Balázs, “Forgiveness and Repentance,” Public Affairs Quarterly 14, no. 2 (April 1, 2000): 111.

[7] Downie, “Forgiveness,” 131.

[8] Roger W. Smith, “Redemption and Politics,” Political Science Quarterly 86, no. 2 (June 1, 1971): 218.

[9] Downie, “Forgiveness,” 131–132.

[10] Jacqueline Mariña, “Kant on Grace: A Reply to His Critics,” Religious Studies 33, no. 4 (December 1, 1997): 379.

[11] Anne Davies, “Apology Was a Mistake, Says Feisty Howard,” The Age (Melbourne, March 12, 2008), http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2008/03/11/1205125911264.html.