Summarize and critically analysis the central
argument of Pogge, T. (2005). "Real World Justice." The Journal of
Ethics 9(2): 29-53.
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In the article Real World Justice, Thomas
Pogge outlines his arguments in regard to moral responsibility for global
poverty. Pogge uses pragmatic and ecumenical arguments in order to gain broad
support for his conclusions and practical outcomes for the global poor. His
main arguments will be addressed in the first part of this paper and critically
analysed in the second section.
Pogge attempts to establish potential from a fact,
then an ought from potential, rather than going directly from an is to an
ought. The potential is connected to a broad sentiment which can loosely be
described as Pogge’s ‘could factor’. The first reason why Pogge is interested
in the issue is because of the fact that 280 million people have died
from poverty in the 15 years leading up to 2004. The second reason he chooses
to write about global poverty is because of the potential for this fact
to be altered through human agency. Pogge writes that ‘the better-off can
improve the circumstances of the worse-off without becoming badly-off
themselves.’[1]
These motivations for addressing the issue of global poverty provide grounding
for the following arguments.
Negative duties to ‘do no harm’ are considered by
Pogge to be a ‘very weak assumption.’[2]
From this broadly appealing assertion Pogge defines three areas where most
citizens of affluent states are complicit in, or beneficiaries of the ‘largest
… crime against humanity ever committed’. First, historical injustices such as
colonialism have adversely affected development in some countries.[3]
Second, the world’s poor are missing out on their share of the world’s natural
resources ‘without compensation.’[4]
Third, in a broadly consequentialist sense, our shared ‘institutional design’
is not geared to achieve the best human rights outcomes. These three points
lead Pogge to believe that citizens of affluent countries owe a debt to the
world’s poor. Such a debt could be repaid through a Global Resources Dividend.[5]
Pogge’s arguments based upon negative duties are
effective at fulfilling his motivations in addressing the issue. A broad
argument which is largely based upon negative duties is vital to the gathering
of public support to reform institutions which adversely harm the poor.
However, with the clauses that Pogge invokes it would be stretching
intellectual honesty to state that his theory is entirely based upon
negative duties. Pogge accepts that there is greater duty where there is
greater need, and not where necessarily where greater harm has been done.
He has also been criticised for being ‘strangely
demanding’ as it appears to be odd that a theory based upon negative duties
could be so burdensome.[6]
Ci argues that Pogge does not appeal to libertarians from a consequentialist
perspective as his theory asks them to do ‘more to combat severe global
poverty’, effectively altering the institutional definition of negative and
positive duties.[7] To
convince others to do more about global poverty is undoubtedly Pogge’s aim in
writing this article. In consideration that it will inevitably be very
difficult to convert the views of some people that Pogge is attempting to
appeal to (such as libertarians), I think Pogge’s work plays a crucial role in
the debate surrounding moral obligations to the world’s poor. I find the
criticisms of his work valid but limited in scope. Therefore, it is my opinion
that Pogge’s argument is reasonable and well supported.
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