Why Marx Was Wrong

Can revolutionaries bring change without imitating the oppression forced upon them? http://goo.gl/2Bj5k

Marx’s theory of historical materialism rests on an indefensible economic reductionism. Critically evaluate.

In The Communist Manifesto, Marx argues that ‘the charges against communism made from a religious, a philosophical and, generally, from an ideological standpoint, are not deserving of serious examination’ (Marx, Engels, & Moore, 1998, p. 18). In this essay I will argue that many of these criticisms of Marxist style political and economic communism are deserving of serious examination. First, the terms ‘materialism’ and ‘economic reductionism will be examined’. Second, a brief overview of Marx’s thoughts in regard to the question will take place. The problems surrounding economic reductionism, materialism, and the inevitable violent outcomes of these theories will then be discussed.

According to the Routledge encyclopaedia of philosophy, materialism is ‘a set of related theories which hold that all entities and processes are composed of – or are reducible to – matter, material forces or physical processes.’ Furthermore, ‘Materialism entails the denial of the reality of spiritual beings, consciousness and mental or psychic states or processes, as ontologically distinct from, or independent of, material changes or processes’ (Wood, 1998). Materialism provides an exact scientific basis to life. For Marx, materialism is able to explain descriptive phenomena, providing a basis of history. From this basis of history, through its epochs and revolutions, patterns emerge. These patterns, from a materialist setting, emerge due to the economic relations of society. Marx’s theory is better understood as deterministic or fatalist rather than prescriptive or moral (Croce, 1966, p. xi). According to Marx, the economic sphere is ‘the real foundation of society’ and therefore, ‘labour is the essence of humanity’ (Hughes, 2007, p. 67; Marx & Engels, 1968, p. 182). The suggestion that economic science is the basis of society leads to economic reductionism, which is the natural outcome of materialism.

Economic reductionism, which stands at the centre of Marx’s thought, is laced with problems. Marx perceives a broad range of issues in society which through scientific historical analysis he explains the economic epochs which human societies have weaved through. He expresses strong concern in regard to the oppression of the proletariat (the working class) throughout his work, while voicing an equal degree of contempt for the middle-class bourgeoisie. As Dupré aptly summarises in The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism, Marx’s chief concern is that ‘those who contribute most to the production receive the least enjoyment from the actual product’ (Dupré, 1966, p. 149). Marx expresses further contempt for the bourgeoisie in The Communist Manifesto by stating that they have ‘agglomerated population, centralised means of production, and has [sic] concentrated property in a few hands’ (Marx et al., 1998, p. 7). He also expresses concern for child labour on multiple occasions (Marx et al., 1998, pp. 17, 20). Marx is not specifically concerned with the immorality or metaphysics of oppression, but rather, his concern regarding oppression is in relation to the progression of history. While referring to the phenomena as a struggle between proletarians and bourgeoisies, he also implies that the transition to communism is part of the unfolding development of human history. It seems that while with one hand Marx denies morality as a facade for religion through showing its incompatibility with materialism, with the other hand, he employs morality into his discourse with moral prescriptions and ethical assessments.

In The Communist Manifesto, Marx writes that ‘the theoretical conclusions of the Communists are in no way based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that would-be universal reformer. They merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes’ (Marx et al., 1998, pp. 13–14). He uses a bottom-up materialist approach rather than a top-down spiritual understanding of the world (Dupré, 1966, p. 155). This has strong implications for any theorist, philosopher, or theologian who may suggest that meaning can be derived from outside the economic sphere. As one writer suggests, ‘any interpretation that sought to detect aesthetic and ethical elements of Marx’s thought must address his critique of ideology and his apparent reductionism in viewing the ‘superstructure’ as simply determined by the economic-material base’ (Hughes, 2007, p. 64). Marx’s reductionism denies the moral and philosophical realm, retendering it ‘not deserving of serious examination’, which begs the question, ‘what is one to do according to Marxist law?’ Should one stand aside from the unfolding of history, or perhaps, try to speed its progress?

It is clear that Marx suggests that there is some kind of moral imperative in his theory. Marx concludes The Communist Manifesto by stating, ‘the proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workingmen of all countries, unite!’ (Marx et al., 1998, p. 30). His conclusion draws out two problems, the first is conceptual while the second is practical.  The conceptual problem is that Marx gets an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, and moreover, from an ‘is’ that is entirely based on a materialist conception of history. It is difficult to predict the trajectory of history, and even more problematic to understand morality in terms of economics and history alone. Hypothetically, if the next stage of history was the further oppression of the working people, the exploitation of the environment, and the extinction of various animal species; it would be difficult to tell what Marx’s moral prescriptions would be. It seems to be of pure coincidence that Marx’s next stage of history, when the proletarians violently overthrow the bourgeoisie, happens to synthesise with some conceptions of morality. As for the practical refutation of encouraging ‘workingmen of all countries’ to ‘unite’, it is interesting to note that there is no longer a clear division between the proletarians and the bourgeoisie, meaning that no longer are proletarians across the world united in struggle (Milanovic, 2011, pp. 110–111). Revolution seems less likely as the proletarians become more comfortable. Poverty was once driven by class, but it is now ‘almost entirely driven by location’ according to Milanovic (2011, pp. 112–113). Poverty in developing countries calls for a revolution of kinds, yet Marx seems to make no prescriptions here. It is ironic that workers in country A who are wealthier than the bourgeoisie in country B, must be equally concerned with political change in their own midst as they should be with the lot of the workers in country B who are much worse-off than they are. According to strict Marxist thought, modern understandings of poverty and development are irrelevant. The famine stricken Somali villagers must form unions and violently overthrow the classes who hold them back. If ‘man’s essence depends on his productive activity, and this activity is determined by nature’, then it seems that we will be led to these illogical conclusions (Dupré, 1966, p. 148).

It is interesting that Marx seems to support the intrinsic value of the human being. He wants to abolish the ‘miserable character of this appropriation, under which the labourer lives merely to increase capital’ (Marx et al., 1998, p. 15). Marx also voices his opinion against children being ‘transformed into simple articles of commerce and instruments of labour’ (my emphasis, Marx et al., 1998, p. 17). While I side with Marx’s concern, it is philosophically problematic for Marx to accept the concept of intrinsic value while simultaneously being a firm supporter of historical materialism and economic reductionism. It is understandable that Marx attempts to integrate a Kantian understanding that it is inappropriate to use another person as a ‘mere means’ to generate ecumenical appeal, however, to argue that children should not be ‘transformed into simple articles of commerce and instruments of labour’ presupposes that there is another basis to the value of humans that is neither economic nor material. If there was child labour intended to help the working class, it would seem that Marx could not take issue with it.

 In the final section of this paper, the issue of Marx’s prescriptions, especially those in relation to violence, will be discussed. Marx suggests in The Communist Manifesto that ‘the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat’, and later that the Communists ‘openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions’ (Marx et al., 1998, pp. 12, 30). He also suggests that the ‘overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy’ and the ‘ conquest of political power by the proletariat’ is part of the ‘immediate aim’ of (Marx’s version) of communism (Marx et al., 1998, p. 13). Croce articulately discerns that an action ‘may have economic value without being moral, and the consideration of economic value must therefore be independent of ethics’ (Croce, 1966, p. xvi). Therefore, the ultimate problem of Marx’s theory is that it cannot care whether an action is moral, but only whether an action has economic value. Leo Tolstoy argues that the means of socialist revolution are ‘in the first place and above all, immoral, containing falsehood, deception, violence, murder; in the second place, these means can in no case attain their end’ (Tolstoy & Stephens, 1990, p. 62). Tolstoy gives a two part criticism to socialist revolutionary theories of change. The first part pertains to the means being ‘immoral’. This will be considered as the philosophical distinction. The second part of Tolstoy’s criticism relates to the means being unable to achieve their desired ends. This will be considered as the pragmatic distinction. Both Tolstoy’s philosophical and pragmatic distinctions are powerful criticisms of Marx’s prescriptive thought.

Tolstoy shares Marx’s concern for the working class and the oppressed. He writes that the ‘men of the ruling classes, who have no reasonable explanation of their privileges, and who in order to retain them are forced to repress all their nobler and more humane tendencies, try to persuade themselves of the necessity of their superior position; while the lower classes, stultified and oppressed by labour, are kept by the higher classes in a state of constant subjection’ (Tolstoy, 2009, p. 284). Tolstoy hears the cries of the oppressed, and while he is committed to pacifism, he is not committed to being passive. He suggests that the people should cease to support the army, a body of working class people who have been convinced to repress their working class peers in the interests of the wealthy (Tolstoy & Stephens, 1990, pp. 61–63). Tolstoy argues that if power, or the current structures of its manifestations, are to be abolished it must be abolished not by force but by man’s awareness of its lack of utility and intrinsic evil. When men refuse to join the army and refuse to pay taxes the foundations of the current order will crumble. Tolstoy’s conception of nonviolent social change rests on the premise that there is some degree of humanity to be found in the so-called evil oppressors. He suggests that ‘our wealthy classes, whether their consciences be tender or hardened, cannot enjoy the advantages they have wrung from the poor, as did the ancients, who were convinced of the justice of their position. All the pleasures of life are poisoned either by remorse or fear’ (Tolstoy, 2009, p. 108). Therefore, it would be better for one to suffer than to oppress, as living a moral life, according to Tolstoy, is of far more value than imitating one’s oppressor. Tolstoy’s thoughts paved the way for the struggle for independence in India as a practical alternative to civil war. Gandhi described himself as ‘Tolstoy’s devoted follower’ and said that Tolstoy’s writings ‘overwhelmed’ him (Lavrin, 1960, pp. 132–134). As Tolstoy suggested, and as Gandhi proved, non-violent revolutions are possible and they also have greater chances of success than violent revolutions, which contradicts Marx’s thoughts. Peace and Conflict researcher Stephen Zunes suggests that ‘less destructive means can be found to overcome dictatorial regimes and unjust social systems’. He cites Iran, Bolivia, Sudan, Haiti, Philippines, Mali, and Madagascar as nations who have been able to overthrow oppressive states through non-violent action. Non-violent action in South Korea, Chile, Mongolia, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Kenya has also led to some reforms (Zunes, 1994, p. 405). While Marx would cast away the idea of a non-violent proletariat revolution as an idea that is merely religion in disguise, the tangible evidence of non-violent revolutions not only being moral but being more effective in achieving their ends is problematic for Marx’s narrow path to freedom.

Marx’s historical materialism and economic reductionism inevitably leads to the imperative for the proletariat to violently revolt against the powers that be. The narrow reductionism and materialism purported by Marx presupposes that the essence of man is his productive capacity, ignoring any other realm of influence. While his concern about the poor, property ownership, and the idle bourgeois is justified, his solutions are dangerous, immoral, and ineffective at achieving their ends.

Bibliography

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Dupré, L. K. (1966). The philosophical foundations of Marxism. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

Hughes, J. (2007). The end of work : theological critiques of capitalism. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Lavrin, J. (1960). Tolstoy and Gandhi. Russian Review, 19(2), 132–139. doi:10.2307/126735

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1968). Selected works : in one volume. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Marx, K., Engels, F., & Moore, S. (1998). The Communist manifesto. London: Merlin Press.

Milanovic, B. (2011). The haves and the have-nots : a brief and idiosyncratic history of global inequality. New York: Basic Books.

Tolstoy, L. (2009). The Kingdom Of God Is Within You. Guildford: White Crow Books.

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Zunes, S. (1994). Unarmed Insurrections against Authoritarian Governments in the Third World: A New Kind of Revolution. Third World Quarterly, 15(3), 403–426.