What shapes the arms
control stance of Barack Obama’s Administration? How would you assess the
administration’s arms control policies?
Introduction
During Barak Obama’s
term as President of the United States of America he has taken several steps
towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear arms control.
However, the practical actions taken by the administration in support of this
commitment have been less than admirable. To respond to the question I will
argue the following points: (i) nuclear weapons are highly ineffective and
unethical as deterrence mechanisms against the threats that the US and its allies
currently face, (ii) arms control is not an ultimate end in itself and there
must be a broader change in nuclear culture, (iii) although the Obama
administration appears to be ideologically committed to ‘a world without
nuclear weapons’, their spending priorities and desire to remain in a place of
dominance suggests otherwise, and (iv) there are several steps that the Obama
administration must take if they genuinely desire a world without nuclear
weapons and the threat of nuclear weapons.
Part I – Morality &
Utility
Before one can respond
to the question of the merit a particular nuclear arms control policy should
receive the value of nuclear weapons must be considered. If the value of
nuclear weapons is considered to be very high in all contexts, then there is
strong merit in abolishing nuclear weapons regulations. If the value of nuclear
weapons is very low in all contexts, or the negative consequences of their use
outweigh any good they could achieve, then it would follow that steps towards a
future free from nuclear weapons is and the threat they present is desirable.
From an egalitarian perspective there are no justifications to act from the belief that
nationality, religion, or other factors of this nature can make a person more
or less valuable. While other perspectives such as racial or religious
superiority are used in the political debate, I shall not entertain them here.
Nuclear weapons by their nature do not discriminate between civilian and
military targets. The collateral damage that is likely to occur from the use of
nuclear weapons against an enemy target is so great that the weapons themselves
already appear to have little moral standing. Arne Naess points out that
responding to a nuclear strike with nuclear weapons would create a situation
where ‘the chance of killing those really responsible for the disaster would be
slim.’ He goes on to state that ‘millions of nonbelligerents and innumerable
other beings would suffer, while people at the top of the power pyramids would
likely escape.’[1] The sheer military ineffectiveness in addition to the likely
excessive collateral damage of nuclear weapons compounds the immorality of the
use and investment into these devices.
The ineffectiveness and
immorality of nuclear weapons has been strengthened in the post-Cold War
context. Drell and Goodby suggest in their article Nuclear Deterrence in a Changed World that nuclear weapons ‘have little or no effect in coercing
states, insurgent groups, or terrorists to abstain from actions that threaten
international peace and security.’[2] They argue that although the mutually assured destruction
(MAD) strategy may have been a useful means of attaining security through
parity during the Cold War, in the vastly different current global context,
this strategy is futile. This is largely due to the decentralised structure of
groups like Al Qaeda. Terrorist groups usually have no central military training
base and do not identify themselves with uniforms which makes them a difficult
target to identify. Using nuclear weapons against targets that are difficult to
identify compounds the risk of error of judgement. These reasons would make a
state significantly less likely to use nuclear weapons against a terrorist
group. Understanding this, terrorists groups are significantly less likely to
respond to the fear of being attacked.
Both the Bush and Obama
administrations have expressed their awareness of the changed world context
from the Cold War era, but neither administration has gone far enough on acting
upon this understanding. In the 2002 National Security Strategy lead by the
Bush administration it was noted that ‘traditional concepts of deterrence will
not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction
and targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death
and whose most potent protection is statelessness.’[3] President Bush has reiterated this sentiment in a recent
speech at Hankuk University, suggesting that his administration’s ‘inherited’
nuclear arsenal ‘is poorly suited to today’s threats, including nuclear
terrorism.’[4] While both sides of politics in the United
States have recognised that nuclear weapons are not an appropriate means for
addressing contemporary conflict situations, the United States has still
managed to retain what Obama describes as a ‘massive nuclear arsenal.’[5] Moreover, the Obama administration has not shied away from
continuing to view nuclear weapons as a necessary part of the US’s national
security. The administration is investing more money into modernising these
weapons they seek to abolish.[6] In consideration of the futility and immorality of nuclear
weapons, political courage must be employed to ensure that the US takes a
genuine leadership role in the abolition of nuclear weapons.
Part II – Ends & Means
In the previous section
I have justified the importance of the reduction and (eventual) abolition of
nuclear weapons on normative and pragmatic grounds. In this section I will
argue that arms control is a means (rather than an end). I will also argue that
arms control is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of
achieving a world without nuclear weapons.
There have been several
bilateral and multilateral nuclear arms control treaties between Moscow and
Washington. These include the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). The START verification regime
limited the aggregate number of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) to 6000 for each party to the
treaty. The START treaty also limited the number of strategic delivery vehicles
to 1,600 for ‘deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and their associated launchers, and
heavy bombers.’[7] The START treaty was signed in 1991 and the 2001
implementation deadline was reached. However, the treaty expired in 2009, so
the Obama administration took the opportunity to pursue further bilateral
nuclear weapons reductions through the 2010 New START treaty.[8] The main development in this treaty was the planned
reduction of deployed ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber warheads to 1550 from 6000.[9]
These treaties are
useful and important as a means to a reduction in the nuclear stockpiles
of Russia and the US. They are a necessary aspect of the goal of abolishing
nuclear weapons and moving towards a demilitarised world. However, the treaties
alone are insufficient. Philosopher Arne Naess suggests that the threat of
rapid nuclear rearmament ‘would probably replace the present threats’ if
disarmament was achieved through international treaties and negotiations.[10] He suggests that ‘nuclear culture as a whole’ must
change in order to abolish the threat that nuclear weapons present to all
planetary life forms.[11]
Naess observes ‘that if
one of a pair of mutually hostile nuclear powers unilaterally disarms, little
motive remains for the other to use nuclear bombs.’[12] In order to reduce the threat of nuclear war Naess suggests step-by-step
unilateral disarmament to move beyond nuclear deterrence. Unilateral
disarmament, while it may seem extreme, manages to overcome the nuclear
deterrence paradox where both sides ‘are thus confronted by the dilemma of
steadily increasing military power and steadily decreasing national security.’[13]
While unilateral
nuclear weapon disarmament and consequential nuclear weapon abolition would
mean that a state has no nuclear deterrence mechanism in place, there
are other potential benefits. For example, in the Nuclear Posture Review
the United States committed to not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons ‘against
non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT (non-proliferation treaty)
and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.’[14] There are 189 states who are signatories of the NPT. The
only states that have not become signatories are India, Israel, and Pakistan.
Although not every state has committed to this standard, and the US’ commitment
is conditional, their pledge lends support to the idea that a state who has
nuclear weapons becomes a greater target. Neighbouring states may be worried
that a state is making or buying nuclear weapons with a plan to use them. This
often creates further conflict even if the weapons are never used. Furthermore,
if the weapons ever were used it would likely be met with global condemnation.
Therefore, there is a strong case for unilateral disarmament as a means to
change nuclear culture as a whole.
Part III – Ideology and
Actions
Obama has stated his
desire to ‘seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons’,
recognising that security may not be achieved through weapons of mass
destruction.[15] While Obama acknowledged that this goal ‘will not be reached
quickly’, he conveyed it as a serious goal with concrete steps that can be
taken by the US.[16] In a speech given in Prague in 2009, he said that ‘we will
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge
others to do the same.’[17] Presented in this order, Obama’s ideals would be compatible
with Naess’ suggestions of unilateral disarmament as a means to change nuclear
culture as a whole.
However, the approach
of the Obama administration has been closer to bilateral and multilateral
disarmament as local disarmament has been used as a bargaining chip to convince
others to reduce their nuclear stockpiles. This has been exemplified in the New
START treaty where the Obama administration and Moscow mutually agreed to
reduce their nuclear weapon stockpiles. While this type of disarmament should
not be condemned, one may argue whether it will achieve its intended purpose.
States may invest in the ‘technological race’ as a means to ‘rapid nuclear
rearmament’, defeating the purpose of international arms control treaties.[18] This leads us once again to Naess’ suggestion that ‘nuclear
cultures as a whole’ must change, not just treaties or policies.[19]
The signs of a positive
nuclear weapons cultural shift are ominous. A recent report by the nonpartisan
Stimson Centre estimates that ‘the US will spend between $352 and $392 billion
on strategic nuclear offensive forces over the next 10 years.’[20] Hans Kristensen from the Federation of American Scientists
described this as ‘somewhat of a schizophrenic nuclear policy.’[21] Since the Bush administration military spending in the US
has continued to grow in constant terms, whilst staying stagnant as a percentage
of gross domestic product (GDP).[22] These figures do not to represent a significant shift in
priorities by the Obama administration as compared to the priorities of the
Bush administration.
Part IV – A pragmatic
solution
The Obama
administration faces a deeply challenging political situation where progress on
the issue of nuclear arms control is difficult at best. The political agenda is
packed and there is a limit to what a president can achieve in their first term
in office. A recent article in Reuters suggests that the Obama
administration had some early achievements with New START. However, the author
also points out that ‘the administration had difficulty winning ratification in
the Senate.’[23] A great deal of the difficulty has come because support for nuclear
arms reduction policy is not bipartisan. Presidential candidate Mitt Romney has
expressed his disapproval of the New START policy, writing that it ‘could be
his worst foreign policy mistake yet’, suggesting that ‘the security of the
United States is at stake.’[24] This has been a critical factor in what has shaped Obama’s
arms control policies.
Given the challenges
that the Obama administration faces in realising its goal of a world without
nuclear weapons, and perhaps the even more ambitious goal of a world free from
the threat of nuclear weapons, it is understandable that progress has been
slow. However, there are several key steps that the administration can make to
achieving this goal.
First, the Obama
administration should cease all investment in nuclear weapon technology except
that which is specifically related to safety and weapon security. This will
give greater credibility to treaties such as New START and create greater trust
between hostile parties.
Second, the Obama
administration should lead the way by unilaterally reducing their nuclear
arsenal. This would achieve three things. First, it would demonstrate that the
moral decisions of the US are not contingent upon the decisions of another
nation. Second, it would demonstrate the type of leadership that is required
for a change in nuclear weapon culture that could eliminate the threat of
nuclear weapons. Third, it would demonstrate that even occupation would be
better than a nuclear war.
Third, the Obama
administration must stop using the fear, security, and deterrence rhetoric that
has paved the way for the public consent of massive amounts of funding for
nuclear weapon modernisation. This is also required for a significant change in
nuclear weapons culture.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is
clear that nuclear weapons are in the first instance immoral, and in the second
instance, ineffective in countering modern security threats. Reducing the
number of nuclear weapons will not completely eliminate the threat of nuclear
weapon use, a broader change in culture must take place for this to happen.
Obama’s spending priorities have indicated that his interest in taking steps
towards achieving world without nuclear weapons is not a priority for his
administration in his first term in office. While this is partly due to the
difficult political situation the administration finds itself in, there are
several concrete steps that must be worked towards as indicated above. The
Obama administration has a great deal of work to do in order to take seriously
the threat of a global nuclear war.
Works Cited
Alexander, David.
“After Early Successes, Obama Struggles to Implement Disarmament Vision.” Reuters.
Washington, August 31, 2012.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/31/us-usa-nuclear-arms-idUSBRE87U06B20120831.
Arms Control
Association. “START I at a Glance”, 2009.
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/start1.
Cohen, Avner, and
Steven Lee. Nuclear weapons and the future of humanity : the fundamental
questions. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1986.
Department Of State.
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs. “Comparison of
the START Treaty, Moscow Treaty, and New START Treaty”, February 11, 2011.
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/139901.htm.
Drell, Sidney, and
James Goodby. “Nuclear Deterrence in a Changed World”, 2012.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_06/Nuclear_Deterrence_in_a_Changed_World#Bio.
“Remarks By President
Barack Obama In Prague As Delivered | The White House”, n.d.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.
“Remarks by President
Obama at Hankuk University | The White House”, n.d.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/26/remarks-president-obama-hankuk-university.
Romney, Mitt. “Obama’s
Worst Foreign-policy Mistake.” The Washington Post, July 6, 2010, sec.
Opinions.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/05/AR2010070502657.html.
Rumbaugh, Russell,
Nathan Cohn, and Henry L. Stimson Center. Resolving ambiguity costing
nuclear weapons. Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2012.
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/RESOLVING_FP_4_no_crop_marks.pdf.
Sagan S.D. “Shared
responsibilities for nuclear disarmament.” Daedalus Daedalus 138, no. 4
(2009): 157–168.
Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute. “Military Expenditure of USA.” Yearbook, 2012.
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2005/08.
United States. Dept. of
Defense. “Nuclear posture review report”, 2010.
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS121566.
United States.
President. The national security strategy of the United States of America.
[Washington, D.C.]: White House, 2002. http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS90878.
Wiesner, Jerome B., and
Herbert F. York. “National Security and the Nuclear-Test Ban.” Scientific
American 211, no. 4 (October 1964): 27–35.
Footnotes
[2]
Drell and
Goodby, “Nuclear Deterrence in a Changed World.”
[3]
United
States. President, The national security strategy of the United States of
America, 15.
[4]
“Remarks
by President Obama at Hankuk University | The White House.”
[5]
Ibid.
[6]
United
States. Dept. of Defense, “Nuclear posture review report,” 7.
[7]
Department
Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, “New START.”
[8]
Arms
Control Association, “START I at a Glance.”
[9]
Department
Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, “New START.”
[10]
Cohen and
Lee, Nuclear weapons and the future of humanity, 426.
[11]
Ibid.
[12]
Ibid., 427.
[13]
Wiesner
and York, “National Security and the Nuclear-Test Ban,” 35.
[14]
United
States. Dept. of Defense, “Nuclear posture review report,” viii.
[15]
“Remarks
By President Barack Obama In Prague As Delivered | The White House.”
[16]
Ibid.
[17]
Ibid.
[18]
Cohen and
Lee, Nuclear weapons and the future of humanity, 426; Sagan S.D, “Shared
responsibilities for nuclear disarmament,” 158.
[19]
Cohen and
Lee, Nuclear weapons and the future of humanity, 426.
[20]
Rumbaugh,
Cohn, and Henry L. Stimson Center, Resolving ambiguity costing nuclear
weapons, 6.
[21]
Alexander,
“After Early Successes, Obama Struggles to Implement Disarmament Vision.”
[22]
Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, “Military Expenditure of USA.”
[23]
Alexander,
“After Early Successes, Obama Struggles to Implement Disarmament Vision.”
[24]
Romney,
“Obama’s Worst Foreign-policy Mistake” Note: This was Romney’s response to the
policy as was drafted in 2010. There are no signs that his views have changed
considerably since then.
