Singer and the principle of equality

note: i would love to hear your views on whether you think utilitarianism can undermine equality. comments are greatly appreciated. here's a picture that sum's up Mr Singer:

image taken from http://goo.gl/r1wMC

The principle of equality that Singer defends has radical consequences. Critically discuss the principle, explaining some of its consequences, and assess whether Singer is right that we  ought to adopt it.

Singer’s principle of equality can have radical consequences. The principle of equality has practical and intuitive appeal as it is able to eliminate many forms of discrimination based on characteristics such as race or sex. Singer’s ideas have also been described as useful for normative ethics as they are based on simple and widely accepted presuppositions (Schaler, 2009, p. 405.).  However, this paper shows how Singer’s principle of equality is inconsistent with his ‘utilitarian exemption’ that allows for the prioritisation of the equal interests of one person above the equal interests of another person based on the consequences of the prioritisation.

According to Singer (1993, p. 21.), the principle of equality can be briefly described as ‘the principle of equal consideration of equal interests’. Singer (1993, p. 21.) suggests that it is morally irrelevant who the interest is held by, asserting that ‘an interest is an interest, whoever’s interest it may be’. For example, If Bob and myself were to both be affected by a possible act, and if Bob stands more to lose than I stand to gain, then it is better not to do the act. I should not favour myself above Bob because I hold the belief that my interests are of greater importance than Bob’s. This example shows how the principle of equality demands impartiality on the part of the one scrutinising the act. Singer (1993, pp. 22-23.) acknowledges that different people have different interests which may ‘vary according to their abilities or other characteristics’. This is a helpful practical consideration as we can draw a distinction between the following two examples: if I am a professional piano player, it can be argued according to this rule, that my interest in not having my index fingers chopped off is greater than another person’s interest in not having their index fingers chopped off. In contrast, if I have an interest in cheap clothing at the expense of atrocious working conditions for the producer of my clothes, I cannot claim that my interest is weightier. Singer would suggest that my interest in cheap clothing is of significantly less moral weighting than the producer’s interest in fair working conditions.

There are occasions where Singer permits exceptions to the principle of equality. The following example illustrates one of these circumstances. Two people may both be suffering a great deal of pain in the wake of a natural disaster. One of the two victims of the natural disaster happens to be a doctor. Singer suggests that it is permissible to prioritise the relief of the doctor’s pain over the relief of the non-doctor person’s pain. Singer (1993, pp. 21-22.) suggest this, because by relieving the suffering of the doctor, utility will be able to be maximised as the doctor will then be able to relieve the suffering of others. Political philosopher John Rawls uses a similar widely accepted justification for income inequality. Rawls suggests that any structural socio-economic inequalities attached to certain positions, like being a doctor, must be to the maximum benefit of the least advantaged. Positions such as being a doctor must also, according to Rawls, be open to all (Rawls, 2000, pp. 52-53.). For Singer, the case of the natural disaster illustrated above is simply a situation where there is an inequality is allowed (prioritising the doctors relief from suffering) in order to maximise utility. In the following example I will show how Singer’s principle of equality erroneously prioritises the interests of the doctor above the interests of the non-doctors and how this in fact breaches the principle of equality.

Utilitarianism and the principle of equality cannot always be reconciled with one another. An asymmetry can be drawn between the doctor who Singer chooses to save in the case of the natural disaster and the beam-fitter in Thomson’s Trolley case. I will briefly explain the Beam Fitter scenario: in this version of the trolley case, there are five people who are assigned each day to work on track A while there is one person who always works on track B as a ‘beam-fitter’. The workmen always work on the same track each day. Thomson suggests that if a trolley was to come towards the workmen on track A, Bloggs is not justified in changing the trolley’s direction to track B. Bloggs is not justified in ‘saving’ the five people on track A because the Beam Fitter always works on track B and therefore, unless the Beam Fitter was very altruistic, he never would have consented to the trolley being diverted towards himself (Thomson, 1990, pp. 131-136.).

Consider once again the case of the doctor and the natural disaster. Elaborating on the previous example, in this case one hundred people are all be in need of medical attention within three hours. Unfortunately there is only one ‘special lifesaving pill’ which can only save one person. Within three hours, without medical attention, the other ninety-nine people will die. Singer would argue that the pill should go to the one doctor, who then can within the three hours, treat two more people. These two patients will then be able to live for one more year each. This would end up satisfying the most preferences by satisfying one major preference; the doctor’s desire to live a full and complete life, and two relatively minor preferences; the non-doctor peoples’ desires to live one more year. However the parallel with Thomson’s beam-fitter case would suggest that such a view is not entirely fair. If you are the doctor in this case you are guaranteed survival, while if you are one of the ninety-nine other people you will only have a very small chance of surviving only one more year of life. It is likely that the ninety-nine non-doctors would prefer to have a small but equal chance of receiving the life-giving pill rather than having no chance of receiving the pill and a small chance of living for one more year. There is not an equal consideration of equal interests if the one-hundred people do not have equal chance of receiving the pill. Singer (1993, pp. 20-21.) writes that ‘there is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we give to their interests’. Singer’s ‘utilitarian exemption’ to the principle of equality contradicts itself by not allowing the principle to give equal consideration to equal interests. In essence, this exemption means that higher value is placed on lives of doctors over other non-doctor people. Like racism or sexism, this is a bad thing firstly because the position of being a doctor is not open to all, and secondly, because arbitrary attributes such as one’s career choice should not determine one’s chances of survival. An alternate distribution of the pill by method of lottery can much better synthesise with the principle of equality, yet such a distribution would not be able to synthesise with utilitarianism.

Singer’s principle of equality contains significant prima facie appeal in that it is accessible, intuitive, and convincing. However, Singer’s poor attempt at reconciling utilitarianism with the principle of equality shows the principle’s weakness. The doctor case illustrated above reveals inconsistencies within the principle of equality as per how Singer describes it. I therefore conclude that, although the principle of equality may be useful if reconsidered separate from utilitarianism, due to its problematic nature we have no reason to accept or adopt it.

Bibliography

JAMIESON, D. 1999. Singer and his critics, Oxford, UK; Malden, Mass., Blackwell Publishers.

RAWLS, J. 2000. A theory of justice, Cambridge, Mass, Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press.

SCHALER, J. A. 2009. Peter Singer under fire : the moral iconoclast faces his critics, Chicago, Open Court.

SINGER, P. 1993. Practical ethics, Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press.

SINGER, P. 2001. Writings on an ethical life, London, Fourth Estate.

THOMSON, J. J. 1990. The trolley problem. In: HANDFIELD, T. (ed.) Life, Death and Morality Reader. Melbourne: Monash University.

Bloody Brown Boxes

I wrote this song before I cared about the marginalised and how my country treated them. It came out as a huge surprise. I had no idea what I was talking about. Prior to this I had no interest in asylum seekers - at all. And yet somehow I ended up writing this song. 

I remember playing this song to my friend Tim. He said to me 'I think God has given you a gift for writing lyrics'. This remark stuck in my head. At the time I was in year ten and I was a lot closer to failing English than becoming a writer of sorts. Even as I look back at the original notepad document I wrote this song in, it was full of spelling mistakes and incorrect grammar. Yet still his words stuck in my head.

I'm not sure how I could have written these lyrics without giving a damn about the issue. I don't think these lyrics were a reflection of my heart at the time. I have come to realise, however, that these lyrics truly reflect God's heart.

I thought I would post these lyrics up now as there is no better time for Australia to stand up for a fair go. If these lyrics strike a chord in you, I would encourage you to do something about it. A fantastic initiative is the Welcome to Australia campaign where you can host a party showing your support for those fleeing persecution. 

Bloody Brown Boxes

Music & Lyrics by Daniel Christiansz

9 July 2007

I've been through your seas but I've not lived a life yet

Your wars have driven me off my own island

I look to you now, asking to stay

They say ‘what do you need to leave these boxes’ that

Packaged my life but couldn't fit my memories

The memories are, fading away

Package me now in your bloody brown boxes

Let me live now but I’ll die like the foxes

We are the ones that won't go away

(first repeat) The value of life crashed on the way                          

(second repeat) Forever and ever we're begging to stay

I know you’re doing fine here while I draw the line here

While you’re making boxes so many bloody boxes

These boxes those boxes forget what it costs us now

So nothings more important than self satisfaction

The glory and power that leads to corruption

As the world wastes away

Package me now in your bloody brown boxes

Let me live now but I’ll die like the foxes

We are the ones that won't go away

(first repeat) The value of life crashed on the way                          

(second repeat) Forever and ever we're begging to stay

That’s you in the corner making millions of boxes

The boxes that fuel empty lives sharp knives

Will kill us all, eventually

Millions of boxes boxing all of my family

Costs too much to make room for the memories

Of boxes and boxes and all your bloody boxes

No time for remembering that all that your doing is

Package me now in your bloody brown boxes

Let me live now but I’ll die like the foxes

We are the ones that won't go away

(first repeat) The value of life crashed on the way                          

(second repeat) Forever and ever we're begging to stay

Your brothers and sisters lie in these brown boxes

Will it ever cost too much to make millions of boxes?

Rule based morality

Is Kant right to suppose that morality is a system of categorical imperatives?

In Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant develops his view on morality, basing it on a system of categorical imperatives. Kant proposes a system where some maxims can be universal and without condition[1]. According to Kant, a system of morality that is based on empiricism is tainted as it does not recognise the unconditionality of the moral law[2]. Integrity is at the core of Kant’s categorical imperative, separating it from other systems of morality like utilitarianism. Utilitarianism suggests that one should do whatever is necessary to achieve maximum happiness, even if this will result in using someone as a mere means[3]. However, in Groundwork, Kant clearly asserts that rational agents should never be used as a mere means rather they should always treated as an end[4]. Kant’s categorical imperative does not provide a solid epistemological framework for morality as one would expect from moral systems. However, an ontological interpretation of Kant’s Groundwork allows for an appreciation of the value of the text and what it can offer moral discourse.

The categorical imperative is based on three formulas. The first is a concept of universalisability. Kant’s first formulation suggests that for a maxim to become categorical (unconditional) rather than hypothetical (conditional) a rational agent must ‘act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law’[5]. The concept of universalisability is crucial to Kant’s writing, forming the strict criteria for his moral theory. For conduct to be morally ‘right’, it would have to be the ‘right’ conduct for any other person to perform if they are in similar circumstances. In the second formulation, Kant states ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’[6]. The third formulation provides the maxim of ‘an absolutely good will’, that is to ‘act in accordance with maxims that can at the same time have as their object themselves as universal laws of nature’[7].

Kant places himself in risky territory by unveiling a normative application of the categorical imperative. One of Kant’s greatest mistakes in regard to the categorical imperative is how his normative approach preferences rules over principles. Rules are typically derived from principles so it would be appropriate that when they are in conflict with one another, the principle should trump the rule[8]. For example, Kant asserts that making false promises is using another person ‘merely as a means’, therefore making false promises is unconditionally impermissible and can be included as part of the categorical imperative[9]. Imagine there is a murderer at your door, and you are hiding a person the murderer wants to kill. Then, if the murderer asks: ‘are you hiding anybody in your house?’, you would be morally obliged to tell the murderer the truth. Intuitively this feels abhorrent as Kant prioritises the rule of not making false promises above principles of justice or loyalty. In another example of the categorical imperative in practice, Kant asserts that one must always seek to develop their own predisposed talents, arguing that not doing so would be neglecting the ‘furtherance’ of humanity[10]. He argues that  these capacities must be developed as they serve the rational being and are ‘given to him for all sorts of possible purposes’[11]. However, the maxim of universalisability neither rules out neglecting one’s talents or pursuing them. In this case, it seems that Kant is taking a rule that should be a hypothetical imperative and attempting to convert it into a categorical imperative[12]. Although the rule of furthering one’s predisposed talents is inconsistent with the categorical imperative, it may be interpreted as a means to further the ends of other rational agents. In a third example, Kant argues that caring for one another is a universal law and therefore is a categorical imperative[13]. Although Kant’s rationale for this categorical imperative seems flimsy, if one were to accept it to be the case, it would then be possible to argue that one cannot truly care for another unless they have developed their own natural talents. Or rather, one will at least be able to provide better care for another person in their time of need if they have developed their natural talents in the first instance. If the categorical imperatives rest on nothing else, they can at least be supported by one another.

In the previous example it has been shown how Kant’s substantive examples of the categorical imperative fail to conform with the maxims that he claims to base them upon. It has also been shown how Kant values these rules highly, even above the principles that they are derived from. However, there is still value to his deontological approach to morality. An ontological perspective, that is a question of being, is able to give Kant’s categorical imperative greater meaning[14]. Satkunanandan suggests that the only way one can overcome ‘moral impurity’ is for one to ground oneself in the style of discipline that Kant suggests[15]. Kant’s concern is that something as important as morality cannot be derived from ‘something so varied and variable as human sentiments’[16].  This claim is waged against alternative moral theories such as utilitarianism which are based on empiricism. For example, in utilitarianism something must be maximised. According to proponent of utilitarianism, Mill, It is unclear as to why happiness should be maximised apart from the presumption that each person desires their own happiness[17]. Kant argues that this is a weak basis for the formulation of the moral law. In consideration of these criticisms, deontology has something to offer as a moral framework.

The natural dialectical is one of the most intriguing aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy. Kant describes the natural dialectical as the ‘propensity to rationalise against those strict laws of duty and to cast doubt upon their validity … that is, corrupt them at their basis and to destroy all their dignity’[18]. An illustration of this concept can be found in the film The Emperor’s New Groove. In one scene from the film, Kronk faces the dilemma of whether or not he should save his enemy’s life. Kronk’s shoulder angel appears asking: ‘you’re not just going to let him die, are you?’. Kronk’s shoulder devil suddenly appears and replies ‘don’t listen to that guy: he’s trying to lead you down the path of righteousness, I’m going to lead you down the path that rocks!’[19]. In the previous example, the shoulder devil mirrors the nature of Kant’s natural dialectical by persuading the rational being away from strict adherence to the rules by an appeal to the consequences. If Kronk allows his enemy to die, it would appeal to Kronk’s own self interest. However, Kronk still feels compelled, as if he has a duty to refrain from killing his enemy. Kant suggests that a sense of ‘becoming human’ and freedom occurs when one’s morality is in accord with the law. Likewise, if one flees from their duty ‘under the sway of the natural dialectic’, they also flee from their freedom[20]. The ontological perspective of Kant’s categorical imperative suggests that this is where the beauty in his formulation lies.

The nature of freedom and how it can be found through obligations surrounding duty synthesises with Kant’s concept of strict adherence to ‘the rules’ as well as rejecting the natural dialectical. Our freedom can be found through moving from the ‘sensible world’ to the ‘intelligible world’[21]. In the sensible world our actions are in some ways groundless, that is, they are based merely on our desires and inclinations. In the intelligible world, however, laws are not empirical, rather, they are grounded on reason[22]. Kant believes this progression into the intelligible world is desirable as it allows one to be free from impulses of sensibility and these impulses now need not affect one’s actions. For Kant, this is similar to removing the ‘shoulder devil’ in the Kronk example above. Following the ‘path of righteousness’ frees one from being able to rationalise oneself out of performing the correct action.

A deontological system of morality has benefits over other systems of morality. It is very difficult to work out exactly what should be maximised in utilitarianism. Once this is established, issues still remain as anything can be justified to achieve the ends. Kant’s deontological approach, however, purports an alternate view where the value of an action is found not in its consequences, but rather, can be found through strict adherence to a system of rules. However, Kant’s categorical imperative is fundamentally flawed and self-contradictory in its logical performance. It also must be noted that the deontological nature of the categorical imperative may lead to worse consequences than utilitarianism or other systems. Due to its problematic nature, systems of morality should not be blindly based on Kant’s categorical imperative. Although Kant’s logic is flawed, there is strong value in his concept of freedom through duty. The ontological idea that one can resist the natural dialectical in order to strive for moral purity is a valuable asset to Kant’s system of morality, rendering it worthy of further investigation. There can be a great wealth of understanding gained from Kant’s concepts of freedom through duty which are crucial elements of his categorical imperative.

Bibliography

Craig, E. (1991). "Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy."   Retrieved May 17, 2011, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/N039.

Disney, W. (2000). "Emperor's New Groove scene: Kronk's dilemma."   Retrieved May 5, 2011, from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VnMGCUH-lLY.

Dudley, W. and K. Engelhard (2011). Immanuel Kant : key concepts. Durham, Acumen.

Kant, I. and M. J. Gregor (1998). Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.

Mill, J. S. and S. Gorovitz (1971). Utilitarianism. Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill.

Satkunanandan, S. (2011). "The Extraordinary Categorical Imperative." Political Theory 39(2): 234-260. 2, 39. Retrieved April 19, 2011 from http://ptx.sagepub.com/content/39/2/234.abstract.

Seung, T. K. (2007). Kant : a guide for the perplexed. London; New York, Continuum.

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[1] Kant and Gregor, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, Cambridge, 1998, p. 31.

[2] Satkunanandan, The Extraordinary Categorical Imperative, 2011, p. 245.

[3] Kant and Gregor, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, 1998, p. 38.

[4] Ibid., p. 45.

[5] Ibid., p. 31.

[6] Ibid., p. 38.

[7] Ibid., p. 44.

[8] Seung, Kant : a guide for the perplexed, London; New York, 2007, p. 102.

[9] Kant and Gregor, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, 1998, p. 38.

[10] Ibid., pp. 38-39.

[11] Ibid., p. 33.

[12] Seung, Kant : a guide for the perplexed, 2007, p. 103.

[13] Kant and Gregor, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, 1998, p. 39.

[14] Craig, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London, 1991.

[15] Satkunanandan, The Extraordinary Categorical Imperative, 2011, p. 239.

[16] Dudley and Engelhard, Immanuel Kant : key concepts, Durham, 2011, p. 105.

[17] Mill and Gorovitz, Utilitarianism, Indianapolis, 1971, p. 37.

[18] Kant and Gregor, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, 1998, pp. 17-18.

[19] Disney, Emperor's New Groove scene: Kronk's dilemma, 2000.

[20] Satkunanandan, The Extraordinary Categorical Imperative, 2011, p. 245.

[21] Ibid., pp. 245-246.

[22] Kant and Gregor, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, 1998, p. 57.

The case for foreign aid

Does justice require the world’s rich populations to transfer significant economic resources to the global poor? Draw critically upon a theory (or theories) of distributive justice to explain and give reasons for your answer.

As a society, our response to global poverty is one of greatest moral challenges that we face. According to the United Nations, around one third of the annual production of food for human consumption in rich nations is wasted and this waste is equivalent to the entire amount of food produced in Sub-Saharan Africa[1]. Despite these facts, poverty continues to claim the lives of 28,000 children every day. They die from hunger and other preventable causes, yet they largely go unknown[2]. In responding to the normative ethical demands of global poverty the first topic that will be considered is whether the transfer of economic resources is beneficial for the recipient society. Second, the causal role of institutions in global poverty will be examined. Finally, methods of distribution of economic resources and the demands they place on the donor will be considered. It will be assumed in this essay that the eradication of poverty is intrinsically valuable to concepts of justice.

If foreign aid has a negative impact or a neutral impact on the receiving society while having a negative or neutral impact on the donor society, giving in such a way could hardly be considered to be a moral duty. In normative ethical theory it can be fairly stated that there is no requirement for the rich to give to the poor if there is no utility gained by the poor or if harm is inflicted[3]. Criticisms of foreign aid include that it has led to, or will lead to, overpopulation and ‘overgrazing’, poor economic growth in poorer nations, and economic imperialism. However these criticisms fail to (1) reduce the importance of the moral imperative of action on global poverty, (2) engage with well designed development efforts, and (3) realise the causal role that rich countries and individuals play in creating, perpetuating, and then ignoring global poverty.

One influential piece in regards to overpopulation is ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’. Hardin states that ‘a finite world can support only a finite population’[4]. He uses the analogous ‘lifeboat ethics’ which further explores his view of how a ‘finite world’ should be managed. An example of ‘lifeboat ethics’ begins as follows: 100 people are paddling in the ocean, trying to save their own lives, 30 of whom have managed to make it onto an emergency lifeboat. The lifeboat can safely carry 30 people, and could carry 40 people, although in such a case it would be more prone to issues. If everyone attempts to get on the lifeboat, everyone will drown. Hardin’s first concern is that the lifeboat example is analogous to the relationship between the world’s rich and the world’s poor as it depicts how finite resources can only stretch so far[5]. Furthermore Hardin believes that world food banks and other charity measures perpetuate and magnify future food emergencies by not allowing a reduction in population, coining this concept the ‘ratchet effect’[6]. Accepting that we live in a world which has the capability to produce a finite quantity and quality of resources, what Hardin fails to realise is that these ‘lifeboats’ that we, the rich, live on do not just hold ourselves but they are also bearing the heavy weight of consumerism, excessive food waste, and other desires that hold minimal moral value in comparison to the 25,000 children who die every day from poverty-related causes[7]. A counter-argument to Hardin’s ‘lifeboat ethics’ is Singer’s drowning child example. Imagine you are walking to work and you notice a drowning child. If you are to save the child you will be the recipient of the following costs: you will dirty your new clean jeans and you will be five minutes late to work. In such a circumstance Singer argues that it would be morally wrong to not save the child[8]. In the same way, it is morally wrong for people from rich nations to value consumerism and excessive food wastage (which takes up a great amount of space on the lifeboat) over the lives of many poor people.

Hardin’s next concern with regard to overpopulation is the rate of reproduction and the ‘ratchet effect’ as outlined above. Hardin writes: ‘the people inside the lifeboats of the wealthy nations are doubling in number every 87 years; those outside are doubling every 35 years, on average’[9]. The ‘ratchet effect’ then explores these facts further, arguing that famine relief is what is fuelling unsustainable levels of population growth within poor nations. Hardin goes so far to argue that poverty is a problem ‘created by poor countries’ and that food programs act as the ‘pawl of a ratchet’ preventing populations from decreasing. According to Hardin, this in turn increases the magnitude of ‘accidents’ and ‘emergencies’[10]. However, Hardin’s argument is only valid under certain conditions: where money is thrown at the problem and no attention is paid to development, and also when global economic institutions which favour the rich are forced upon the world’s poor to their detriment. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development aid is resources that are ‘administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective’, it must also be used with concession and not used for a range of other purposes such as military interventions[11]. Foreign aid, from a holistic perspective should not be primarily targeted at feeding people after a global food crisis, rather, aid should primarily be targeted at developing the economies and agricultural practices of poor countries so that they can better cope with these disasters in the first instance. While the focus must be on development, some emergency relief aid may be given to help a nation get back onto its feet after a large-scale disaster.

It still appears plausible that aid is going into a pool of poor people whose population is increasing at an unsustainable rate. Hardin believes that nature provides ‘two great tools’ for population control which are ‘starvation and disease’. However, research is showing that ‘birth-rates tend to fall dramatically wherever poverty is alleviated and women gain better economic opportunities, more control within their households, and better access to reproductive information and technologies’[12]. To curb population growth with ‘starvation and disease’ rather than development seems morally ludicrous. Hardin does not take this into account when presenting his ‘lifeboat ethics’ case. According to Pogge, Hardin’s analysis of overpopulation and its correlation with moral duties and the poor is inadequate as it does not consider the results of well designed development efforts and the decrease in population growth that is incurred when people, particularly women, are released from poverty.

From the analysis provided above we have good reason to believe that the transfer of economic resources, when primarily focused on development initiatives, will not perpetuate poverty but decrease it. In consideration of this, economic aid as a means of ending poverty can hardly be considered ‘futile’, but something closer to a polar opposite of the term. Now that we have an acceptable means of ending poverty we can proceed to examine some different theories of our moral obligations to the world’s poor. Although some acts of foreign aid or charity may be ‘helpful’, this has not yet mandated a response such as the one characterised in the question, that of a transfer of significant economic resources.

I will now consider the most basic moral duties that we owe to one another and what they mean in regards to practical action. The most basic, fundamental, and obligatory moral duties that we owe to each other are negative duties. Negative duties are duties that involve the duty-bearer simply refraining from a particular course of action, in turn creating negative rights[13]. Somewhat uncontroversial examples of these rights could be any of the following: the right not to be tortured, the right not to be murdered, or the right not to be unjustly discriminated against. In other words, we all have a negative duty not to torture, not to murder, and not to unjustly discriminate. Negative rights, in a strict sense, should not imply a correlative duty of economic assistance; this is typically the role of positive rights. But if we further consider the implications of negative rights, for example the right to not be tortured, and the duty to refrain from torturing, we do see that there are some costs involved. To have the right not to be tortured realised there may need to be a system of courts, laws, and prisons in case one’s right not to be tortured is violated. The right not to be tortured still remains a negative right in light of these facts and duties. It can be concluded that torture is a negative right and that there are costs involved in realising this right. Participating, collaborating, or even voting in such a way that supports the imposition of institutions or rules which are hurtful to the world’s poor is a breach of one’s negative duties towards the poor in the same way that one should refrain from torturing another person. Pogge sums up this relationship stating that ‘those who collaborate in the imposition of an institutional order under which foreseeably and avoidably, many cannot meet their basic needs are violating negative duties of the institutional kind’[14]. Pogge canvases a key concept of his argument here: if you uphold a person or institution who represents you and they are submitting to a global economic order which entrenches systematic poverty, then you have violated the negative right of not imposing life-threatening conditions on another individual or community.

The link between the global economic order, its imposition of poorer countries, and how it adversely affects poorer countries may not yet seem obvious. Generally, we view interaction between countries (for example trade) as something that the two parties would only partake in if they were both likely to gain mutual benefit. Pogge outlines two key concepts of the global economic order which entrench systematic poverty, these are the international borrowing privilege and the international resource privilege. These concepts articulate how there are circumstances where countries interact with one another that do not create mutually beneficial outcomes. In Nigeria, for example, oil exports account for approximately one quarter of the country’s revenue. If a tyrannical dictator is able to seize power they are then able to use the international resource privilege to be able to sell off the country’s assets to fuel their dictatorship. This is precisely what has happened to the Nigerian people because of the global economic order which allows for such travesties. The international borrowing privilege also allows the power-holder of a country to borrow money recklessly, giving their successors, and nation, a mountain of debt which may endure over generations. If the government of the day refuses to honour the debts of a corrupt government before them, they will be refused any monetary loans in the future. This faulty global economic order imposed on the poor has not just hurt Nigeria, but also the Congo, Kenya, Angola, Mozambique, Brazil, Venezuela, the Philippines, Burma/Myanmar, as well as other poor countries[15]. In addition to institutional reforms, development assistance is also owed to the global poor due to the historical injustice of unfavourable global economic conditions that have been imposed on them. The beneficiaries of this global economic order  happen to be rich countries, and the individuals they represent. Therefore it is fair to state that rich nation-states and individuals owe a duty of supporting institutional reform and the redistribution of at least a small amount of surplus resources (above those of one’s day to day survival needs) as a minimum moral duty to counteract to harm they (or those representing them) have foreseeably and repeatedly inflicted on poorer nations.

In some situations however, justice may require more than the minimally good ‘do no harm’ approach that was elaborated upon above. Drawing back on Singer’s example of the drowning child, let me ask again, is it permissible to simply walk past a child who is drowning in a pond when the costs involved in saving the child are minimal? What if, like with poverty, there are many other people who may be equally or better placed to help, yet choose not to; should you still save the drowning child? In both circumstances, it seems clear in my mind that you should save the drowning child, even though you are not at fault for the child’s predicament. Singer expands on this principle, stating that ‘if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it’[16]. Singer uses this principle to justify saving the drowning child, even considering the costs that will be involved, as they are minimal in comparison to the ‘moral gain’. For Singer, there is little or no moral difference between watching a child drown while able to help (an act of omission), and actually drowning a child (act of commission) as they both result in the same utility loss[17]. Since proximity should not amount to a significant moral difference, Singer suggests that those who can act on the issue of global poverty without sacrificing something of comparable moral importance, ought to do it.

Singer’s moral framework is far removed from that of Pogge’s, yet still carries a strong moral imperative. Although Singer’s theory is demanding, and in reality one’s duty will continue to increase as others fail to comply, this does not render it wrong[18]. However Arneson does note that setting the moral bar too high, where every last dollar goes to buying oral rehydration salts, will lead to less compliance. In this sense, from a utilitarian perspective it may lead to less preferences being satisfied. Both Singer and Pogge do share one common value: apathy in the face of global poverty is morally impermissible. The transfer of economic resources to the resource deprived is not merely an act of niceness, but an obligation. The purpose of this essay is not to pinpoint precise institutional reforms or an exact monetary figure that is owed to the poor (although Singer does attempt this) but to conclude whether economic assistance and institutional reforms are owed to the poor and why. Due to the causal role that rich nations play in perpetuating poverty as well as the capacity of many states and individuals to help  to global poor, economic assistance should be part of a wider duty owed to the poor in helping release over one billion people from severe poverty[19].

Bibliography

Arneson, R. J. (2004). The ethics of assistance : morality and the distant needy. D. K. Chatterjee. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 33-58.

Brooks, T. (2008). The global justice reader. Malden, MA, Blackwell Pub.

Denton, A., J. Casimir, et al. (2004). Enough rope with Andrew Denton 2. Sydney, ABC Books for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation.

Donnelly, J. (2003). Universal human rights in theory and practice. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (2009). "1.02 billion people hungry."   Retrieved May 7, 2011, from http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/20568/icode/.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (2011). "Cutting food waste to feed the world."   Retrieved May 11, 2011, from http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/74192/icode/.

Hardin, G. (1968). "The Tragedy of the Commons." Science 162(3859): 1243-1248. 3859, 162. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1724745.

Hardin, G. (1974). "Commentary: Living on a Lifeboat." BioScience 24(10): 561-568. 10, 24. Retrieved May 4, 2011 from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1296629.

Kuper, A. (2002). "More Than Charity: Cosmopolitan Alternatives to the “Singer Solution”." Ethics & International Affairs 16(1): 107-128. 1, 16. Retrieved http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2002.tb00378.x.

Moyo, D. (2009). Dead aid : why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa. London, Allen Lane.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2008). "Is it ODA?"   Retrieved May 10, 2011, from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/21/34086975.pdf.

Pogge, T. W. M. (2002). World poverty and human rights : cosmopolitan responsibilities and reforms. Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA, Polity; Blackwell Publishers. 8-15.

Pogge, T. W. M. (2010). Politics as usual : what lies behind the pro-poor rhetoric. Cambridge, Polity.

Singer, P. (1972). "Famine, Affluence, and Morality." Philosophy & Public Affairs 1(3): 229-243. 3, 1. Retrieved May 6, 2011 from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265052.

United Nations Development Group (2008) "Thematic Paper on MDG 4, 5 and 6." Retrieved May 8, 2011 from http://www.undg.org/docs/11421/MDG4-6_1954-UNDG-MDG456-LR.pdf.

Wenz, P. S. (2007). Political philosophies in moral conflict. Boston, McGraw-Hill.

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[1] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Cutting food waste to feed the world, Rome, 2011

[2] United Nations Development Group, Thematic Paper on MDG 4, 5 and 6, 2008, p. 12.

[3] Wenz, Political philosophies in moral conflict, Boston, 2007 p. 349.

[4] Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 1968, p. 1243.

[5] Hardin, Commentary: Living on a Lifeboat, 1974, pp. 561-563.

[6] Ibid. pp. 563-564.

[7] Pogge, Politics as usual : what lies behind the pro-poor rhetoric, Cambridge, 2010, p. 5.

[8]Adapted from Arneson, The ethics of assistance : morality and the distant needy, Cambridge, 2004, pp. 33-34 & Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1972, p. 231.

[9] Hardin, Commentary: Living on a Lifeboat, 1974, pp. 562-565.

[10] Ibid., pp. 562-565.

[11] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Is it ODA?, Paris, 2008.

[12] Pogge, World poverty and human rights : cosmopolitan responsibilities and reforms, Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA, 2002, p. 7.

[13] Donnelly, Universal human rights in theory and practice, Ithaca, 2003, pp. 30-31.

[14] Pogge, Politics as usual : what lies behind the pro-poor rhetoric, 2010, pp. 28-29.

[15] Pogge, World poverty and human rights : cosmopolitan responsibilities and reforms, 2002, pp. 112-117.

[16] Brooks, The global justice reader, Malden, MA, 2008, p. 388.

[17] Denton, Casimir and Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Enough rope with Andrew Denton 2, Sydney, 2004, p. 158.

[18] Arneson, The ethics of assistance : morality and the distant needy, 2004, pp. 33-57.

[19] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1.02 billion people hungry, Rome, 2009